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Zusammenfassung 
Steigende Geschwindigkeit und Komplexität von Geschäftsprozessen und –beziehungen 
verändern fundamental die Ansprüche an umfassende und werthaltige finanzielle und 
nicht-finanzielle Informationen über Unternehmen. Relevante Informationen in einem 
Geschäftsbericht müssen daher zunehmend Vorhersagecharakter besitzen, um ihre Da-
seinsberechtigung nicht zu verlieren. Die adäquate Lösung existenter Prinzipal-Agenten-
Konflikte bedarf zugleich einer detaillierten und objektiven Einschätzung der Leistung 
des Agenten, was zusätzlich zur Wertrelevanz ein Mindestmaß an Verlässlichkeit der be-
richteten Informationen bedingt. In diesem Spannungsfeld kommt den Standardsettern 
die Aufgabe zu, Rahmenbedingungen zu schaffen, die es dem Management ermöglichen, 
Spielräume bei der Erstellung der Berichte zu nutzen, um diesen Qualitätsansprüchen an 
Informationen über die aktuelle und zukünftige Lage des Unternehmens gerecht zu wer-
den. Diese bewusst gesetzten Möglichkeiten der Einflussnahme durch das Management 
begreifen jedoch auch signifikante Risiken der opportunistisch motivierten Beeinflussung 
der Adressaten, welche unter der Überschrift Bilanzpolitik subsumiert werden können. 
Die in der empirischen Forschung gängige Klassifizierung unterscheidet zwischen der 
buchmäßigen und realen Bilanzpolitik, wobei letztere im Vergleich eine gezielte Beein-
flussung von Geschäftsvorfällen und nicht deren ex-post Abbildung begreift. 
Kapitel 2 der vorliegenden Dissertation propagiert eine umfassende Auseinandersetzung 
mit der empirischen Messung von Bilanzpolitik. Das Fehlen einer zufriedenstellenden 
Ermittlung des aggregierten Ausmaßes von Bilanzpolitik erfordert hierbei die Anwen-
dung verschiedener Regressionsmodelle. Im speziellen Kontext der empirischen Analyse 
von Bilanzpolitik im Bankensektor besteht diesbezüglich eine ausgeprägte Heterogenität 
der verwendeten Modelle. Zugleich existiert nach wie vor keine systematische Analyse 
der Ansätze und Modellierungsarten von Loan Loss Provisions, welche als elementares 
Vehikel der diskretionären Einflussnahme im Fokus der einschlägigen Studien steht. Da-
her untersucht der Verfasser in Kapitel 2.1 prävalente Modellierungsansätze, erstellt ei-
nen Baukasten verschiedener Regressionsparameter und testet eine Vielzahl an Varianten 
im Hinblick auf die Validität der ermittelten bilanzpolitischen Größen. Eine derartige 
Analyse ist von elementarer Wichtigkeit für die Validität der Ergebnisse und der gezoge-
nen Schlüsse aus empirischen Studien im Bankensektor und liefert daher einen wichtigen 
Beitrag zur Entwicklung und Einordnung vergangener und zukünftiger Analysen. Die 
Ergebnisse der zur Anwendung gebrachten Analysen und Tests zeigen, dass eine Vielzahl 
der existierenden Modelle eine ausreichende Passgenauigkeit aufweist. Jedoch sind ge-
wisse Regressoren weniger wichtig als zunächst angenommen. So können die Regresso-
ren der Non-Performing Loans die Modellierung stark verbessern, während Loan Loss 
Reserves und Net Charge-Offs nur einen kleinen Beitrag leisten können. Im weiteren Ver-
lauf lässt sich zudem eine ausgeprägte Nichtlinearität einzelner Regressoren aufzeigen, 
sowie dass ein Wechsel auf ein Modell mit Berücksichtigung von Endogenität nicht 
zwangsläufig zu einer verbesserten Modellierung führt. Insgesamt kann die Studie als 
geeigneter Startpunkt für zukünftige Studien zu Bilanzpolitik im Bankensektor fungieren. 
Im anschließenden Kapitel 2.2 werden aus Gründen der Konsistenz Modellierung und 
Ergebnisse der Schätzung von Bilanzpolitik in nicht-finanziellen Industrien für die Stu-
dien in Kapitel 3 und 4 vorgestellt. 
Im Rahmen einer umfassenden Betrachtung der Qualität von Finanzinformationen sollte 
die bereits angesprochene Verlässlichkeit der Rechnungslegung sichergestellt werden 
können. Hierbei spielt neben den Rahmenbedingungen der Rechnungslegung die Qualität 
der Attribute und Prozesse der Abschlussprüfung eine gewichtige Rolle. Im Zuge dessen 
wird die Unabhängigkeit des externen Abschlussprüfers von seinem Mandanten als eines 
der Kernattribute proklamiert, da diese Neutralität verleiht und simultan die Qualität der 
vollzogenen Abschlussprüfungshandlungen erhöht. Ein unabhängiger Wirtschaftsprüfer 
ist demzufolge besser in der Lage, das Ausmaß an Bilanzpolitik zu verringern, was wie-
derum eine Erhöhung der Qualität der Finanzinformationen nach sich zieht. Kapitel 3 
widmet sich daher der Analyse der Unabhängigkeit von kleinen und mittelgroßen Ab-
schlussprüfern im deutschen Markt für Mandanten von öffentlichem Interesse zwischen 
2007 und 2014. Das Setting der Studie zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dass kleine und mittel-
große Wirtschaftsprüfer traditionell im Verdacht stehen, aufgrund einer eingeschränkten 
Unabhängigkeit von kapitalmarktorientierten Mandanten diesen ein höheres Maß an 
Spielräumen zuzugestehen, c.p., es wird eine geringere Qualität der Prüfung und damit 
größerer Spielraum für Bilanzpolitik vermutet. Das europäische und insbesondere deut-
sche Umfeld qualifiziert sich durch divergente gesetzlich vorgeschriebene Schwellen-
werte der Abhängigkeit des Wirtschaftsprüfers für eine differenzierte Analyse der Nicht-
linearität der Zusammenhänge. Des Weiteren bilden die in Deutschland prävalenten 
Transparenzberichte eine profunde Datenbasis für die Ermittlung von Abhängigkeitsma-
ßen, die im speziellen Marktsegment eine überlegene Messung der Abhängigkeit der be-
trachteten Prüfer ermöglichen. Die vorliegende Arbeit in diesem Kapitel wählt auf Basis 
der prävalenten gesetzlichen Regelungen ein nicht-lineares Forschungsdesign und legt 
nahe, dass kleine und mittelgroße Wirtschaftsprüfers im speziellen Marktsegment der ka-
pitalmarktorientierten Mandanten mit steigender Abhängigkeit eine erhöhte Prüfungs-
qualität liefern, bis sich die Effekte an einer hohen Schwelle der Abhängigkeit umkehren. 
Dieser Wendepunkt spiegelt zugleich formulierte gesetzliche Schwellenwerte wider. 
Kleinen und mittelgroße Abschlussprüfer scheinen trotz steigender Abhängigkeit eine 
höhere Prüfungsanstrengung zu wählen, welche buchmäßige Bilanzpolitik einschränkt 
und damit die Qualität der Finanzinformationen erhöht. Im Fokus steht hierbei vermutlich 
das Bestreben des Festigens und Ausbauens einer Reputation im Marktsegment der kapi-
talmarktorientierten Mandanten. Ab Überschreiten eines kritischen Schwellenwertes 
scheint hingegen die gestiegene Abhängigkeit die Reputationseffekte zu dominieren. Die 
Ergebnisse der Studie legen zudem den Schluss nahe, dass Mandanten bei einer Ein-
schränkung der buchmäßigen Bilanzpolitik geneigt sind mehr reale Bilanzpolitik einzu-
setzen, deren Einschränkung nicht originärer Gegenstand der Prüfung durch den Ab-
schlussprüfer ist. Die geschilderten Ergebnisse erweisen sich als sehr robust gegenüber 
zahlreichen Veränderungen und Tests wie etwa einer de-facto Office Level und Partner 
Level Analyse. Zudem kann gezeigt werden, dass die dominierenden Reputationseffekte 
wohl in der eingeschränkten Wichtigkeit der kapitalmarktorientierten Mandanten für den 
Gesamtumsatz begründet liegen, welche von bisherigen Studien systematisch überschätzt 
wird. 
Kapitel 4 richtet den Fokus auf originär nicht-finanzielle Nachhaltigkeitsstrategien und 
deren Einfluss auf bilanzpolitisches Verhalten. Bisherige Studien betrachten die hetero-
gene Gruppe der Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Unternehmen dabei überwie-
gend in ihrer Gesamtheit. Die vorliegende Analyse in Kapitel 4 versucht demgegenüber 
die untersuchten Unternehmen in prävalente Anreizgruppen zu trennen, um vermutete 
diverse Anreize zur Investition in CSR mit den Anreizen zu Bilanzpolitik in Verbindung 
zu bringen. Hierfür wird ein europäisches Setting mit kapitalmarktorientierten Unterneh-
men der ASSET4 Datenbank zwischen 2005 und 2014 gewählt. Durch eine gezielte Ver-
knüpfung der Anreize zur Investition mit der Entscheidung zur einschlägigen Berichter-
stattung werden Unternehmen mit prävalenten Reputationsanreizen von Unternehmen 
mit Tendenzen zur intrinsischen, philanthropischen Motivation abgegrenzt. Die Ergeb-
nisse lassen vermuten, dass Unternehmen mit Reputationsanreizen bilanzpolitisch kon-
form handeln und buchmäßige durch reale Bilanzpolitik zu ersetzen versuchen. Hierdurch 
lassen sich sowohl Risiken der medialen Bilanzschelte minimieren als auch hohe Ge-
winne als Teil einer Gesamtreputationsstrategie realisieren. Des Weiteren kann gezeigt 
werden, dass diese strategische Positionierung einen Einfluss auf die Wirkungsweise von 
Corporate Governance (CG) hat. Während Maße für gute CG mit einem geringeren Aus-
maß an buchmäßiger Bilanzpolitik einhergehen, wählen Unternehmen mit Reputations-
anreizen kohärent mit ihrer strategischen Tendenz erneut ein höheres Maß an realer Bi-
lanzpolitik. Insgesamt deuten die Ergebnisse der Studie daraufhin, dass gewisse Unter-
nehmen CSR als Reputationsinstrument nutzen und sich nicht konform einer nachhalti-
gen Strategie im Hinblick auf Bilanzpolitik verhalten.
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1 Introduction and summary 
In an Arrow-Debreu world of unrestricted access to perfect and competitive financial 
markets, there is no need for accounting information about the financial situation of a 
firm. Because information is costless, share- and stakeholders are then indifferent in de-
posits and securities (e.g., Holthausen & Watts 2001; Freixas & Rochet 2008). However, 
several reasons exist indicating a rejection of the assumptions for an Arrow-Debreu 
world, hence there is no perfect costless information. Moreover, the distribution of infor-
mation is asymmetric, causing follow-through multi-level agency problems, which are 
the main reasoning for the variety of financial and non-financial accounting standards, 
regulatory and advisory entities and the auditing and rating agency profession. Likewise, 
these agency problems have been at the heart of the accounting literature and raised the 
question of whether and how accounting information can help resolve these problems. 
In their review on the earnings quality (EQ) literature, Dechow et al. (2010) provide an 
important framework for a general thinking about reporting with a focus on all kinds of 
financial information of a representative firm. Defining  as the unobservable perfor-
mance of such a firm1 and (	) as the respective accounting system to map performance 
into observable accounting numbers, the innocent reader regards the following exposi-
tional proposition, presented in the form of an idealized formula, as straightforward: 
	
	
 ≡ () 
When it comes to the quality of financial reporting, the earnings figure as the key ac-
counting information should precisely capture the performance of the firm. 
However, when thinking about the operationalization of this framework, several issues 
become apparent. The aggregation to a single number requires a sharp refinement and 
focus. Financial performance  could be simply defined as the sum of cash flows gener-
ated by the entity in the financial year. However, in a multi-year view of the performance 
of a firm, the financial performance might further subsume expected discounted cash-
                                                          
1 The specific element of performance information required is highly dependent on the type of stakeholder looking for performance 
information, e.g., the specific decision model (e.g., Dechow et al. 2010). 
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flows collocated within the future years of existence plus a possible change in the liqui-
dation value of the firm (Sterling 1970; Ohlson 2000). While reducing the financial per-
formance to one number  might be a conception of the reality that is too simple, Figure 
1 shows results from the survey by Graham et al. (2005) and highlights that CEOs/CFOs 
see accounting earnings as the most important performance number reported to outsiders 
(51 percent of the respondents). Hence, the informational content of a single earnings 
number should have superior informational content compared to simple cash flows. 
Figure 1 – Most important performance measures from survey by Graham et al. (2005) 
 
Figure shows results for 305 survey responses to the question: “Rank the three most important performance measures reported to 
outsiders.” based on a survey of 401 financial executives. Figure shows percentages of respondents assigning #1 ranking to the re-
spective performance. Source of information: Graham et al. (2005), p. 20. 
Consequently, when thinking about the presentation of financial information, (	) plays 
an important role.2 Being a vehicle of communication, the management of the firm has 
incentives to see financial reporting not as the single compliance task towards investors, 
but the opportunity to address and influence investors, employees, suppliers, customers, 
                                                          
2 In their extensive survey, Dichev et al. (2013) also find that CFOs regard accounting standards, in addition to the business model 
of the company, as the most important influencing factor of earnings quality. 
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lenders and the government. For investors, not only reliable judgement about the appro-
priateness of the work of the management, but also the depiction of performance and 
expectations about future opportunities and risks is inevitable. 
International standard setting boards (e.g., FASB for the US-GAAP, IASB for the IFRS) 
have to balance rules and discretion in financial reporting standards to enable presentation 
of a true and fair view of a firm, thereby maximizing information efficiency of the finan-
cial report for multiple stakeholders with a variety of decision models (e.g., Kothari et al. 
2010). Therefore, standard setters need to make trade-offs to enable standards to represent 
all users’ needs in an appropriate way, which clearly leaves all addressees with subopti-
mal representation. On top of that, in the recent 20 years, complexity and multitude of 
business activities of globally active companies has likewise increased the complexity of 
the task to map all business activities from a variety of firms from different industries into 
one financial report that can feature value-enhancing attributes for addressees of the fi-
nancial information. While this complexity has gradually led to an increased volume of 
financial reports (many financial reports account for more than 400 pages, e.g., KPMG 
2014) and hence a possible information overload, the speed of global markets has raised 
the collective demand for more and more timely information, ideally with predictive 
value (CFA Institute 2013). 
In his speech, IASB chair Hoogervorst (2017) talks about the complexity of the task to 
provide sufficient accounting systems: 
“Valuable information gets drowned out by ‘tick the box’ disclosures and vo-
luminous, but poorly organised and presented, financial data. […] The fact is 
that IFRS Standards prescribe very little in the way of formatting the income 
statement. We define revenue, we define profit or loss, but we do not define 
very much in between.” Hoogervorst (2017) 
Ultimately, the variety of firms and information as well as the necessity of timeliness and 
prediction demand for high flexibility in assembling (	), causing potential for intentional 
and unintentional errors and biases of information (e.g., Dechow et al. 2010). To frame 
the quality of accounting information in more detail, Gaynor et al. (2016) identify com-
pleteness (e.g., Botosan 1997; Botosan & Plumlee 2002), confirmatory value (Dechow & 
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Dichev 2002) and predictive value (e.g., Clor-Proell et al. 2014; Müller et al. 2015) as 
well as neutrality and freedom of error as main dimensions of quality. This doctoral thesis 
focuses on the last part of the picture, in particular on the intentional errors caused by 
management’s discretion. 
“I fear that we are witnessing an erosion in the quality of earnings, and there-
fore, the quality of financial reporting. Managing may be giving way to ma-
nipulation. Integrity may be losing out to illusion.” (Levitt 1998) 
Levitt’s famous speech effectively raised awareness for the flexibility in accounting being 
a way for managers to manipulate earnings numbers for their own good. Consequently, it 
has caused major changes in both the accounting and auditing profession to ensure the 
validity of accounting information (e.g., Beatty & Liao 2014; DeFond & Zhang 2014). 
Nevertheless, intentional errors, hereinafter referred to as Earnings Management (EM), is 
a phenomenon that is likely to prevail as long as accounting information seeks to map a 
true and fair view of the firm to eliminate information asymmetries using expectations, 
estimates and subjective opinions by the management, who possess information ad-
vantages. Dichev et al. (2013) find in their recent survey that EM is modestly used by top 
management, e.g., based on their survey 20 % of the firms use 10 % of their earnings 
representing 2 % economy-wide EM. Moreover, accounting research has also highlighted 
the possibility of managers to use real actions to manage earnings in a certain way. In 
their survey, Graham et al. (2005) highlight (see Figure 2) that 80% of the survey partici-
pants would decrease discretionary expenses to manage earnings upwards, while this is 
an alteration of real business actions resulting in higher earnings. However, the account-
ing of the discretionary expense information is not influenced by this type of discretion. 
Subsequently, there have been many studies (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 
2008; Cohen & Zarowin 2010; Gunny 2010) focusing on real activities earnings manage-
ment (REM) in addition to the originally studied accounting based accrual earnings man-
agement (AEM), in particular with respect to a possible trade-off relation between the 
two types of EM (e.g., Zang 2012). 
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Figure 2 – Importance of REM vs. AEM from survey by Graham et al. (2005) 
 
Figure shows results for 298-304 survey responses to the question: “Near the end of the quarter, it looks like your company might 
come in below the desired earnings target. Within what is permitted by GAAP, which of the following choices might your company 
make?” based on a survey of 401 financial executives. Numbers show percentages of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with 
the respective statement. Source of information: Graham et al. (2005), p. 33-35. 
To be able to study the phenomenon of EM in empirical settings throughout this doctoral 
thesis, chapter 2 deals with the comprehension of appropriate proxies to measure both 
kinds of EM. Accounting research has traditionally studied the field of EM separately for 
non-financial and financial industries, since financial institutions have disparate balance 
sheets and diverse incentives to pursue EM compared to non-financial firms. Since EM 
cannot be observed directly, it is important for every research question in any setting to 
find a verifiable proxy for EM. What is important, in the light of the earlier discussion 
about asymmetric information and follow-up agency problems, banks as financial inter-
mediaries function as a vehicle to address information asymmetry between borrowers and 
depositors. They enhance much more efficient (because of high economies of scale) and 
less costly (because of no redundant tasks) monitoring of the borrower compared to the 
vast number households (Diamond 1984).3 Decisively, this upside comes at the cost of a 
potential information asymmetry between depositors and bank managers, which can 
                                                          
3 See Armstrong et al. (2010) for a thorough discussion of how bank financing can help mitigate information asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders. 
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cause incentives for intentional management of accounting numbers on another level. 
While numerous studies on AEM in banks exist, accounting research still lacks a thorough 
understanding of how to measure AEM, e.g., what regressors can add value to the esti-
mation process. The analysis in chapter 2.1 tries to close this gap and analyses existing 
model specifications of discretionary loan loss provisions (LLP) in the banking sector to 
identify common pattern groups and specific patterns used. Thereupon, prevalent test pro-
cedures are applied to an U.S.-dataset from 2005-2015 to examine the extent of measure-
ment errors, extreme performance and omitted-variable biases as well as predictive power 
of the discretionary proxies of each of the models. The results highlight the importance 
of a thorough understanding about the methodological modelling process of EM in the 
banking industry. The currently established models to estimate EM are appropriate yet 
optimizable. In particular, the analysis identifies non-performing asset patterns as the 
most important group, while loan loss allowances and net charge offs can add some value, 
though do not seem to be indispensable. In addition, the results show that non-linearity 
of certain regressors could be an issue, which should be addressed in future research, 
while the analysis identifies some omitted and possibly correlated variables that might 
add value to specifications in identifying non-discretionary LLP. Results also indicate 
that a dynamic model and endogeneity robust estimation approach is not necessarily 
linked to better prediction power. To enhance the coherence of the analysis, chapter 2.2 
depicts commonly applied models of the industry part of the accounting literature on 
AEM and REM and presents the results from first stage regressions of the models applied 
in chapter 3 and chapter 4. 
Chapter 3 sheds the light on another important vehicle of improvement of financial re-
porting quality, e.g., the influence of external audits with different quality. Therefore, the 
study undertakes an in-depth analysis of one important input factor of the auditing process 
and audit quality, which shapes the quality of the financial information provided by the 
company. In particular, DeFond and Zhang (2014) and Gaynor et al. (2016) highlight the 
advantage of high quality audits when the quality of financial information is low, e.g., a 
high quality audit can restrict the amount of EM used by the management. The analysis 
in chapter 3 uses a German sample of clients from small and midsized auditors with 1,052 
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firm-year observations between 2007 and 2014 and studies the influence of client im-
portance, e.g., economic dependence on the client, on the amount of EM used. In partic-
ular, the study consciously concentrates on a market (German small and midsized audi-
tors) where client importance is claimed to be more pronounced than in markets with high 
concentrations of large Big N auditors. What is more, the setting is special with regard to 
existent regulatory thresholds of economic dependence as well as opposing incentives 
and very mixed results, indicating a non-linearity in the relationship that has not been 
studied thoroughly. Consequently, the study raises the question whether firms audited by 
small and midsized audit companies use higher AEM around certain critical client im-
portance thresholds because their audit quality is impaired. Furthermore the analysis 
looks at whether these firms trade-off REM as their use of AEM increases/decreases. Two 
precise client importance proxies are investigated, (1) measured as total sales from the 
client in relation to total sales of the audit firm from all clients and (2) measured as non-
audit sales in relation to total sales from the client. By using (1), client importance can be 
measured much more precisely than in the most part of prior literature. The results indi-
cate for measure (1) that firms with auditor’s client importance below the thresholds gen-
erally use lower amounts of AEM and trade-off from AEM to REM as client importance 
increases. Hence, there is an increase in audit quality, presumably caused by superimpos-
ing reputation and litigation incentives of the auditors in this special market segment. 
However, for firms with auditor’s client importance above 5%, 10% and 15% for one, 
two and three consecutive years, we find that AEM increases and REM decreases again 
as client importance increases, while the intensity of the effects increases with an increas-
ing time-period and magnitude of the threshold. This can be seen as a sign for the domi-
nance of diverse incentives at different levels of dependence. In contrast, we do not find 
significant results for measure (2), indicating the necessity to study non-audit service im-
portance and total sales client importance separately and precisely. The results hold for 
de-facto office and partner level analysis, while a convincing reasoning is provided, 
which opens up a new perspective on small and midsized auditors and their eligibility to 
perform high quality PIE audits. What is more, the analysis tries to cancel out the moder-
ating role of audit committees in changing or causing the results, while providing some 
interesting insights into the effectiveness of supervisory boards and the additional benefit 
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of a best practice audit committee. Furthermore, the various other alterations show the 
robustness of the findings, e.g., using alternative EM proxies, using additional confound-
ing controls as well as various changes in methodology. 
Chapter 4 connects the fields of financial information and non-financial information on 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities in a setting where there is no mandatory 
framework for non-financial reporting, but high incentives to act socially responsible for 
different reasons. The study tries to elaborate diverse incentives to perform well in CSR, 
while one of these might be connected to opportunistic EM behaviour as part of a repu-
tation enhancement strategy. In particular, the analysis in chapter 4 examines whether 
firms that act socially responsible engage in different amounts of EM. Therefore, this 
piece of work tries to disentangle the two main incentives incorporated into CSR invest-
ments and analyses whether these entail diverse EM strategies in terms of AEM, REM, 
total EM and the trade-off relationship between AEM and REM. Furthermore, the effect 
of Corporate Governance (CG) on EM strategies is considered, particularly whether the 
respective CSR incentives moderate this relationship. For this purpose, a European sam-
ple with 2,733 firm-years from the 2005-2014 period is comprehended. The results show 
that EM strategies might vary between intrinsic and reputational CSR incentives. For both 
incentives, the respective firms seem to engage in lower AEM. However, high-reputation 
firms use more total EM and trade off from AEM to REM at the possible expense of 
shareholder value, whereas rather intrinsic firms use less total EM and trade off vice 
versa. Additionally, the results reveal that certain independence in the board limits op-
portunities to pursue AEM, whereas CSR incentives significantly moderate the outcome 
of effective monitoring. While both CSR incentives entail a lower use of AEM with in-
creasing independence, high-reputation firms again switch to higher REM and further 
trade off from AEM to REM. Altogether, the results highlight that firms with a high CSR 
orientation engage in different EM strategies, depending on their CSR incentives and 
thereby presumably preserve or jeopardize shareholder value.  
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2 Earnings management modelling in accounting re-
search 
To be able to study the field of EM properly, research studies have to identify appropriate 
EM proxies. While cash flows are regarded as a noisy proxy for performance, accruals 
function as an instrument to produce a decision-useful proxy for financial performance, 
hence accounting earnings (e.g., Dechow 1994; Dechow & Dichev 2002). As discussed 
in chapter 1, the accounting system provides a way of reporting an earnings number cap-
turing a true and fair view of the financial situation of the firm, while discretion is pro-
vided to each of the firms to meet this requirement. When measuring EM, most studies 
rely on the total amount of accruals as an initial measurement of the total adjustment of 
the cash-flow numbers. When it comes to modelling the accrual part that is likely to be 
affected by management discretion, there are several studies that discuss the statistical 
issues in empirical accrual modelling (e.g., Dechow et al. 1995; McNichols & Wilson 
1988; McNichols 2000). They partition the total amount of accruals into a non-discre-
tionary () part caused by normal developments within the firm, and a discretionary 
() component, which is assumed to be related to EM behaviour: 
Equation	1	
 !" = _
%!" + _
%!" 
Ideally, the applied models would capture the true amount of normal variation 
(_
%!") of the total accruals to comprehend the remaining part as the true discretion-
ary variation (_
%!"). Since both parts cannot be observed, research uses a simple 
linear panel regression framework with  individuals and ' regressors to comprehend a 
proxy !": 
Equation	2	
 !" = )* + +	,-.!" + %!" 
 !" is the total accruals of firm i in year t, ,-.!" is a  × ' matrix of certain variables 
that are assumed to cause variation, which is connected to non-discretionary business 
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decisions and developments. !" is calculated as the residual %!" of Equation	2, with a 
certain measurement error 0!": 
Equation	3	
!" = _
%!" + 0!" 
The properties of 0!"	 determine whether !" is a good or a noisy measure. These prop-
erties are dependent on the accuracy of our non-discretionary regressors in estimating the 
non-discretionary variation, e.g., _
%!": 
Equation	4	
0!" = !" − _
%!" 
Consequently, research studies use the following simple linear regression: 
Equation	5	
!" = )* + 56789!" + +	.!" + :!" 
789!" is a dichotomous or continuous variable of interest that is hypothesized to exert 
significant influence on discretionary accruals, e.g., EM. .!" is another  × ' matrix that 
captures a set of control variables that influences the variation in the discretionary de-
pendent variable, while :!" is an error term capturing the individual heterogeneity of the 
firm i in year t. 
If the coefficient for the variable of interest (56) has the hypothesised sign and is statisti-
cally significant at the conventional (0.01, 0.05, 0.1) levels, researchers consider their 
results to support their hypotheses. In this situation, the significance of coefficient 56 can 
be biased when the variable of interest is correlated with the error 0!". In particular, this 
will be the case when _
%!" is correlated with 789!" but !" does not capture 
_
%!" properly, e.g., 0!" is not just white noise. 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the special setting of banks in chapter 2.1 and 
presents an extensive analysis of the applied models to reveal information about the va-
lidity of bank accounting studies when it comes to measuring EM. In particular, the stud-
ies tries to shed light on the accuracy of fit of the specifications used in disentangling 
_
%!" and therefore limiting 0!" to white noise. In chapter 2.2, results of modelling 
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analyses in the non-financial part of the accounting literature are briefly discussed, where-
inafter modelling approach and results of first-stage regressions for the empirical analyses 
in chapters 3 & 4 are presented. 
2.1 Earnings management modelling in the banking industry4 
2.1.1 Introduction 
Earnings management (EM) is a frequently discussed topic in both accounting and bank-
ing literature. This fact is not surprising, since EM is a very debatable, sometimes even 
obstructive issue when it comes to discussing earnings quality and the need for relevant 
and reliable information disclosure in its entirety (e.g., Ball & Shivakumar 2005). 
“Higher quality earnings provide more information about the features of a 
firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific decision made by 
a specific decision-maker.” (Dechow et al. 2010) 
In this mind-set, research settings typically capture an opportunistic use of EM to manip-
ulate the perception of the state of a company in favour of the management and/or com-
pany itself. Over the last three decades, various studies in the accounting and banking 
field have proposed models, which are able to estimate the non-discretionary variation of 
total or parts of total accruals. Based on these models, they isolate the discretionary part 
of the total accruals, which can be seen as a potential proxy for accounting-based EM. 
However, since a direct measurement is not possible,5 these modelling attempts have con-
siderably changed over time, with the goal to improve preciseness and credibility.6 
Altogether, EM models in the accounting literature are characterized by two main prop-
erties. First, they approach the measurement from various directions, all of which are 
justifiable and appropriately reasoned. Second, a clear path of improvement is discernible, 
as the motivation for new models is connected with the flaws of the previous ones. Both 
                                                          
4 This chapter is based on a 2017 version of a working paper titled “Earnings management modelling in the banking industry – eval-
uating valuable approaches”, which is co-authored by Markus Stralla. The reasoning, results, and interpretations of this might 
change after the submission of this thesis and the completion of the doctoral degree. The most recent version of this study is availa-
ble upon request. Please do not cite this working paper without permission. 
5 Although a direct measurement is not possible, there are surveys investigating the existence and motivation behind EM, e.g. Gra-
ham et al. (2005). In spite of that, general possibility to pursue EM likely is likely to cause a certain utilization. 
6 See chapter 2.2 and/or Dechow et al. (2010) for a general overview on the modelling of discretionary accruals in the other indus-
tries. 
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characteristics can be transferred to the EM modelling approach in the banking literature. 
Beatty and Liao (2014) compare various EM models and study these two properties in 
their comprehensive literature review. They discuss the first main difference of EM meas-
urement in the banking industry, which is the focus on a single accrual, e.g., loan loss 
provisions (LLP). The authors provide three potential explanations for this focus. First, 
LLP is by far the most important accrual, amounting to 56% of total accruals and 34% of 
total accrual variance. Second, the focus on LLP could be related to the urge of minimiz-
ing measurement error. When total accruals are considered, mapping non-discretionary 
variation might be more prone to measurement issues. Third, data availability may also 
play a role, since major databanks gradually developed and provided all variables for 
more complex approaches. The aforementioned reasons are plausible, which is why we 
focus on LLP models in our extensive analysis of previous studies published in highly 
ranked accounting and banking journals. The second main difference between EM in ac-
counting and banking is the missing comprehensive discussion and examination of the 
applied models. Beatty and Liao (2014) state that there is no “consensus in banking stud-
ies on how to best model discretionary accruals.” What is important, existing models vary 
considerably in complexity and choice of pattern groups. In addition, in contrast to the 
accounting literature for the non-financial industries (e.g., Dechow et al. 1995; Young 
1999; Peasnell et al. 2000), there are no studies on the modelling approach for banks, 
which is why we try to provide important insights to fill this gap. 
Our results indicate that non-performing loan patterns are the most important pattern 
group when it comes to separating LLP into discretionary and non-discretionary parts, 
while loan loss reserve and/or net charge-off patterns can enhance the modelling, though 
are less important. Consequently, EM proxies derived from models that are more complex 
predict potential EM more accurately, while for settings of data limitation, sufficient mod-
els can be found. Furthermore, we find that the relationship between LLP and a common 
set of control variables might be non-linear in contrast to common assumptions of linear-
ity, while we identify growth, loan intensity, income diversification and operating cash-
flow patterns as possible omitted correlated variables that could improve the quality of 
discretionary LLP. At last, we find that dynamic modelling seems to improve explanatory 
power, while they might explain some discretionary part of total LLP, which can lead to 
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biased inferences and lower prediction power. We also show that endogeneity robust es-
timation cannot solve this problem. 
Altogether, we contribute to the current literature in two major ways. First, we provide 
an overview of the differences between various EM estimation procedures and analyse 
the respective regression pattern groups. Furthermore, we extent our research on models 
for situations of data availability issues, which are especially relevant for research settings 
that investigate non-commercial banks. Second, we apply several test procedures from 
banking and accounting literature to investigate measurement errors, omitted variable bi-
ases and prediction power of the applied EM models. Based on our results, future research 
should be able to identify an appropriate specification and further improve the modelling 
of EM to enhance the validity of inferences drawn from regressions. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.1.2 presents a brief over-
view of EM modelling in the banking literature and provides an extensive analysis of the 
specifications used in prior literature, whereupon we set up various models for our test 
procedures. Section 2.1.3 contains the research design, including data, sample selection 
and empirical test procedures to test the validity of the models. Section 2.1.4 presents the 
results from first-stage regressions and the uni- and multivariate findings of the empirical 
test procedures. Section 2.1.5 presents a summary and conclusion. 
2.1.2 Earnings management in banks and modelling discretionary LLP 
2.1.2.1 Earnings management in banks 
Major parts of the earnings and financial reporting quality literature focus on evaluating 
the degree of EM in non-financial firm samples.7 Consecutively, EM in banks has evolved 
as a somewhat distinct field of research, particularly because possibilities and incentives 
to pursue EM differ significantly and therefore determine customized methods of meas-
urement. 
Beatty and Liao (2014) provide an extensive theoretical and empirical overview of bank-
ing research in accounting. Among various related questions, they elaborate and discuss 
                                                          
7 Dechow et al. (2010) give an extensive literature overview for the quality of earnings research. When discussing EM, they also 
focus on the measures that are used in studies that cover non-financial industry questions. 
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why banks use discretion in their financial reporting to foster certain opportunistic goals, 
namely capital management (e.g., Wahlen 1994; Collins et al. 1995; Beatty et al. 1995; 
Kim & Kross 1998) and smoothing of earnings (e.g., Ahmed et al. 1999; Anandarajan et 
al. 2007; Beatty & Liao 2009; Bouvatier et al. 2014). Bushman (2014) complements 
Beatty and Liao (2014) and highlights the risk-taking aspect of opportunistic reporting 
behaviour. Acharya and Ryan (2016) extensively discuss selected papers and provide 
suggestions for regulation to enhance the stability of the financial system. 
These studies highlight the decisiveness of discretionary accounting choices in banks and 
hence the importance of research in this field. Essentially, for adequate inferences to be 
drawn, underlying methodological approaches have to be adequate. Beatty and Liao 
(2014) give an idea of how many different measures exist, while actively stating the im-
portance of a thorough analysis of the applied models and the modelling approach itself. 
Although applying significantly different models, most studies use some sort of discre-
tionary accruals, which is equivalent to the non-financial part of the accounting literature. 
Models vary over time in the analysed dependent variables. For example, some studies 
use discretionary loan loss reserves (e.g., Hasan & Wall 2004; Jin et al. 2016) or realized 
gains and losses (e.g., Beatty et al. 1995; Collins et al. 1995; Beatty & Harris 1998; Beatty 
et al. 2002). Yet, most papers regard LLP as the most important vehicle for EM in banks 
(e.g., Bushman 2014; Lobo 2017). LLP account for 56% of the total accruals (e.g., Beatty 
& Liao 2014) as well as 15-20% of earnings before taxes and loan loss provisioning 
(; <) (e.g., Lobo 2017). In particular, a bank using higher LLP can intentionally build 
up loan loss reserves in years of high performance for means of improving earnings num-
bers when ; < is low (e.g., Sutton 1997; Levitt 1998). Alternatively, models could 
follow a total accrual approach, equivalent to the industry models. However, several stud-
ies (e.g., Dechow et al. 1995; Peasnell et al. 2000; McNichols 2002; Dechow et al. 2010) 
already show that total accrual designs are associated with potentially high degrees of 
measurement error in non-financial settings, particularly due to omitted correlated varia-
bles and the complexity of identifying appropriate normal accrual regressors. What is 
even more important, for financial entities, the remaining 44% of the total accruals are 
unlikely to be subject to discretion since standard setting for banks has consequently lim-
ited accounting flexibilities (e.g., Beatty & Liao 2014). Hence, total accrual approaches 
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would be likely to produce additional measurement error rather than feasible discretion-
ary accruals. 
Furthermore, the degree of discretion in the provisioning for loan losses has likewise been 
shaped by significant changes in accounting standards for credit losses. While the respec-
tive rules in the 1990s relied heavily on future-oriented fundamentals, e.g., non-perform-
ing loans, to evaluate their loan loss reserves (e.g., Ludwig 2009; Beck & Narayanamoor-
thy 2013; Beatty & Liao 2014), the SEC and FASB issued the Staff Accounting Bulletin 
(SAB) 102 and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) Policy 
Statement (e.g., FFIEC 2001; SEC 2001) for fiscal years after 2001. These emphasized a 
market-to-market based evaluation in the form of the incurred loss model, e.g., focus on 
already occurred loss events for means of loan loss provisioning, resulting in less room 
for discretion. Subsequently, there has been a constant field of tension between the deci-
sion usefulness of accounting standards and the regulatory prevention of bank failures, 
particularly due to the pro-cyclicality of provisioning for loans and leases under the in-
curred loss model (e.g., Financial Stability Forum 2009; Bushman & Williams 2012). As 
a result, there have been changes in LLP accounting standards once again, e.g., the intro-
duction of the expected loss model in IFRS 9 and the current expected credit loss model 
in ASC 326. They leave banks again with more discretion in terms of the inclusion of 
future estimates (e.g., Bushman & Williams 2015; Lobo 2017; PwC 2017) for fiscal years 
2018 (IFRS 9) and 2020 (ASC 326).8 Altogether, LLP are likely to remain the most im-
portant discretionary accrual for banks, which is why we concentrate on the discretionary 
LLP models throughout our analysis. 
2.1.2.2 Specification analysis 
We focus on a sample of studies from the accounting and finance literature between 1990 
and 2017. We incorporate all regression-based analyses published in journals with an h5-
index above 50 or an SRJ above 0.500.9 We identify 39 papers using discretionary LLP 
                                                          
8 While, neither framework requires a specific methodology, IFRS 9 and ASC 326 require “the estimate of expected credit losses 
[…] [to] consider historical information (past events), information about current conditions, and reasonable and supportable fore-
casts of future events and economic conditions, as well as estimates of prepayments.” (PwC 2017, p. 6) In addition, US-GAAP does 
not require multiple forward-looking scenarios as long as the scenario is carefully selected and represents the expected credit loss. 
Altogether, US-GAAP and IFRS guidelines seem to provide room for estimates about the future and therefore discretion. 
9 The analysed papers use one- and two-step approaches, where one-step means inclusion of variables of interest in the first-stage 
regressions together with the non-discretionary LLP regressors, while two-step means separate, second-stage analyses of variables 
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as their EM or EQ measure and capture time-period analysed, setting, one vs. two-step 
modelling and specifications.10 We identify eight pattern groups in the literature.11 A brief 
look at panel A of Table 1 shows the frequencies of use for all pattern groups as well as 
the specific patterns from each group. Most papers (76.9 percent) use both total loan and 
non-performing loan patterns to estimate non-discretionary LLP, whereas 48.7 percent 
respectively 43.6 percent of the studies use loan loss reserves respectively net loan 
charge-offs. In addition, a further set of controls is included by 59.0 percent of the studies 
for capital requirement ratios and earnings before provisioning, while 35.9 percent use a 
variable for the overall size of the bank.12 We separately study the total loan and non-
performing loan pattern groups in panel B & C of Table 1, since most studies use more 
than one regressor to capture these pattern groups. Again, we find a variety of patterns 
for both groups, highlighting the importance of a structured and thorough analysis. For 
non-performing loans, most studies use a combination of <=!">6 and ∆<=!" (33.3 per-
cent), while for the total loans group, ∆ =!" is the predominantly used (36.7 percent) pat-
tern. 
In the following, we comment on every pattern group and present respective reasoning 
for the choice of regressors. We further discuss the model specification parts and gradu-
ally develop a specification for our further analysis. 
Total loans 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2010a) elaborate that a higher level of loans results in a higher 
level of provisions (e.g., also Kim & Kross 1998). Therefore, they expect a positive 
relation. However, Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) argue that this relationship would 
only be true in a world of prudent and forward-looking banks, which is not in line 
with a reality where banks exaggerate expectations to minimize provisioning. To our 
                                                          
of interest with discretionary LLP as a dependent variable. We focus on a two-step approach to enable our empirical test procedures 
and further comment on this design choice whenever applicable. 
10 See Appendix B for the list of specifications.  
11 We do not report frequencies for lagged LLP as a possible pattern group, since we regard the decision to include these variables as 
a methodological one (static vs. dynamic modelling) and not a choice of patterns. Bouvatier et al. (2014) use ==<!">6 and Fonseca 
and Gonzalez (2008) additionally use ==<!">@ to implement a dynamic approach. We further discuss static vs. dynamic modelling in 
section 2.1.2.4. 
12 We find 23 papers with a one-step approach, while 16 papers comprehend discretionary LLP as the residual from a first stage 
model and test their variables of interest in a separate second stage. In addition, there is no change over time in the preference of 
one- or two-step approaches. We note that not all papers seek to draw inferences about EM behaviour, e.g., Liu and Ryan (1995) 
study the influence of bank loan-portfolio composition on loan loss provisioning. Rather, all papers seek to explain the variation of 
non-discretionary LLP. 
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understanding, the expected sign is unpredictable due to uncertainty about the incre-
mental quality of the loan portfolio. What is more, changes in total loans can be seen 
as changing assessment of future default risk (e.g., Lobo & Yang 2001; Bikker & 
Metzemakers 2005), hence an increase would go hand in hand with an increase in 
provisioning (expected sign positive).13 While 36.7 percent of all papers with a total 
loans pattern choose to include only ∆ =!", only 13.3 percent apply  =!" and ∆ =!" 
(see panel C of Table 1). However, we choose to follow the latter approach, since we 
expect changes in assessment of future credit risk and level of actual credit risk to 
have distinct influences on non-discretionary LLP.14 
Non-performing assets/loans15 
Loans, whose payments are due for more than 90 days, are categorised as non-per-
forming. Most studies include non-performing assets, since a higher level of non-per-
forming assets signals difficulties with the loan portfolio (e.g., Wahlen 1994; Kana-
garetnam et al. 2010a; Hamadi et al. 2016). These might force banks to act, resulting 
in higher provisions. This argumentation holds true for the change in non-performing 
assets. Increases reflect actual changes in default rate, e.g., improving or deteriorating 
loan portfolio quality (e.g., Beatty et al. 1995; Kim & Kross 1998; DeBoskey & Jiang 
2012). Prior studies use patterns for level and change in non-performing assets with 
different lags. Based on our further analysis of the pattern group in panel B of Table 
1, we add the pattern with the highest frequency of use, <!">6 and ∆<!" (33.3 
percent of all NPA papers and 25.6 of all papers), to our specification pattern list.16 
The expected signs for the two coefficients are positive. 
  
                                                          
13 Some studies note that the effect of changes in loans could also be ambiguous if changes in total loans are not caused by changes 
in credit default risk. Then, the effect of changes in loans might be ambiguous, just like the effect of total loans, because of uncer-
tainty about the quality of the loan portfolio (e.g., Kanagaretnam et al. 2004; Hamadi et al. 2016). 
14 Kim and Kross (1998) also formulate ==<!" = ( =!",  =!">6, <!", <!">6, B8!"), while including change and level of total 
loans implicitly maps lagged total loans. 
15 Throughout our study, the two terms non-performing loans and non-performing assets are used interchangeably. The same holds 
for the two terms loan loss allowances and loan loss reserves. 
16 Since <!">6 + ∆<!" = <!", this pattern simultaneously captures the influence of current non-performing loans, which is 
the pattern with second highest frequency of use. 
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Set of further controls (capital adequacy ratio, earnings before provisioning and bank 
size) 
Papers using one- and two-step approaches apply a multitude of confounding control 
variables to cancel out omitted variable biases. One component is the inclusion of 
important capital ratios to control for banks’ incentives to manage their capital ade-
quacy (e.g., Beatty et al. 1995; Ahmed et al. 1999; Bouvatier et al. 2014). Further-
more, prior research controls or tests for the earnings smoothing incentives of banks.  
Table 1 – Specification pattern distribution 
Specification pattern distribution 
Panel A: All regressors     
Pattern group Pattern  
Number of pattern 
papers
(percentage of 
pattern group 
papers) 
Number of pattern 
group papers
(percentage 
of papers) 
Total loans 
∆ =!"	  21 (70.0%) 
30 (76.9%) 
 =!"	  12 (40.0%) 
 =_B C89D!"	  9 (30.0%) 
∆ =!"E6	  1 (3.3%) 
 =!">6	  1 (3.3%) 
Non-performing 
assets/loans 
∆<!"	  22 (73.3%) 
30 (76.9%) 
<!">6	  13 (43.3%) 
<!" 
 9 (30.0%) 
∆<!"E6 
 6 (20.0%) 
∆<!">6	  3 (10.0%) 
∆<!">@	  2 (6.7%) 
<!">@	  2 (6.7%) 
∆<!">F	  1 (3.3%) 
Capital require-
ment ratio 
B<;!"	  16 (94.1%) 
23 (59.0%) 
B<;!">6	  7 (5.9%) 
Earnings before 
provisioning 
; <!"	  23 (100.0%) 
23 (59.0%) ∆; <!"	  1 (4.3%) 
∆; <!"E6	  1 (4.3%) 
Loan loss allow-
ances/reserves 
=G!">6	  13 (68.4%) 
19 (48.7%) 
=G!"	  6 (31.6%) 
Net loan charge-
offs 
B8!"	  16 (94.1%) 
17 (43.6%) 
∆B8!"	  1 (5.9%) 
Bank size 
D9H!" 
 12 (85.7%) 
14 (35.9%) D9H!">6  2 (14.3%) 
∆D9H!" 
 1 (7.1%) 
Macroeconomic variables (∆C<I", ∆JK<I", ∆=<
LI", BD I", ∆;M9I",	∆DI") 13 (33.3%) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Specification pattern distribution 
Panel B: Non-performing asset/loan 
regressors 
  
   
Pattern  Number of ,N- papers (percentage of ,N- papers) 
<!">6	∆<!" 10 (33.3%) 
<!" 5 (16.7%) 
∆<!" 4 (13.3%) 
<!"	∆<!" 3 (10.0%) 
<!">@	<!">6	∆<!"	∆<!"E6 2 (6.7%) 
<!"	∆<!"	 1 (3.3%) 
∆<!">@	∆<!">6	∆<!"	∆<!"E6 1 (3.3%) 
∆<!"	∆<!"E6 1 (3.3%) 
<!">6	∆<!">6 1 (3.3%) 
∆<!">F	∆<!">@	∆<!">6	∆<!" 1 (3.3%) 
∆<!"E6 1 (3.3%) 
Panel C: Total loan regressors      
Pattern  Number of OP papers (percentage of OP papers) 
∆ =!" 11 (36.7%) 
 =!" 4 (13.3%) 
 =!"	∆ =!"	 =_B C89D!" 4 (13.3%) 
 =!"	∆ =!" 4 (13.3%) 
 =_B C89D!" 4 (13.3%) 
∆ =!"	 =_B C89D!" 1 (3.3%) 
 =!">6	∆ =!" 1 (3.3%) 
∆ =!"E6 1 (3.3%) 
Pattern distributions are based on the loan loss provision specifications of the papers stated in Appendix B. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
For the industry models, Kothari et al. (2005) highlight that without appropriate con-
trol for performance, the resulting EM proxies are biased, e.g., performance of the 
firm significantly influences the magnitude of the non-discretionary accruals and 
therefore exclusion leads to a bias of the discretionary accruals. Since most banking 
models focus on LLP single accrual approaches, they apply performance before pro-
visioning (e.g., Ahmed et al. 1999; Anandarajan et al. 2007; Leventis et al. 2011; 
Bushman & Williams 2015).17 Panel A in Table 1 highlights that 59 percent of the 
analysed papers control for capital requirement ratios and earnings before provision-
ing, while the overwhelming majority use current year proxies.18 We follow this ap-
proach and add ; <!" and B<;!" to our specification pattern list. As a third major 
control, 35.9 percent of the papers control for bank specific size (e.g., Agarwal et al. 
                                                          
17 Kothari et al. (2005) distinguish between the inclusion of a performance control and actual matching. We assume actual matching 
to over-correct for performance, especially for discretionary LLP, since they are recurrent and systematic. E.g., a bank has positive 
discretionary LLP due to high EM and the matched bank has comparably high positive discretionary LLP, not due to bad fitting of 
the model, but because both banks pursue EM, e.g., have comparable earnings smoothing or capital management incentives. Perfor-
mance matching would correct for actual EM and hence distort the results on the null hypothesis of no EM in a way that it accepts 
the null. We therefore only use ; < as an additional regressor. 
18 We note that capital adequacy ratios are applied in a wide variety, e.g., tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, tier 1 capital to total 
assets, tier 1 and tier 2 capital ratios, etc. We test for the validity of our results when changing the capital adequacy proxy used. 
However, our results are not dependent on this design choice. 
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2007; Beatty & Liao 2011; Beck & Narajanamoorthy 2013). Again, we decide upon 
the pattern option with the highest frequency of use (85.7 percent of the papers with 
a size pattern), e.g., D9H!". 
Loan loss allowances/reserves 
Allowances for loan losses capture past decisions about loan loss provisioning. The 
effect on current LLP and therefore its sign depends on the relation between past pro-
visioning, the actual demand for provisioning and loan loss recognition (e.g., Beatty 
et al. 1995; Kanagaretnam et al. 2010a; DeBoskey & Jiang 2012). If larger past pro-
visioning, summarized by loan loss reserves, is associated with increases in loss 
recognition, especially in times of distrust and high uncertainty, larger reserves should 
be associated with larger current loan loss provisions, hence we expect a positive sign 
(e.g., Wahlen 1994; Ahmed et al. 1999; DeBoskey & Jiang 2012). However, for con-
stant loss recognition, we expect contrasting over-/underprovisioning effects on cur-
rent-year non-discretionary LLP, indicated by a negative sign. We find that 68.4 per-
cent of the studies with a loan loss allowance pattern use lagged allowances as a re-
gressor, which is we add =G!">6 to our specification list.
19 
Net loan charge-offs 
Beaver and Engel (1996) see current loan net charge-offs as a source of information 
about future charge-offs (e.g., Cheng et al. 2011). In comparison to non-performing 
loans, net charge-offs are a less noisy indicator of future losses (e.g., Beck & Nara-
yanamoorty 2013). When net charge-offs are high, current loan quality is rather low 
and therefore higher provisioning is expected (e.g., Kanagaretnam 2010a). Interest-
ingly, only 43.6 percent of the papers use this pattern group in their EM models. How-
ever, since this variable should be a significant driver of the variation in non-discre-
tionary LLP, we add current year net charge-offs, which is the pattern with the highest 
frequency of use (94.1 percent of the papers using a net charge-off pattern) to our 
specification list, expecting a positive coefficient. 
                                                          
19 We note that small differences in the specifications, e.g., including =G!">6 (13 times used) or =G!" (6 times used), might also 
be due to sample specific considerations of autocorrelation. 
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Macroeconomic variables 
Ahmed et al. (1999) point out that macroeconomic factors might have an effect on 
non-discretionary LLP. The loan repayment behaviour of companies and private 
households should be somewhat influenced by the overall economic state of the re-
spective country. In particular, increases in unemployment rates or decreases in GDP 
may point to a deterioration of the economic situation. In these cases, a decrease in 
loan quality is highly likely, imposing higher demand for LLP (e.g., Bikker & Met-
zemakers 2005; Bushman & Williams 2012; Beck & Narayanamoorty 2013). How-
ever, Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) propose that inclusion of changes in non-performing 
loans and net charge-offs will control for macroeconomic effects. What is more, some 
papers (e.g., Laeven & Majnoni 2003; Kanagaretnam et al. 2014) use year and/or 
country fixed effects, which work similarly. We regard continuous macroeconomic 
controls to be more precise and add ∆C<I" and ∆JK<I" to our specification list. 
2.1.2.3 Static LLP models 
Based on our specification analysis and discussion, we use the different patterns from the 
identified patter groups to construct the following first-stage regression framework: 
Equation	6	
==<!"  !">6⁄ = )* + 56<!">6  !">6⁄ + 5@ ∆<!"  !">6⁄ + 5F =G!">6  !">6⁄
+ 5S  =!"  !">6⁄ + 5T ∆ =!"  !">6⁄ + 5UB8!"  !">6⁄
+ 5V ∆C<I" C<I">6⁄
+ 5W ∆JK<I" JK<I">6⁄ 	X+5YD9H!" + 56* ; <!"  !">6⁄
+ 566B<;!"Z	[+56@<!">@  !">6⁄ + 56F ∆<!"E6  !">6⁄ \ + :!" 
where, LLP is loan loss provisions, < is non-performing assets, =G is loan loss al-
lowances, B8 is net loan charge-offs,  = is total loans and   is total assets for bank i 
in year t. C< / JK< is gross domestic product / unemployment rate for country j 
(the respective firm i is located in) in year t.	D9H is defined as the natural logarithm of 
total assets, ; < is earnings before taxes and provisioning scaled by total assets and 
B<; is a capital adequacy ratio, calculated as tier 1 capital to lagged total assets. 
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Consequently, we set up four static models using particular parts of the regression frame-
work. Model S1 uses all regressors that are not recorded in brackets (56 − 5W). We include 
the set of further controls for size, pre-provisioning performance and capital ratio in S2 
by adding the regressors in curly brackets (5Y − 566) to the specification. In comparison, 
S3 includes the additional set of non-performing loans in square brackets, while excluding 
the set of further controls in curly brackets (include 56@ − 56F, exclude 5Y − 566). At last, 
model S4 uses all regressors in Equation 6. 
2.1.2.4 Dynamic LLP models 
Models S1-S4 are static regressions. In contrast, some authors (e.g. Laeven & Majnoni 
2003; Fonseca & Gonzalez 2008; Bouvatier et al. 2014)20 introduce dynamic EM models 
by including the lagged dependant variable (lagged LLP) as an independent variable. This 
change in the modelling of discretionary LLP assumes autoregressive effects of the first 
order to have a significant influence on the variation of normal LLP, which have not 
already been captured by the remaining non-discretionary regressors included in the static 
LLP models. E.g., Laeven and Majnoni (2003) mention the adjustments in loan loss pro-
visioning when banks approach equilibrium reserve levels. 
To investigate the differences in fit between static and dynamic approaches, we define 
model D1-D4 as dynamic versions of models S1-S4. Therefore, we add 56S to each of the 
specifications of S1-S4: 
Equation	7	
==<!"  !">6⁄ = )* + 56<!">6  !">6⁄ + 5@ ∆<!"  !">6⁄ + 5F =G!">6  !">6⁄
+ 5S  =!"  !">6⁄ + 5T ∆ =!"  !">6⁄ + 5UB8!"  !">6⁄
+ 5V ∆C<I" C<I">6⁄
+ 5W ∆JK<I" JK<I">6⁄ 	X+5YD9H!" + 56* ; <!"  !">6⁄
+ 566B<;!"Z	[+56@<!">@  !">6⁄ + 56F ∆<!"E6  !">6⁄ \ 	
+ 56S ==<!">6  !">6⁄ + :!" 
                                                          
20 Laeven and Majnoni (2003) include a dynamic version (using lag-1 and lag-2 LLP) of their model as an alternative specification. 
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2.1.2.5 Basic models 
Models S1-S4 and D1-D4 represent the state of the art with regard to the estimation of 
discretionary LLP. Therefore, these specifications should be able to disentangle discre-
tionary LLP from their non-discretionary part to a degree where the resulting proxies are 
viable for EM propositions. Hence using these models should enable researchers to draw 
conclusive inferences with significantly low probabilities of type I errors when empirical 
designs apply sufficient controls. 
However, some studies within special settings deliberately leave out non-performing 
loans (e.g., Cavallo & Majnoni 2002; Bikker & Metzemakers 2005 and Bouvatier et al. 
2014, who report data availability as a reason)21, net loan charge-offs (e.g., Beatty & Liao 
2011; DeBoskey & Jiang 2012; Cohen et al. 2014) and loan loss allowances (e.g., Cheng 
et al. 2011; Bushman & Williams 2012; Bouvatier et al. 2014) as regressors, while nu-
merous studies do so uncommented.22 To investigate the validity of simplified ap-
proaches, we set up basic models. Based on our specification analysis as well as our own 
data availability, we identify three variables, which are predominantly accountable for 
the reduction of data sets, namely non-performing loans/assets, allowance for loan losses 
and net charge-offs. The models are characterised as follows: 
Equation	8	
==<!"  !">6⁄ = )*X+56<!">6  !">6⁄
+ 5@ ∆<!"  !">6⁄ Z[+5F =G!">6  !">6⁄ \ + 5S  =!"  !">6⁄
+ 5T ∆ =!"  !">6⁄ (+5UB8!"  !">6⁄ ) + 5V ∆C<I" C<I">6⁄
+ 5W ∆JK<I" JK<I">6⁄ 	+ :!" 
For model B1, we exclude all brackets (56>F and 5U) and obtain a model, which is only 
dependent on the development of two factors: the total loan patterns and macroeconomic 
effects. For model B2-B4, we include either <, =G or B8, while for model B5-B7 
we include combinations of two out of the three terms. We estimate these basic models 
to gain insights concerning two interrelated questions. First, which of these basic pattern 
                                                          
21 Data availability is particularly important for researchers, who focus on bank types other than commercial banks and/or smaller 
(non-US) samples, due to less pronounced regulations and/or disclosure requirements. 
22 Some studies use the excluded specification parts in untabulated robustness tests (e.g., Bushman & Williams 2012). 
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groups are important when it comes to splitting discretionary and non-discretionary LLP? 
Second, does an exclusion of seemingly important variables cause biases and/or lead to 
substantially varying results on the second stage, especially when it comes to the predic-
tion power of the resulting proxies for EM?  
2.1.3 Research design 
2.1.3.1 Data and sample selection 
We obtain an initial data set containing 14,547 firm-year observations from all 1,445 fi-
nancial institutions available in Thomson Reuters Datastream with industry codes be-
tween 6011-6099 and 6710-6719 for the time-period of 2005-2015. We exclude all ob-
servations where annual reports follow any accounting standards but US-GAAP and 
IFRS, which accounts for a loss of 4,888 observations. We furthermore exclude all ob-
servations with insufficient data for the estimation of our models to ensure a constant 
sample. This step accounts for a loss of 7,07623, leaving 2,583 firm-year observations as 
the remaining sample. Since more than 70 percent of the observations are U.S.-banks and 
regulatory differences between countries, even though having decreased in the post-BA-
SEL I + II era (e.g., Beatty & Liao 2014), may influence the measurement of EM, we 
decide to use a final sample of 1,854 observations containing only banks from the U.S.24 
We winsorize all incorporated variables at the 1st and 99th percentile to control for outliers 
that could majorly influence our results. Table 2 gives an overview of the sample selection 
procedure and the distribution of observations over the sample period.25 
  
                                                          
23 In particular, the data availability concerning non-performing loan, net loan charge-off and loan loss reserve patterns leads to a 
significant sample decrease by about three quarters. 
24 The remaining quarter of the remaining sample comprises 50 countries with very few observations each. In addition, the setting of 
most parts of the related literature focuses on US banks, too. 
25 We apply lagged and forward variables, which results in a final sample period from 2007-2014. 
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Table 2 – Sample selection procedure and distribution by years 
Selection mode  Number of observations 
All companies from 2005-2015  14,547 
Less:   
Not US-GAAP or IFRS as reporting standards  4,888 
Missing data for estimation of models  7,076 
Non-U.S. firm-year observations  729 
Final Sample  1,854 
Distribution by years   
2007  173 (9.3%) 
2008  175 (9.4%) 
2009  180 (9.7%) 
2010  187 (10.1%) 
2011  158 (8.5%) 
2012  364 (19.6%) 
2013  334 (18.0%) 
2014  283 (15.3%) 
2.1.3.2 Empirical test procedures 
2.1.3.2.1 Empirical design 
We test the validity of the discretionary LLP proxies in several analyses. First, we com-
pare the coefficients and the goodness-of-fit of the first-stage regressions. Second, we 
check for measurement errors of the discretionary LLP measures by applying a method 
proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) and applied by Peasnell et al. (2000). The test evaluates 
the rate of rejection of the null hypothesis of no EM when actually no EM exists (type I 
error). Consequently, we study the rate of incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis. We 
therefore use a randomly selected sample of 25 percent of the firm-year observations from 
the total sample26 and compute a PART variable that takes up the value of one if the firm-
year observation is located in the randomly selected sample, and zero otherwise. We study 
significances of the randomised PART variable, which should not have any significant 
influence on the dependent variable. We repeat the test procedure 10,000 times for each 
of the models to cancel out the problem of randomly selecting firm-year observations that 
actually have significant influences on the dependent variable. 
                                                          
26 We follow Peasnell et al. (2000) and note that this percentage should capture a typical, dichotomous variable of interest with no 
systematic influence on our EM proxy. We point to the selection process and the probabilities to draw observations that bear a cer-
tain communal characteristic that could lead to a significance, which decreases with increasing number of observations drawn from 
the sample for our PART variable. We coincide with Peasnell et al. (2000) and Dechow et al. (1995) that this is simply a test of 
whether the Gaussian assumptions underlying our regressions in Equation	6, Equation	7 and Equation	8 are satisfied. 
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Third, we address omitted variable problems of the first stage using two different ap-
proaches. First, we study the performance error bias of our coefficients and residuals (e.g., 
Kothari et al. 2005). Therefore, we use a systematic sampling method (e.g., Dechow et 
al. 1995) selecting extreme performance firm-year observations and compute another 
PART dummy variable. We then estimate second-stage univariate regressions once again. 
When financial performance is one major omitted variable that can majorly improve spec-
ification of the model, the coefficients on the PART variable should indicate a significant 
influence at conventional levels. Peasnell et al. (2000) note that having a systematically 
selected sample, endogeneity might actually lead to correct significances and therefore 
false rejections of the models. In particular, observations in the extreme performance parts 
of the distributions might represent very successful or unsuccessful banks and lead to 
systematic EM approaches, e.g., very successful banks in the positive extreme part of the 
distribution might use considerable negative discretionary LLP to build up loan loss al-
lowances and vice versa.27 We address this problem in more detail in section 2.1.4.3. 
We additionally use a more general OMV test proposed by Young (1999). Therefore, we 
estimate a multivariate second-stage regression containing several omitted and possibly 
correlated variables.28 When applying this approach, we must include several conven-
tional control variables to avoid significant coefficients on the applied omitted variables 
while this variation can actually be explained by the conventional EM control variables. 
Finally, we apply a test procedure suggested by Beatty and Liao (2014), who address the 
prediction power as another desirable property of functional EM proxies. If our discre-
tionary LLP proxies are well fitted, they should be highly correlated with events of actual 
use of EM. Consequently, if a proxy is able to predict EM events more reliably than an-
other proxy, it can be considered as superior. Due to the lacking observability of actual 
EM, we employ a proxy for suspected or detected, and therefore highly likely EM. Since 
2005, the SEC publicly releases correspondence between SEC staff and SEC filers that 
                                                          
27 Peasnell et al. (2000) alternatively use decile-specific first-stage regressions and compare abnormal accruals for the extreme dec-
ile group with the remaining groups. While recognizing the problem with the test for extreme performance, this alternative test also 
lacks informative value, since assessment of abnormal accruals from the decile-specific regressions is hard without an unbiased 
benchmark. 
28 What is important, we assume that these variables could additionally help to separate non-discretionary and discretionary accrual 
parts. 
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can be retrieved through the EDGAR database. In these comment letters, the SEC staff 
comments, criticises and requests more or altered information regarding disclosures.  
Therefore, we estimate a univariate logit regression of a dummy variable capturing SEC 
comment letters and/or restatements on the respective discretionary LLP. 
Altogether, we exercise the following steps for each of the presented models: 
(1) We estimate first-stage regressions of: 
a. The models B1-B7, models S1-S4 and models D1-D4 using OLS with 
two-way clustering at the bank and year level (Petersen 2008; Gow et al. 
2010). 
b. The models D1-D4 using system GMM with Windmeijer correction 
(Windmeijer 2005). 
We compare coefficients and apply goodness-of-fit tests for all models. 
(2) We compute signed (==<!") and absolute discretionary LLP (==<__!") for 
bank i in year t as the residual and the absolute value of the residual from each 
model for both estimation procedures. 
(3) We construct the following samples for each of the discretionary LLP proxies: 
a. We randomly select 25% of the firm-year observations of the total sample 
and construct an indicator (< !") that takes up the value of one if the 
observation has been selected, and zero otherwise. 
b. We select 1%, 5% or 10% of the firm-year observations of the total sample 
from the firm-years with extreme cash-flow performance and construct an 
indicator value (< !") that takes up the value of one if the observation 
has been selected; and zero otherwise. 
(4) We estimate the following univariate regression for all models, with PART being 
defined as stated in (3)a. and (3)b.: 
Equation	9	
==<__!"(==<!") = ) + 5< !" + :! 
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Using OLS regressions with specially designed robust standard errors for hetero-
scedastic cases29 and test whether coefficient 5 is significantly different from zero 
at conventional levels (0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels). 
(5) We apply 10,000 iterations for steps (3)a. & (4). 
(6) We estimate the following multivariate regression of signed (==<!") and abso-
lute discretionary LLP (==<__!") for all models using two-way clustering at 
the firm and year level (Petersen 2008; Gow et al. 2010): 
Equation	10	
==<__!"(==<!")
= ) + 56 ==<!">6  !">6⁄ + 5@D9H!" + 5F; <!" + 5SB<;!"
+ 5T ∆C<I" C<I">6⁄ + 5U ∆JK<I" JK<I">6⁄
+ 5V ==<!"  !">6⁄ + 5WC8G b!" + 5Y=8DD!"
+ 56*=89 !" + 5669B97!" + 56@ BM8!">6  !">6⁄
+ 56F BM8!"  !">6⁄ + 56S BM8!"E6  !">6⁄ + :! 
(7) We estimate the following univariate regression of the comment/restatement of 
K-10/Q-10 indicator (B'c!") on the average absolute discretionary LLP 
(D!") for all models using a logit regression with two-way clustering at the 
bank and year level (Petersen 2008; Gow et al. 2010): 
Equation	11	
B'c!" = ) + 5D!" + :! 
And calculate probabilities based on the coefficient 5. 
The randomised PART variable should not represent any systematic EM, particularly 
when univariate regressions are run at a high frequency rate. We expect rejection rates of 
the null hypothesis of no influence of the PART variable in test statistics for coefficient 
5 to be (not) significantly different from 10%, 5% respectively 1% when model specifi-
cations are (good) poor at a confidence interval of 90%, 95% respectively 99%. For the 
                                                          
29 We find significant heteroscedasticity in the sample, which is why we apply standard errors using the Davidson and MacKinnon 
(1993) method, which obtains more conservative results in cases of heteroscedastic models. 
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extreme performance PART variable, we assume significant coefficients on PART when-
ever financial performance drives the magnitude of the discretionary accrual component 
significantly.30 
Concerning the multivariate omitted variable regressions, we use the approach proposed 
by Young (1999), modify it when necessary and use the signed and absolute discretionary 
LLP. Consequently, we include cash flow from operations as a first omitted and possibly 
correlated variable. Accruals function as accounting-based adjustments of cash flows to 
obtain an earnings proxy that captures fundamental firm performance more accurately 
(e.g., Ball & Shivakumar 2006). Dechow and Dichev (2002) show that when accruals 
quality is high, accruals’ variation should capture performance measurement errors of 
cash flows. Dechow et al. (1995) and McNichols (2002) further show for the non-finan-
cial industry models that excluding cash-flow patterns can cause omitted variable prob-
lems. We therefore include lagged (BM8!">6), current (BM8!") and forward (BM8!"E6) 
cash flows from operations as separate regressors to study whether these problems also 
arise in our financial industry models.31 Young (1999) uses fixed asset intensity to capture 
the magnitude of the depreciation expense as one major accrual. We correspond with this 
idea and use banks’ counterpart for LLP, e.g., loan intensity (=89 !"), as another 
omitted variable. The common banking literature (e.g., Stiroh 2004; Stiroh & Rumble 
2006; Lippett et al. 2008) further discusses income diversification (9B97!"), e.g., the 
ratio of non-interest to interest income, as one important proxy for the strategic alignment 
of the bank. In particular, we regard this omitted variable as a proxy for the significance 
of interest income and therefore the significance of the loan portfolio for the bank from 
an earnings perspective. Following Young (1999), we also integrate C8G b!", calcu-
lated as the change in sales scaled by lagged total assets. Expanding banks experience 
growth in assets as well as liabilities. However, if this development is not overall sym-
metric, growth may influence the level of non-discretionary accruals disproportionately 
                                                          
30 As discussed earlier, this could indicate low quality models or actual EM in high-performance situations, e.g., models of high 
quality. We further discuss this issue when we present the results in section 2.1.4.3. 
31 Even though the relationship between cash flows and earnings might be less direct and intuitive within banks, accruals should also 
be means of providing a more accurate performance measure, hence the inclusion of the operating cash flow variables should be 
able to describe non-discretionary LLP variation. E.g., consider the case of a bank with a high-risk loan portfolio reporting high op-
erating cash flows in the first year of observation. Here, high LLP will appropriately counter-steer to provide a smoothed earnings 
number, while operating cash flows might deteriorate in the following years as high-risk loans are charged off. On a final note, LLP 
might have a rather forward-looking impact; hence, cash flows in year t+2 or t+3 could be appropriate alternative variables to map 
the mechanism of provisioning accruals. 
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and therefore growth needs to be accounted for when modelling discretionary accruals. 
(e.g., Sloan 1996; Young 1999). While industry models account for the change in sales 
as growth measure, the banking industry models do not, which is why we include 
C8G b!" to study the necessity of consideration.  
The set of control variables used in the regression is as follows. We add lagged and cur-
rent total LLP to control for still existing measurement errors. =8DD!" is an indicator var-
iable that takes on the value of one if the net income before extraordinary items is negative 
for firm i in year t, and zero otherwise. It captures the differences in EM incentives when 
earnings are below zero. Once again, we incorporate the controls for macroeconomic ef-
fects ∆C<I" and ∆JK<I". 
For our prediction power test, we follow Beatty and Liao (2014) and construct a dummy 
variable B'c!", which equals one if: 
a. The bank received an SEC comment letter regarding their annual (K-10) or quar-
terly (Q-10) earnings report due to unappropriated handling of LLP, 
or 
b. The bank restated their annual (K-10) or quarterly (Q-10) earnings report due to 
reasons connected to the handling of LLP, 
and zero otherwise.32 Based on the resulting coefficients of the univariate regressions, we 
calculate probabilities. If the resulting probability is above 50%, the model assumes actual 
EM and expects a detection by the SEC, while probabilities below 50% are interpreted as 
the absence of actual EM. 
2.1.3.2.2 Methodology 
We estimate first-stage regressions using two different estimation procedures. Conse-
quently, we use the estimated coefficients to calculate respective residuals of the models 
for each observation to comprehend our EM proxies (abnormal/discretionary LLP). To 
estimate the seven basic models, four static and four dynamic models, we use OLS with 
                                                          
32 Consequently, B'c!" splits the sample into banks with a high probability of EM in the financial year and banks, which do not or 
considerably less engage in EM. 
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standard errors based on two-way clustering at the year- and bank-level (e.g., Petersen 
2008; Gow et al. 2010). For the four dynamic models, we alternatively follow prior bank-
ing literature with dynamic settings and use system GMM (e.g., Arellano & Bover 1995; 
Blundell & Bond 1998). We apply all available lags as GMM-style instruments for the 
lagged dependent variable ==<!">6, while all remaining variables are considered as 
strictly exogenous.33 Since standard errors are downward biased in a non-asymptotic set-
ting (e.g.,  → ∞ is not given), and significances therefore overconfident, we apply the 
standard error correction for finite sample panels developed by Windmeijer (2005).  
For models B1-B7 as well as models S1-S4 and D1-D4 using OLS with two-way cluster-
ing, we report @, adjusted @ and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) as tests for ab-
solute and relative goodness-of-fit. Higher @ (respectively adjusted @) values indicate 
a higher explanatory power of the model and therefore a higher proportion of variation of 
non-discretionary LLP being explained, leading to lower volatility and therefore more 
conservatism in our discretionary LLP proxy, which can limit type I errors.34 Lower BIC 
values indicate a higher predictive power of the model. Schwarz (1978) introduces the 
BIC as an extension of the Akaike Information Criterion, assigning different weights to 
the penalties for the inclusion of additional variables based on the natural logarithm of 
the number of observations for nested and non-nested models. Given our models that are 
highly nested in each other, BIC allows us to determine the model with the highest like-
lihood of generating the underlying data (e.g., Raftery 1995).35 For the system GMM 
estimator, we alternatively report AR (1), AR (2) and Hansen statistics as goodness-of-fit 
tests. They should be significant for AR (1), respectively insignificant on a 10% level for 
AR (2) and Hansen statistics. These thresholds should not be exceeded to obtain valid 
regressions and interpretable coefficients. 
                                                          
33 Bouvatier et al. (2014) also use this assumption in their analysis. Any different approach would contradict the OLS assumptions 
of exogeneity between dependent and independent variables and question appropriateness of OLS for the remaining models. 
34 We note that this is no clear indication of a better model, although it is likely that regressors, which marginally increase the expla-
nation of the variation in the dependent variable, enhance the modelling until a certain degree of overall explanatory power, since it 
is highly unlikely that high degrees of total LLP are systematically driven by discretion. Nevertheless, we build our conclusions on 
various additional tests and not only on the @ of the first-stage regressions. 
35 Decisively, we do not seek to explain 100% of the variation in total LLP, but the non-discretionary part. This is why we analyse 
actual prediction rates for situations of highly likely use of EM in section 2.1.4.5. 
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2.1.4 Results 
2.1.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for all relevant variables. Banks in our sample on 
average provision an amount of 0.47 percent of the lagged total assets, while mean non-
performing loans are 2 percent of the lagged total assets. The loan portfolios of the banks 
represent on average 70.61 percent of the beginning of the year total assets, while varia-
tion is rather low with an interquartile range of only 18.01 percent. Mean net charge-offs 
(non-performing loans) of 0.3559 (0.02) together with a standard deviation of 2.2729 
(0.0215) imply that few extreme observations drive the mean.36 
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics of relevant variables 
Descriptive statistics of relevant variables 
  Mean  fgh  Std. Dev.  fig  fjg 
Basic specification  
patterns 
          
==<!"  0.0047  0.0024  0.0071  0.0009  0.0057 
<!">6  0.0200  0.0136  0.0215  0.0062  0.0254 
∆<!"  0.0013  0.0000  0.0136  -0.0039  0.0049 
=G!">6  0.0110  0.0097  0.0060  0.0073  0.0132 
 =!"  0.7061  0.7001  0.1606  0.6126  0.7927 
∆ =!"  0.0454  0.0309  0.1079  -0.0069  0.0737 
B8!"  0.3559  0.0020  2.2729  0.0005  0.0067 
Set of further 
control variables 
          
D9H!"  14.4496  14.1297  1.5724  13.3686  15.2051 
; <!"  0.0133  0.0138  0.0088  0.0094  0.0177 
B<;!"  0.0986  0.0948  0.0258  0.0837  0.1088 
Macroeconomic  
control variables 
          
∆C<I"  0.0308  0.0378  0.0184  0.0314  0.0411 
∆JK<I"  0.0190  -0.0889  0.2187  -0.0976  0.0319 
OMV variables 
          
BM8!"  0.0126  0.0136  0.0292  0.0089  0.0181 
C
	kℎ!"  0.0005  -0.0005  0.0088  -0.0033  0.0031 
=8DD!"  0.1348  0.0000  0.3416  0.0000  0.0000 
=89 !"  0.6608  0.6760  0.1176  0.5990  0.7431 
9B97!"  0.2677  0.2141  0.2360  0.1296  0.3291 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
                                                          
36 We note that few banks exist, which account for considerable net-charge offs and run into financial distress in the following year, 
especially throughout the years of the financial crisis. However, our results do not change when we alternatively exclude these ob-
servations. 
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A mean allowance for loan losses of 1.1 percent compared to mean non-performing loans 
of 2.0 percent implies that on average banks might be in a situation where building up 
allowances is an issue. Table 4 and Table 5 show signed and absolute discretionary LLP 
from our models. Signed values are not statistically different from zero on the 0.01 level, 
indicating that none of our models produces EM proxies with systematic upward or down-
ward bias.37 Mean Absolute discretionary LLP and standard deviations are considerably 
different for all models, particularly when system GMM is applied for model D2 and D4 
compared to corresponding regressions using two-way clustering. Discretionary LLP 
from models D2 and D4 with two-way clustering account for the lowest mean values and 
standard deviations, hence the most conservative proxies. 
Table 4 – Descriptive statistics of signed value of discretionary loan loss provisions 
Descriptive statistics of the signed value of discretionary loan loss provisions (mPPN) 
  Mean  fgh  Std. Dev.  fig  fjg 
First-stage OLS           
B1  0.0000  -0.0011  0.0061  -0.0032  0.0015 
B2  0.0000  -0.0005  0.0054  -0.0026  0.0015 
B3  0.0000  -0.0006  0.0058  -0.0030  0.0018 
B4  0.0000  -0.0011  0.0061  -0.0032  0.0016 
B5  0.0000  -0.0004  0.0053  -0.0025  0.0017 
B6  0.0000  -0.0006  0.0058  -0.0030  0.0018 
B7  0.0000  -0.0005  0.0054  -0.0026  0.0016 
S1  0.0000  -0.0004  0.0053  -0.0025  0.0016 
S2  0.0000  -0.0004  0.0052  -0.0026  0.0016 
S3  0.0000  -0.0004  0.0052  -0.0024  0.0015 
S4  0.0000  -0.0004  0.0051  -0.0025  0.0016 
D1  0.0000  -0.0003  0.0050  -0.0020  0.0013 
D2  0.0000  -0.0003  0.0049  -0.0021  0.0014 
D3  0.0000  -0.0003  0.0049  -0.0020  0.0012 
D4  0.0000  -0.0003  0.0048  -0.0021  0.0012 
First-stage GMM           
D1  0.0001  0.0000  0.0053  -0.0017  0.0017 
D2  0.0000  -0.0008  0.0083  -0.0047  0.0037 
D3  0.0002  -0.0001  0.0058  -0.0028  0.0024 
D4  0.0001  -0.0008  0.0079  -0.0046  0.0036 
==< is the signed value of the residual from the respective first-stage regression. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  
                                                          
37 We apply untabulated univariate tests to address this issue. They confirm this favorable setting for all discretionary proxies. 
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Table 5 – Descriptive statistics of the absolute value of discretionary loan loss provisions 
Descriptive statistics of the absolute value of discretionary loan loss provisions (mPPN_nop) 
  Mean  fgh  Std. Dev.  fig  fjg 
First-stage OLS           
B1  0.0039  0.0026  0.0047  0.0012  0.0050 
B2  0.0034  0.0021  0.0043  0.0010  0.0041 
B3  0.0037  0.0024  0.0045  0.0011  0.0048 
B4  0.0039  0.0026  0.0047  0.0012  0.0049 
B5  0.0033  0.0021  0.0042  0.0010  0.0041 
B6  0.0037  0.0024  0.0045  0.0011  0.0047 
B7  0.0033  0.0021  0.0042  0.0009  0.0041 
S1  0.0033  0.0021  0.0042  0.0010  0.0041 
S2  0.0033  0.0022  0.0040  0.0010  0.0040 
S3  0.0032  0.0020  0.0041  0.0009  0.0039 
S4  0.0032  0.0021  0.0040  0.0009  0.0039 
D1  0.0029  0.0017  0.0040  0.0007  0.0034 
D2  0.0029  0.0018  0.0039  0.0008  0.0033 
D3  0.0028  0.0016  0.0040  0.0007  0.0033 
D4  0.0028  0.0017  0.0039  0.0007  0.0032 
First-stage GMM           
D1  0.0031  0.0017  0.0043  0.0008  0.0034 
D2  0.0059  0.0043  0.0058  0.0022  0.0077 
D3  0.0038  0.0026  0.0044  0.0012  0.0048 
D4  0.0056  0.0041  0.0055  0.0021  0.0072 
==<__ is the absolute value of the residual from the respective first-stage regression. All variables are defined in Appen-
dix A. 
Table 6 shows pairwise correlation matrices for the relevant variables. We find no unex-
pectedly high correlations that would signify multicollinearity issues, which would lead 
to implausible or noisy parameter estimates (e.g., O’Brien 2007). We also study mean 
variance inflation factors and find that they are considerably below five for all specifica-
tions.38 Furthermore, we find expected correlations between our non-discretionary varia-
bles and LLP. Interestingly, we find a positive and significant correlation between begin-
ning of the year loan loss allowances and LLP, which could stand for a situation of in-
creasing reserves and loss recognition, which results in even higher provisioning. 
                                                          
38 A mean variance inflation factor of 5.01 for model B1 could indicate minor multicollinearity problems with this model. However, 
we follow O’Brien (2007), who extensively discusses the issue of multicollinearity and assesses rules of thumb, in particular a VIF 
of 10 and above. Altogether, multicollinearity values below 10 should not indicate a crucial problem in our analysis. 
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2.1.4.2 First-stage regression results 
Table 7, Table 8 and Table 9 show first-stage regressions of Equation	6, Equation	7 and Equation	
8. We start analysing the basic models, since they entail concise specifications from where 
on all other models derive. To assess the absolute and relative goodness-of-fit of our 
models, we use adjusted r-squared and BIC.39  
Results in Table 7 indicate for models B1-B7 that all regressors exert a significant influ-
ence on total LLP except for B8!" and ∆C<!", which are only marginally significant in 
one case each. The signs for the coefficients are as expected, while the coefficient on 
=G!">6 is positive and significant for models B3, B5 and B6. This result is in line with 
our univariate findings and the proposition that higher lagged loan loss reserves are asso-
ciated with higher loss recognition, leading to higher provisioning in the current year. 
Concerning the absolute goodness-of-fit, the highest increase in adjusted r-squared is 
achieved by incorporating the non-performing asset pattern group (increase in qrI
@  by 
0.16), followed by the inclusion of =G!">6 (increase in qrI
@  by 0.07), while adding 
B8!" leaves an insignificant coefficient and hence no increase in explanatory power. 
What is more, the mutual use of both NPA and ALW patterns (model B5) results only in 
a slight improvement in qrI
@  compared to model B2. Hence, loan loss allowances and 
non-performing assets seem to explain equal amounts of variation in total LLP.40 Taking 
a closer look at the relative goodness-of-fit, the general results prevail, while the applica-
tion of BIC unfolds more details. Given the guidelines for evidence in Raftery (1995)41, 
model B4 is positively inferior in comparison to model B1, while model B7 outperforms 
model B2 very strongly. This result still leaves the sole inclusion of our NCO pattern with 
a loss of fit. However, the mutual use of the NCO pattern and the NPA pattern group 
strongly indicates a better fit compared to the sole use of NPA, which has not been de-
tected by qrI
@ . Even more, compared to absolute goodness-of-fit, we find very strong 
evidence (BIC difference of 50.49) that there is a better fit of model B5 relative to B2, 
                                                          
39 We use adjusted r-squared instead of r-squared, since it corrects for the degrees of freedom, while r-squared increases with the 
inclusion of every new regressor. 
40 In particular, both the coefficients on <!">6 and =G!">6, decrease when they are mutually included, representing an adjust-
ment of the reserves based on current non-performing assets. 
41 Raftery (1995) proposes absolute differences from 0-2 as weak, 2-6 as positive, 6-10 as strong and >10 as very strong evidence of 
preferral of a model in goodness-of-fit. 
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suggesting that even though NPA pattern groups are already in use, the addition of loan 
loss allowance patterns can enhance the fit of the model. Consequently, while NPA al-
ways seem to increase the fit of our models, loan loss allowances might work as an alter-
native, while net charge-offs only improve our modelling if they are used together with 
NPA patterns.42 
Table 7 – First stage multiple regressions for basic models 
First stage multiple regressions for basic models B1-B7 
Dependent variable: total loan loss provisions (==<) 
==<!"  !">6⁄ = )*X+56<!">6  !">6⁄ + 5@ ∆<!"  !">6⁄ Z[+5F=G!">6  !">6⁄ \ + 5S  =!"  !">6⁄ +
5T ∆ =!"  !">6⁄ (+5UB8!"  !">6⁄ ) + 5V ∆C<I" C<I">6⁄ + 5W ∆JK<I" JK<I">6⁄ 	+ :!"  
 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 
<!">6  0.137   0.108  0.139 
  (5.65)***   (7.30)***  (5.59)*** 
∆<!"  0.168   0.168  0.171 
  (4.18)***   (4.28)***  (4.19)*** 
=G!">6   0.351  0.207 0.351  
   (3.06)***  (2.15)** (3.05)***  
 =!" 0.014 0.008 0.008 0.014 0.005 0.008 0.007 
 (3.04)*** (2.79)*** (2.96)*** (3.08)*** (2.61)*** (3.01)*** (2.96)*** 
∆ =!" -0.026 -0.013 -0.014 -0.025 -0.009 -0.014 -0.012 
 (2.51)** (1.97)** (2.30)** (2.52)** (1.72)* (2.31)** (1.98)** 
B8!"    -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
    (1.30)  (1.37) (1.73)* 
∆C<!" 0.069 0.086 0.101 0.072 0.094 0.105 0.093 
 (0.61) (1.52) (1.22) (0.64) (1.86)* (1.24) (1.59) 
∆JK<!" 0.016 0.016 0.021 0.017 0.017 0.021 0.017 
 (1.83)* (3.30)*** (3.16)*** (1.84)* (3.97)*** (3.15)*** (3.34)*** 
L	 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 
 (1.48) (2.32)** (2.07)** (1.49) (2.61)*** (2.07)** (2.38)** 
@ 0.25 0.41 0.32 0.25 0.43 0.32 0.42 
qrI
@  0.25 0.41 0.32 0.25 0.43 0.32 0.41 
;9B -13,595.62 -14,032.24 -13,772.22 -13,591.55 -14,082.73 -13,768.00 -14,047.38 
M 89.02 85.96 91.05 71.37 80.36 76.11 75.63 
 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,854 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test 
statistics are calculated using two-way clustering at the firm and year level (e.g., Petersen 2008; Gow et al. 2010). We apply 
the ;9B with correction for N (e.g., Schwarz 1978) to assess the relative fit of our models and follow Raftery (1995) in as-
sessment. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Given these results, model S1 in Table 8 is of major interest, because it includes NCO, 
ALW and NPA patterns. The significant coefficients for all three pattern groups demon-
strate that integrating B8!" can have a considerable effect if used in addition to loan loss 
allowances and non-performing assets. =G!">6 is again positive and significant for mod-
els S1-S4. While qrI
@  does not imply any significant difference between modelling with-
out NCO (model B5) and model S1, the difference in BIC shows very strong evidence 
                                                          
42 Furthermore, the use of net charge-off patterns seems to decrease the fit of the model when we use them together with loan loss 
allowance patterns, as indicated by a positive evidence for the difference in BIC between model B3 and B6. 
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for a better fit of S1. Model S3 contains further lagged and forward components of non-
performing assets. We observe that these exert only marginal increases in explanatory 
power, while researchers will have to trade-off a further loss of two panel years. However, 
relative goodness-of-fit testing shows a difference in BIC that is considerable. The further 
set of control variables (D9H!", ; <!" and B<;!") likewise explains considerable var-
iation in total LLP, while model S4 contains all static regressors and yields an adjusted r-
squared of 0.47, which is the highest explanatory power of the static models. The results 
on the information criterion are in line, with a difference in BIC between model S1 and 
S4 of 99.83. 
Starting with model D1, the conversion to a dynamic approach expands explanatory 
power to a level of 0.50 with a very strong evidence of a mutual increase of relative fit. 
Again, the use of controls and/or non-performing loan regressors has slightly positive 
effects (qrI
@  between 0.51 and 0.53). These results are again supported by a look at the 
relative goodness-of-fit. What is important,	=G!">6 turns insignificant for the dynamic 
versions D1-D4, while ==<!">6 is highly significant. We remark that the effect of loan 
loss reserves is mainly driven by last year’s addition to the reserve, e.g., ==<!">6. 
Altogether, these results show that non-performing assets are by far the most important 
pattern group when it comes to modelling EM proxies. The effect of NCO seems to be 
highly dependent on the ex-ante specification, while the omission of this pattern has no 
influence on the explanatory power and leads to the lowest decrease in relative goodness-
of-fit (difference in BIC between model S1 and B5 of 13.72). Additional lag and forward 
patterns of the NPA pattern group and/or the additional set of controls significantly im-
prove the BIC, while explanatory power only increases by 2%. However, the switch to a 
dynamic model yield a much higher increase in both explanatory power (6-7% compared 
to the respective static model) and BIC (up to a difference of BIC of 272.06). Therefore, 
EM studies should consider the trade-off between more lags/forwards of NPA patterns 
and the loss in number of observations, while dynamic models should normally entail 
insignificant losses of observations. 
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Table 8 – First stage multiple regressions for the static and dynamic models using two-way clustering 
First stage multiple regressions for the static models S1-S4 and dynamic models D1-D4 using two-way clustering 
Dependent variable: total loan loss provisions (==<) 
==<!"  !">6⁄ = )* + 56<!">6  !">6⁄ + 5@ ∆<!"  !">6⁄ + 5F =G!">6  !">6⁄ + 5S  =!"  !">6⁄ + 5T ∆ =!"  !">6⁄ +
5UB8!"  !">6⁄ + 5V ∆C<I" C<I">6⁄ + 5W ∆JK<I" JK<I">6⁄ 	X+5YD9H!" + 56*; <!"  !">6⁄ +
566B<;!"Z	[+56@<!">@  !">6⁄ + 56F ∆<!"E6  !">6⁄ \	+ 56S ==<!">6  !">6⁄ + :!"  
 S1 S2 S3 S4 D1 D2 D3 D4 
<!">6 0.110 0.110 0.163 0.157 0.072 0.075 0.117 0.115 
 (7.50)*** (7.41)*** (8.70)*** (8.02)*** (5.94)*** (5.97)*** (5.66)*** (5.48)*** 
∆<!" 0.171 0.165 0.158 0.153 0.159 0.155 0.150 0.147 
 (4.28)*** (4.28)*** (4.21)*** (4.17)*** (3.84)*** (3.85)*** (3.79)*** (3.78)*** 
=G!">6 0.204 0.189 0.251 0.236 -0.014 -0.014 0.032 0.031 
 (2.16)** (2.36)** (2.75)*** (3.09)*** (0.34) (0.33) (0.81) (0.80) 
 =!" 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 
 (2.70)*** (3.01)*** (2.30)** (2.66)*** (2.77)*** (2.91)*** (2.33)** (2.54)** 
∆ =!" -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 
 (1.69)* (2.11)** (1.60) (2.02)** (1.20) (1.55) (1.13) (1.46) 
B8!" -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.76)* (1.50) (1.87)* (1.65)* (2.10)** (1.82)* (2.20)** (1.96)* 
∆C<!" 0.101 0.110 0.076 0.087 0.053 0.063 0.031 0.041 
 (1.92)* (2.21)** (1.63) (1.90)* (1.50) (2.09)** (0.89) (1.37) 
∆JK<!" 0.018 0.019 0.015 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.010 0.011 
 (3.98)*** (4.49)*** (3.49)*** (3.96)*** (3.65)*** (4.70)*** (2.91)*** (3.79)*** 
D9H!"  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (2.00)**  (1.82)*  (1.92)*  (1.73)* 
; <!"  -0.030  -0.041  -0.024  -0.032 
  (1.01)  (1.45)  (0.88)  (1.22) 
B<;!"  -0.024  -0.022  -0.018  -0.017 
  (3.49)***  (3.33)***  (4.46)***  (4.37)*** 
<!">@   -0.080 -0.074   -0.061 -0.057 
   (5.92)*** (5.57)***   (3.95)*** (3.46)*** 
∆<!"E6   -0.001 -0.001   0.011 0.011 
   (0.06) (0.03)   (0.66) (0.63) 
==<!">6     0.379 0.358 0.363 0.344 
     (7.37)*** (8.03)*** (6.60)*** (6.93)*** 
L	 -0.006 -0.012 -0.005 -0.010 -0.004 -0.009 -0.003 -0.007 
 (2.69)*** (2.17)** (2.56)** (1.95)* (2.57)** (2.14)** (2.04)** (1.81)* 
@ 0.43 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.53 
qrI
@  0.43 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.53 
;9B -14,096.45 -14,149.36 -14,151.99 -14,196.28 -14,368.51 -14,412.63 -14,411.68 -14,443.18 
M 71.76 57.90 60.89 52.80 76.48 64.10 64.44 57.54 
 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,854 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test statistics are calcu-
lated using two-way clustering at the firm and year level (e.g., Petersen 2008; Gow et al. 2010). We apply the ;9B with correction for N 
(e.g., Schwarz 1978) to assess the relative fit of our models and follow Raftery (1995) in assessment. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. 
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For the dynamic models D1-D4 with alternative system GMM estimation in Table 9, we 
apply instrument settings that cancel out issues of over-identifying restrictions, which 
gives us a certain fit of the models. However, standard goodness-of-fit tests (qrI
@ , BIC) 
do not exist. We alternatively compare coefficients of the models, which leaves us with 
marginal or no significances for the loans and net charge-off pattern groups. 
Table 9 – First stage regressions for the dynamic models using system GMM 
First stage regressions for the dynamic models using system GMM 
Dependent variable: total loan loss provisions (==<) 
==<!"  !">6⁄ = )* + 56<!">6  !">6⁄ + 5@ ∆<!"  !">6⁄ + 5F =G!">6  !">6⁄ +
5S  =!"  !">6⁄ + 5T ∆ =!"  !">6⁄ + 5UB8!"  !">6⁄ + 5V ∆C<I" C<I">6⁄ +
5W ∆JK<I" JK<I">6⁄ 	X+5YD9H!" + 56* ; <!"  !">6⁄ + 566B<;!"Z	[+56@<!">@  !">6⁄ +
56F ∆<!"E6  !">6⁄ \ 	+ 56S ==<!">6  !">6⁄ + :!"  
 D1 D2 D3 D4 
<!">6 0.150 0.183 0.057 0.167 
 (4.93)*** (4.74)*** (1.07) (2.32)** 
∆<!" 0.270 0.276 0.175 0.254 
 (4.97)*** (3.95)*** (2.51)** (3.54)*** 
=G!">6 -0.227 -0.191 -0.348 -0.210 
 (2.81)*** (1.44) (2.13)** (0.93) 
 =!" 0.006 0.015 0.022 0.017 
 (0.68) (1.38) (1.58) (1.13) 
∆ =!" -0.005 -0.024 -0.019 -0.026 
 (0.62) (1.96)* (1.32) (1.75)* 
B8!" -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.88) (0.76) (0.43) (0.71) 
∆C<I" 0.043 0.038 0.111 0.049 
 (1.95)* (0.88) (1.84)* (0.80) 
∆JK<I" 0.009 0.008 0.017 0.010 
 (3.71)*** (1.73)* (2.38)** (1.40) 
D9H!"  0.002  0.002 
  (2.28)**  (2.06)** 
; <!"  0.082  0.066 
  (0.67)  (0.55) 
B<;!"  -0.234  -0.212 
  (1.98)**  (1.72)* 
<!">@   0.049 -0.003 
   (0.74) (0.04) 
∆<!"E6   -0.151 -0.029 
   (1.44) (0.27) 
==<!">6 0.416 0.205 0.439 0.234 
 (4.68)*** (1.68)* (3.83)*** (1.43) 
L	 -0.004 -0.015 -0.014 -0.019 
 (0.77) (0.85) (1.79)* (0.92) 
Bℎ@ 474.64 272.84 354.90 343.71 

1 -4.08 -3.49 -4.14 -2.76 

2 -0.03 -1.60 0.67 -0.90 
b 39.66 26.83 33.62 27.91 
s 42.00 42.00 42.00 42.00 
_C 430 430 430 430 
 1,854 1,854 1,854 1,854 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed 
tests. All test statistics are calculated using system-GMM (e.g., Arellano & Bover 1995; and Blundell & Bond 
1998) with all available lags as GMM-style instruments for ==<!">6 and Windmeijer (2005) correction, while 
all remaining variables are considered as strictly exogenous. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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As expected, ==<!">6 has a highly significant influence on the variation of current year 
LLP, surprisingly only as long as we do not include the additional set of control variables. 
Furthermore, the coefficient on =G!">6 is negative and significant in these models (D1 
& D3). While this result could challenge our univariate results for =G!">6 as well as the 
static first-stage regressions, we note that in the case of =G!">6 and ==<!">6 capturing 
similar or identical effects, the sum of the coefficients in our dynamic system GMM mod-
els D1 and D3 again shows an overall positive effect of past provisioning. 
2.1.4.3 Univariate analysis of measurement errors 
Table 10 contains results for the univariate regressions of the EM proxies on our random-
ized PART variable. For each of the models, we report the frequency of significant 56 
coefficients when we alternatively apply confidence intervals of 1%, 5% and 10%. The 
frequencies are within the thresholds, e.g., not significantly different from the frequencies 
you would expect at random. We conclude that the Gaussian assumptions are not violated 
and we have no biases in this regard. 
Table 10 – Univariate analysis of measurement errors for random PART 
PART – randomly selected indicator 
Dependent variable: signed discretionary loan loss provisions (==<) 
==<!" = ) + 5< !" + :! 
 B1 B2 B3 B4 
10% level 954 966 1081 1032 
5% level 510 501 529 571 
1% level 138 122 107 137 
 B5 B6 B7  
10% level 1032 1044 1023  
5% level 541 541 539  
1% level 118 118 120  
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
10% level 1021 984 1055 1026 
5% level 521 501 530 538 
1% level 115 122 124 112 
 M5 M6 M7 M8 
10% level 1030 1001 1000 1029 
5% level 510 533 537 548 
1% level 121 123 132 116 
 D1 D2 D3 D4 
10% level 999 1006 991 1039 
5% level 502 537 477 513 
1% level 129 113 118 96 
* Indicate whether the number of occurrence of significant coefficients on PART for 10,000 rep-
lications of the univariate regression is lower than the hypothesised number. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 11 reports the results for the univariate regression, in which the PART variable rep-
resents extreme CFO performance. We find significant coefficients, especially on the 
10% and 5% levels. These results could indicate that our EM proxies are biased with 
regard to extreme CFO performance. If this holds, the applied EM models are not able to 
unambiguously separate non-discretionary performance influences from discretionary 
LLP. However, as mentioned earlier, this test can be biased due to EM taking place in 
observations with extreme CFO performance, e.g., over- or under-provisioning. If this 
holds, the separation works well and the significant coefficient is the result of successful 
modelling. In particular, when adding a set of further controls, we include ; <!" as 
performance before provisioning, while the results on this univariate test do not change.43 
Table 11 – Univariate analysis of measurement errors for performance PART 
PART – extreme performance indicator (CFO) 
Dependent variable: signed discretionary loan loss provisions (==<) 
==<!" = ) + 5< !" + :! 
 B1 B2 B3 B4 
10% selected (4.07)*** (4.90)*** (3.78)*** (4.06)*** 
5% selected (3.05)*** (3.90)*** (2.94)*** (3.13)*** 
1% selected (1.44) (1.69)* (1.19) (1.46) 
 B5 B6 B7  
10% selected (4.29)*** (3.74)*** (4.75)***  
5% selected (3.65)*** (2.99)*** (3.84)***  
1% selected (1.54) (1.20) (1.72)*  
 S1 S2 S3 S4 
10% selected (4.13)*** (4.70)*** (4.01)*** (4.41)*** 
5% selected (3.58)*** (4.02)*** (3.69)*** (3.90)*** 
1% selected (1.56) (1.81)* (1.56) (1.60) 
 D1 D2 D3 D4 
10% selected (3.68)*** (4.21)*** (3.76)*** (4.36)*** 
5% selected (3.39)*** (3.78)*** (3.42)*** (3.79)*** 
1% selected (1.74)* (1.85)* (1.67)* (1.73)* 
 DLLP_D1 DLLP_D2 DLLP_D3 DLLP_D4 
10% selected (4.32)*** (3.16)*** (4.27)*** (3.33)*** 
5% selected (3.59)*** (2.49)** (3.71)*** (2.61)*** 
1% selected (1.71)* (0.32) (1.50) (0.49) 
* Indicate whether the number of significant coefficients on PART for the 10,000 replications is 
lower than the hypothesised number. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  
                                                          
43 We further study the influence of cash flow performance in our multivariate analysis in section 2.1.4.4. 
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2.1.4.4 Multivariate analysis of measurement errors and omitted variables 
Table 12, Table 14 and Table 16 contain multivariate regressions of the signed discretionary 
LLP on omitted variables for all models.44 We use the regressions on signed discretionary 
LLP to study probable non-linearity issues of variables that have been included in the first 
stage. In Table 14, we find significant coefficients for the further set of controls for size, 
performance and capital requirements. 
Table 12 – Multivariate regressions of signed DLLP on OMV for basic models 
Multivariate regressions to study omitted correlated variables in basic models B1-B7 
Dependent variable: signed value of discretionary loan loss provisions (==<) 
==<!" = ) + 56==<!">6 + 5@D9H!" + 5F; <!" + 5SB<;!" + 5T∆JK<!" + 5U∆C<!" + 5V==<!" +
5WC8G b!" + 5Y=8DD!" + 56*=89 !" + 5669B97!" + 56@BM8!">6 + 56FBM8!" + 56SBM8!"E6 + :!  
 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 
==<!">6 -0.055 -0.127 -0.200 -0.055 -0.179 -0.199 -0.126 
 (4.08)*** (8.12)*** (11.25)*** (4.21)*** (10.03)*** (11.43)*** (8.31)*** 
D9H!" 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (2.41)** (2.63)*** (1.88)* (1.94)* (2.41)** (1.50) (2.46)** 
; <!" -0.000 0.021 -0.003 -0.001 0.012 -0.004 0.020 
 (0.01) (1.05) (0.30) (0.08) (0.71) (0.34) (0.97) 
B<;!" -0.001 0.003 -0.006 -0.001 -0.000 -0.007 0.002 
 (0.54) (0.43) (1.98)** (0.73) (0.02) (2.11)** (0.33) 
∆JK<!" -0.019 -0.015 -0.019 -0.019 -0.015 -0.019 -0.015 
 (17.53)*** (7.67)*** (16.78)*** (17.98)*** (8.19)*** (16.86)*** (7.63)*** 
∆C<!" -0.092 -0.066 -0.090 -0.093 -0.069 -0.090 -0.066 
 (7.80)*** (3.11)*** (7.05)*** (8.05)*** (3.46)*** (7.04)*** (3.10)*** 
==<!" 0.983 0.854 0.991 0.980 0.863 0.988 0.846 
 (65.37)*** (55.51)*** (81.39)*** (59.90)*** (40.97)*** (74.88)*** (48.87)*** 
C8G b!" 0.073 0.058 0.061 0.072 0.059 0.060 0.057 
 (4.41)*** (5.39)*** (7.10)*** (4.40)*** (6.61)*** (7.34)*** (4.83)*** 
=8DD!" 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.11) (3.68)*** (1.65)* (0.40) (3.88)*** (1.49) (3.79)*** 
=89 !" -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 -0.008 
 (40.08)*** (14.24)*** (19.05)*** (40.86)*** (13.93)*** (19.94)*** (13.84)*** 
9B97!" -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (3.49)*** (2.43)** (5.44)*** (2.85)*** (3.24)*** (5.07)*** (2.09)** 
BM8!"E6 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 
 (3.22)*** (2.50)** (4.11)*** (3.20)*** (3.49)*** (3.76)*** (2.64)*** 
BM8!" 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (2.26)** (1.06) (5.97)*** (2.29)** (1.61) (5.19)*** (1.12) 
BM8!">6 -0.000 -0.002 -0.011 -0.000 -0.007 -0.011 -0.002 
 (0.00) (0.29) (2.79)*** (0.03) (1.23) (2.72)*** (0.30) 
L	 0.005 -0.000 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.000 
 (4.58)*** (0.15) (5.11)*** (5.27)*** (0.58) (6.14)*** (0.08) 
@ 0.96 0.79 0.92 0.96 0.79 0.92 0.78 
qrI
@  0.96 0.79 0.92 0.96 0.79 0.92 0.78 
M 2,347.89 174.55 1,401.28 2,328.21 179.67 1,385.67 164.30 
 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test 
statistics are calculated using two-way clustering at the firm and year level (e.g., Petersen 2008; Gow et al. 2010). All varia-
bles are defined in Appendix A. 
                                                          
44 Compared to our first-stage regressions, we lose one observation each for C8G b!", BM8!" and BM8!">6 due to data insuffi-
ciency, which gives us a sample of 1,851 firm-years. 
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What is important, these show opposing signs compared to the first-stage results in Table 
8. Assuming that an inclusion of these regressors should show no significances in the 
second stage whenever there is a linear relationship, we propose a non-linear fit of the 
data for these control variables.45 
Table 13 – Multivariate regressions of absolute DLLP on OMV for basic models 
Multivariate regressions to study omitted correlated variables in basic models B1-B7 
Dependent variable: absolute value of discretionary loan loss provisions (==<__) 
==<__!" = ) + 56==<!">6 + 5@D9H!" + 5F; <!" + 5SB<;!" + 5T∆JK<!" + 5U∆C<!" + 5V==<!" +
5WC8G b!" + 5Y=8DD!" + 56*=89 !" + 5669B97!" + 56@BM8!">6 + 56FBM8!" + 56SBM8!"E6 + :!  
 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 
==<!">6 -0.039 -0.015 -0.056 -0.039 -0.019 -0.057 -0.016 
 (2.94)*** (0.89) (1.34) (2.92)*** (0.83) (1.36) (0.95) 
D9H!" -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (1.24) (2.07)** (1.77)* (1.22) (2.09)** (1.80)* (2.19)** 
; <!" -0.059 -0.046 -0.059 -0.060 -0.045 -0.060 -0.049 
 (2.86)*** (2.86)*** (2.55)** (3.00)*** (2.62)*** (2.66)*** (3.22)*** 
B<;!" 0.007 0.009 0.012 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.009 
 (1.72)* (2.10)** (2.18)** (1.79)* (1.99)** (2.17)** (2.21)** 
∆JK<!" 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.33) (1.21) (0.48) (0.31) (2.23)** (0.48) (1.04) 
∆C<!" 0.001 -0.026 -0.024 0.001 -0.042 -0.024 -0.024 
 (0.04) (1.83)* (0.87) (0.02) (2.80)*** (0.86) (1.41) 
==<!" 0.532 0.426 0.482 0.533 0.409 0.483 0.426 
 (11.17)*** (15.38)*** (9.33)*** (10.99)*** (16.90)*** (9.20)*** (15.36)*** 
C8G b!" 0.027 0.002 0.013 0.029 0.002 0.015 0.005 
 (2.28)** (0.27) (1.53) (2.35)** (0.26) (1.62) (0.47) 
=8DD!" -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.94) (0.23) (0.57) (0.96) (0.13) (0.62) (0.40) 
=89 !" 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.81) (0.08) (0.27) (0.90) (0.19) (0.37) (0.36) 
9B97!" -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.29) (0.97) (0.65) (0.36) (0.89) (0.59) (0.71) 
BM8!"E6 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (3.87)*** (0.74) (1.77)* (3.78)*** (0.95) (1.53) (0.70) 
BM8!" -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.58) (2.56)** (1.23) (0.57) (3.06)*** (1.20) (2.33)** 
BM8!">6 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.008 
 (2.24)** (2.33)** (2.89)*** (2.36)** (2.41)** (2.95)*** (2.56)** 
L	 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (1.15) (2.45)** (1.52) (1.12) (2.40)** (1.51) (2.55)** 
@ 0.60 0.51 0.52 0.59 0.48 0.52 0.50 
qrI
@  0.59 0.50 0.51 0.59 0.47 0.51 0.50 
M 59.11 40.65 43.91 58.88 35.97 43.98 39.64 
 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test 
statistics are calculated using two-way clustering at the firm and year level (e.g., Petersen 2008; Gow et al. 2010). All varia-
bles are defined in Appendix A. 
 
                                                          
45 We run simple curve estimations to test this proposition. They show for the respective signed discretionary LLP that common 
non-linear formulations (e.g., squared or cubic) fit the data significantly better than a linear model. 
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However, results on absolute discretionary LLP (Table 15) show no significant coefficients 
on size and capital requirement, while the coefficients on ; <!" are significant and neg-
ative, indicating pro-cyclical bank provisioning behaviour. Therefore, studies following 
two-step approaches might consider either non-linear modelling or additional control on 
the second stage, while one-step approaches are only left with the former solution. The 
outcomes on ==<!">6, ΔC<I" and ΔJK<I" also indicate non-linearity (for all models 
in Table 12 Table 14 and Table 16), hence we suggest an equivalent strategy to address this 
issue. 
Table 14 – Multivariate regressions of signed DLLP on OMV for static and dynamic two-way models 
Multivariate regressions to study omitted correlated variables in static models S1-S4 and dynamic models D1-D4 
Dependent variable: signed value of discretionary loan loss provisions (==<) 
==<!" = ) + 56==<!">6 + 5@D9H!" + 5F; <!" + 5SB<;!" + 5T∆JK<!" + 5U∆C<!" + 5V==<!" + 5WC8G b!" + 5Y=8DD!" +
56*=89 !" + 5669B97!" + 56@BM8!">6 + 56FBM8!" + 56SBM8!"E6 + :!  
 S1 S2 S3 S4 D1 D2 D3 D4 
==<!">6 -0.178 -0.179 -0.182 -0.181 -0.398 -0.386 -0.389 -0.378 
 (10.06)*** (10.26)*** (9.74)*** (10.22)*** (27.15)*** (28.07)*** (29.87)*** (31.81)*** 
D9H!" 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (2.27)** (2.51)** (1.53) (2.26)** (1.59) (3.17)*** (1.01) (2.82)*** 
; <!" 0.012 0.042 -0.003 0.039 0.003 0.027 -0.008 0.025 
 (0.65) (2.34)** (0.21) (2.51)** (0.27) (2.44)** (0.74) (2.31)** 
B<;!" -0.001 0.023 0.001 0.023 0.004 0.022 0.005 0.022 
 (0.10) (3.58)*** (0.12) (3.59)*** (0.97) (5.27)*** (1.19) (5.09)*** 
∆JK<!" -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.013 -0.015 -0.013 -0.014 
 (8.09)*** (8.74)*** (7.48)*** (8.12)*** (10.22)*** (11.08)*** (9.75)*** (10.57)*** 
∆C<!" -0.070 -0.082 -0.067 -0.078 -0.045 -0.056 -0.044 -0.055 
 (3.41)*** (4.01)*** (2.96)*** (3.51)*** (3.07)*** (3.86)*** (2.78)*** (3.50)*** 
==<!" 0.855 0.858 0.831 0.837 0.873 0.874 0.853 0.856 
 (38.24)*** (40.68)*** (48.44)*** (50.76)*** (44.24)*** (46.90)*** (50.90)*** (53.50)*** 
C8G b!" 0.058 0.062 0.059 0.061 0.017 0.022 0.020 0.024 
 (5.93)*** (6.68)*** (6.65)*** (7.40)*** (1.52) (2.14)** (1.93)* (2.46)** 
=8DD!" -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (4.05)*** (3.93)*** (3.52)*** (3.51)*** (2.50)** (2.63)*** (1.96)* (2.07)** 
=89 !" -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 
 (13.83)*** (15.81)*** (12.32)*** (14.45)*** (12.62)*** (14.99)*** (10.23)*** (12.29)*** 
9B97!" -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (2.93)*** (2.98)*** (3.15)*** (3.19)*** (0.91) (1.17) (0.24) (0.62) 
BM8!"E6 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
 (3.72)*** (3.58)*** (2.90)*** (2.93)*** (2.98)*** (2.92)*** (1.85)* (1.98)** 
BM8!" 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 (1.71)* (1.72)* (0.70) (0.83) (1.19) (1.26) (0.35) (0.50) 
BM8!">6 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (1.18) (1.12) (0.86) (0.86) (0.12) (0.06) (0.28) (0.21) 
L	 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.006 
 (0.88) (3.40)*** (0.96) (3.00)*** (1.13) (4.05)*** (1.17) (3.59)*** 
@ 0.78 0.78 0.76 0.76 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.85 
qrI
@  0.78 0.78 0.75 0.76 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.84 
M 169.70 185.44 150.12 169.08 231.17 237.52 191.55 207.07 
 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test statistics are calcu-
lated using two-way clustering at the firm and year level (e.g., Petersen 2008; Gow et al. 2010). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 13, Table 15 and Table 16 show the results for absolute discretionary LLP on omitted 
variables. For the set of further controls, we find significant coefficients when these have 
not been added to the first stage of the regressions. Since ; <!" and B<;!", are likely 
to capture EM incentives of capital management and earnings smoothing, we cannot dis-
tinguish between signs of high or low quality of the respective model. 
Table 15 – Multivariate regressions of absolute DLLP on OMV for static and dynamic two-way models 
Multivariate regressions to study omitted correlated variables in static models S1-S4 and dynamic models D1-D4 
Dependent variable: absolute value of discretionary loan loss provisions (==<__) 
==<__!" = ) + 56==<!">6 + 5@D9H!" + 5F; <!" + 5SB<;!" + 5T∆JK<!" + 5U∆C<!" + 5V==<!" + 5WC8G b!" +
5Y=8DD!" + 56*=89 !" + 5669B97!" + 56@BM8!">6 + 56FBM8!" + 56SBM8!"E6 + :!  
 S1 S2 S3 S4 D1 D2 D3 D4 
==<!">6 -0.020 -0.028 -0.030 -0.035 0.053 0.045 0.033 0.027 
 (0.86) (1.25) (1.43) (1.95)* (1.05) (0.96) (0.82) (0.70) 
D9H!" -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (2.30)** (1.29) (1.77)* (0.84) (2.45)** (1.87)* (2.23)** (1.49) 
; <!" -0.048 -0.038 -0.046 -0.036 -0.054 -0.042 -0.051 -0.041 
 (2.98)*** (3.05)*** (2.88)*** (2.93)*** (3.68)*** (3.20)*** (3.38)*** (3.09)*** 
B<;!" 0.010 0.008 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.007 
 (2.03)** (1.13) (1.97)** (1.15) (1.27) (0.84) (1.46) (0.98) 
∆JK<!" -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (1.99)** (2.08)** (1.88)* (1.94)* (1.53) (1.77)* (1.49) (1.65)* 
∆C<!" -0.040 -0.038 -0.035 -0.033 -0.037 -0.039 -0.032 -0.032 
 (2.31)** (2.20)** (2.21)** (2.11)** (1.87)* (1.99)** (1.79)* (1.87)* 
==<!" 0.410 0.400 0.407 0.398 0.359 0.353 0.364 0.358 
 (16.82)*** (16.14)*** (14.67)*** (15.21)*** (11.74)*** (12.43)*** (10.12)*** (10.68)*** 
C8G b!" 0.005 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.014 0.007 0.009 0.004 
 (0.53) (0.30) (0.32) (0.30) (2.68)*** (0.95) (1.35) (0.47) 
=8DD!" -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.29) (0.06) (0.03) (0.14) (0.42) (0.16) (0.04) (0.13) 
=89 !" 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.57) (0.09) (1.09) (0.52) (0.51) (0.92) (0.02) (0.28) 
9B97!" 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.71) (0.49) (1.01) (0.83) (0.26) (0.49) (0.15) (0.13) 
BM8!"E6 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.76) (0.62)  (3.10)*** (0.85) (0.92) (1.11) (1.11) 
BM8!" -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (2.75)*** (2.20)** (3.68)*** (3.35)*** (1.69)* (1.93)* (1.81)* (2.12)** 
BM8!">6 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 
 (2.52)** (1.99)** (1.99)** (1.77)* (2.02)** (1.81)* (1.46) (1.41) 
L	 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 (2.48)** (1.87)* (1.77)* (1.32) (2.45)** (2.20)** (2.03)** (1.70)* 
@ 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.48 
qrI
@  0.47 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.48 
M 35.08 32.29 36.02 32.89 30.13 27.87 30.49 27.98 
 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test statistics are calcu-
lated using two-way clustering at the firm and year level (e.g., Petersen 2008; Gow et al. 2010). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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For models S2, S4, D2 & D4 where we include the further set of controls, significances 
and therefore influences of size and capital adequacy on the inferences drawn from the 
model are no longer existent.46 This could also entail disproportionate exclusion of dis-
cretionary variation from the total LLP, which would decrease the quality of the model. 
What is more, we still find significant regressors for ; <!".
47 Altogether, adding a fur-
ther set of controls should follow careful considerations of which inferences are to be 
drawn and possible non-linearity of the variables. When we compare the results for the 
coefficients on the variables C8G b!", =89 !", 9B97!" and the CFO variables 
in Table 12, Table 14 and Table 16 contain multivariate regressions of the signed discretion-
ary LLP on omitted variables for all models. We use the regressions on signed discretion-
ary LLP to study probable non-linearity issues of variables that have been included in the 
first stage. In Table 14, we find significant coefficients for the further set of controls for 
size, performance and capital requirements. 
Table 12, Table 14 & Table 16, we find significant influences on the variation of non-abso-
lute discretionary LLP. In contrast, we do not find consistent results for the absolute value 
of discretionary LLP except for BM8!" and BM8!">6. Even though all of these omitted and 
possibly correlated variables do not seem to significantly influence the variation of 
==<__!", they seem to explain variation of discretionary LLP to a certain degree, as 
indicated by the significances for the regressions using signed values. Therefore, includ-
ing these variables in the first-stage of the EM modelling process could help explain con-
siderable variation of total LLP. If this variation turns out to be mostly non-discretionary, 
inferences drawn from the second stage could be consolidated. In particular, mapping the 
relationship between cash-flows and non-discretionary variation of total LLP by includ-
ing all three (e.g., McNichols 2002) or certain fractions of CFO into a model could im-
prove the quality of our discretionary LLP proxy. 
  
                                                          
46 However, when regressions use system GMM in the first stage (Table 16), influences of size, performance and capital adequacy 
are still pronounced, especially when they are included in the first place. Still left with two possible explanations, these results indi-
cate less proper exclusion of variation caused by these variables on the first stage compared to the remaining models. 
47 We are still left with two alternative explanations, hence the lacking isolation of non-discretionary and discretionary LLP and the 
recognition of EM through the model 
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Table 16 – Multivariate regressions of signed and absolute DLLP on OMV for dynamic GMM models 
Multivariate regressions to study omitted correlated variables in dynamic models D1-D4 using system GMM 
 Dependent variable: signed value of discretionary loan 
loss provisions (==<) 
Dependent variable: absolute value of discretionary loan 
loss provisions (==<__) 
==<!"	(==<__!") = ) + 56==<!">6 + 5@D9H!" + 5F; <!" + 5SB<;!" + 5T∆JK<!" + 5U∆C<!" + 5V==<!" +
5WC8G b!" + 5Y=8DD!" + 56*=89 !" + 5669B97!" + 56@BM8!">6 + 56FBM8!" + 56SBM8!"E6 + :!  
==<!">6 -0.379 -0.268 -0.424 -0.290 0.064 -0.063 0.042 -0.062 
 (15.58)*** (11.52)*** (19.08)*** (13.72)*** (1.31) (2.56)** (0.72) (2.61)*** 
D9H!" 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (1.84)* (7.14)*** (1.92)* (7.81)*** (2.08)** (2.10)** (1.44) (2.09)** 
; <!" 0.015 -0.057 0.020 -0.044 -0.051 -0.057 -0.059 -0.054 
 (0.77) (2.21)** (0.91) (1.80)* (3.57)*** (1.67)* (3.19)*** (1.66)* 
B<;!" 0.010 0.243 0.007 0.220 0.007 0.098 0.007 0.089 
 (1.42) (28.24)*** (1.31) (28.04)*** (1.34) (5.90)*** (1.02) (5.82)*** 
∆JK<!" -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 -0.011 -0.004 0.006 -0.003 0.005 
 (4.51)*** (4.29)*** (3.05)*** (4.29)*** (3.64)*** (2.05)** (1.52) (1.79)* 
∆C<!" -0.035 -0.041 -0.019 -0.042 -0.047 0.068 -0.030 0.059 
 (1.37) (1.48) (0.52) (1.40) (3.02)*** (2.01)** (1.26) (1.79)* 
==<!" 0.787 0.772 0.872 0.786 0.341 0.242 0.344 0.248 
 (27.25)*** (32.02)*** (42.61)*** (38.12)*** (6.92)*** (5.45)*** (7.68)*** (5.90)*** 
C8G b!" 0.014 0.079 -0.008 0.075 0.007 0.002 0.010 -0.002 
 (0.66) (4.43)*** (0.43) (4.45)*** (0.72) (0.10) (0.91) (0.13) 
=8DD!" -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.001 
 (2.32)** (2.72)*** (1.85)* (2.56)** (0.65) (1.88)* (0.57) (1.78)* 
=89 !" -0.006 -0.014 -0.016 -0.015 -0.000 -0.006 -0.001 -0.005 
 (6.67)*** (15.47)*** (19.60)*** (18.59)*** (0.04) (3.85)*** (1.07) (3.86)*** 
9B97!" 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.05) (1.71)* (0.34) (1.63) (0.87) (0.98) (0.97) (1.04) 
BM8!"E6 -0.005 -0.011 -0.008 -0.011 0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 
 (1.73)* (2.22)** (3.08)*** (2.37)** (0.54) (1.73)* (0.78) (1.91)* 
BM8!" 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.54) (0.92) (1.46) (0.98) (2.15)** (0.89) (1.83)* (0.91) 
BM8!">6 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.001 
 (1.06) (0.59) (0.46) (0.59) (2.24)** (0.02) (4.08)*** (0.11) 
L	 -0.002 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.005 -0.010 0.006 -0.009 
 (0.55) (1.69)* (1.84)* (2.71)*** (2.55)** (1.90)* (3.07)*** (1.81)* 
@ 0.62 0.80 0.67 0.80 0.42 0.26 0.35 0.26 
qrI
@  0.62 0.80 0.67 0.80 0.41 0.26 0.34 0.26 
M 62.72 433.92 116.64 417.30 22.57 18.49 19.26 18.83 
 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test statistics are calcu-
lated using two-way clustering at the firm and year level (e.g., Petersen 2008; Gow et al. 2010). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
2.1.4.5 Test for prediction power 
Table 17, Table 18 and Table 19 include the results of the prediction power test procedure.48 
To analyse the results, we differentiate between two odds. The first value 
(B	

L		B'c = 1) indicates the percentage of observations, in which our regres-
sion results, given that probable EM had been criticized by the SEC or restated by the 
firm, correctly predicts EM (Odds > 0.5; positive prediction). The second value shows 
                                                          
48 We have to exclude all banks without an entry at the SEC, which reduces our sample to 1,826 firm-year observations. 
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the respective percentage of observations, in which no EM is predicted (Odds < 0.5; neg-
ative prediction), given that the SEC or firm had issued no comment or restatement letters 
on EM related topics. Therefore, a higher value in both percentages indicates a better 
prediction power. 
Table 17 shows the results for basic models. Model B1 accomplishes to positively predict 
20.27% cases of potential EM. Adding more explanatory variables into the regression 
substantially increases the positive prediction power. The only exception is model B4, 
which is not surprising, as the sole inclusion of B8!" already has no improving effect on 
the first stage, as indicated by the differences in adjusted @ and BIC we discussed earlier. 
The highest increase in positive prediction power is achieved by including the non-per-
forming assets pattern (<!">6 and ∆<!"), either solely (27.99%) or in combination 
with =G!">6 (28.73%). However, the combination of NPA and NCO patterns results in 
the highest positive prediction value (28.98%). Regarding negative predictions, the re-
sults only vary by a small margin (86.20% to 85.03%). Overall, B7 seems to produce the 
best trade-off between positive and negative predictions.  
The results for static and dynamic models vary by a large margin. The highest positive 
prediction values are achieved in models S1 and S3 (29.73%). The addition of controls 
for size, performance and capital requirement decreases the positive prediction power by 
a large portion (26.99% in S2 and 28.98% in S4), which might underline that these con-
trols (particularly performance and capital adequacy) capture actual EM to some degree. 
Given the assumption of actual use of EM in every year, an inclusion of these variables 
results in the removal of discretionary variation from total LLP in the first stage, which 
leaves the resulting proxy with a lower probability of verifying EM when it actually oc-
curs. 
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What is more, the introduction of a dynamic modelling already seems to introduce addi-
tional bias. Model D1 achieves the lowest positive prediction power, with only 24.00%, 
which is even lower than most of the basic models. Likewise all other dynamic models 
produce less appropriate proxies for means of predicting EM. We present two explana-
tions for this result. First, the introduction of an additional lagged dependent variable as 
a regressor does not add any value to modelling non-discretionary variation in total LLP, 
but actually colludes with discretionary LLP in the current year. Second, simple assump-
tion of no endogeneity in the models estimated using pooled OLS with two-way cluster-
ing tends to lead to biased coefficients for this variable and therefore biases the resulting 
discretionary proxies. To cancel out the second reason, we alternatively apply the dy-
namic models with a system GMM estimator. Here, results vary widely. For model D1, 
the positive prediction value increases from 24.00% to 27.39%, while it is still consider-
ably lower than the prediction value for model S1 (29.73%). For all other models, values 
decrease substantially, i.e. for model D2 the positive prediction value more than halves 
from 25.25% to 12.31%.49 These results could indicate that that our first explanation for 
the decrease in positive prediction power for dynamic modelling approaches is valid. 
However, we cannot cancel out that estimation efficiency of system GMM estimators is 
lacking in our small sample size or the remaining regressors in the first-stage regressions 
should also be assumed to be endogenous to produce appropriate results (e.g., Bouvatier 
et al. 2014).50 
2.1.5 Conclusion 
This study tries to analyse modelling of EM in the banking sector. In particular, we ana-
lyse the prior literature and identify common specification patterns, examine them and 
thereby set up various models that capture commonly used specification pattern parts. 
Consequently, we apply various established statistical methods to test the validity of the 
models concerning measurement errors, omitted variable biases and prediction power. 
What is more, we investigate basic models for settings with data limitations, which are 
                                                          
49 This result is in line with the problem of including the set of further controls discussed earlier. Regarding the negative prediction 
power, models D1 and D4 result in the best negative prediction values (88.65% and 87.77%), which is likely to be caused by the 
decrease in positive prediction power, hence no sign of efficient modelling. 
50 As discussed earlier, such an assumption would question most of the applied specifications in bank accounting research, which 
assume all regressors to be exogenous. 
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characterised by the absence of potential important specification pattern groups. Applying 
these models, we additionally try to gain insights with regard to the influence on explan-
atory and predictive power. 
Our results show that the pattern group of non-performing assets is by far the most im-
portant influencing factor of non-discretionary variation and therefore a potentially non-
disputable data insufficiency variable. The pattern group loan loss allowances can en-
hance modelling if solely used, but loses most of its explanatory and predictive power 
when used in combination with the NPA patterns. NCO patterns seem to be dispensable, 
as they exert only limited influence on non-discretionary variation in first stage regres-
sions and only if used together with NPA patterns. Dynamic models could be superior to 
static models and should be applied, as there is no loss in observations, if NPA patterns 
are already used in first stage regression. However, the efficient application of dynamic 
modelling has to be examined, e.g., choice of estimators. Regarding measurement errors 
and extreme performance bias, our results indicate that commonly used EM proxies do 
not suffer from measurement errors but are correlated with extreme CFO performance. 
Tests of omitted and possibly correlated variables uncover some interesting insights re-
garding size, performance and capital requirements. All of these variables seem to influ-
ence loan loss provisioning in a non-linear way and should therefore be implemented as 
such. Moreover, our results indicate that the inclusion of certain variables, e.g., variables 
for growth, income diversification, loan intensity and cash flows may potentially improve 
the quality of EM proxies. 
The results for the prediction power test are somewhat different from first stage results. 
For our data limitation models, we see an increase in positive prediction power in accord-
ance with the results of the first stage regressions: NPA is a main driver of positive pre-
dictive power. Regarding the full-specified static and dynamic models, we see that intro-
duction of D9H!", ; <!" and B<;!" reduces the positive prediction power, while ad-
ditional lags and forwards of NPA have no effect. Regarding static and dynamic models, 
the result differs compared to the first stage regression. Positive prediction power de-
creases by a large margin. Hence, in research environments, in which the prediction 
power of EM proxies is relevant, static models are superior. 
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This study also has some possible limitations. The proposed and tested models as well as 
the strand of literature focusing on residual proxies could suffer from insufficient separa-
tion of non-discretionary and discretionary accrual parts on the first stage, making two-
step approaches a biased way of modelling. In particular, when correlated non-discretion-
ary variables explaining variation in the discretionary proxy that actually includes non-
discretionary variation are not included on the second stage. However, none of our anal-
yses could be applied in a one-step approach and we try to ex-post check for the validity 
of the models in this regard. Furthermore, we focus only on one accrual, which cancels 
out noisy variation in the total accrual amount caused by any other accrual we are not 
able to map with our non-discretionary regressors. However, we propose future research 
papers to check for the robustness of their results using both one- and two-step ap-
proaches, while using residuals from the first-stage for descriptive reasons. Future re-
search should also focus on integrating our omitted and possibly correlated variables to 
further check for the robustness of their results and possibly improve their modelling of 
discretionary LLP. This could help to improve the specifications and therefore the mod-
elling process of EM going forward. 
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2.2 Earnings management modelling in non-financial industries 
For the accounting literature and its focus on non-financial industry companies, the de-
velopment over time is easily despicable. Healy (1985) is the first author to propose a 
measurement of discretionary accruals. The author assumes that the non-discretionary 
part of total accruals equals the mean of total accruals during the observed period, indi-
cating that a change in total accruals is attributable to discretionary behaviour.51 Jones 
(1991) resolves this restriction and proposes the first estimation-based model, which is 
able to determine non-discretionary parts from the coefficients of economic figures that 
reflect the state of the firm. The author uses change in revenue and property, plant and 
equipment as regressors. This modelling approach follows the idea that the applied eco-
nomic variables are largely connected with non-discretionary, while the discretionary part 
can be captured as the residual from the regression. The modified Jones model (DeFond 
& Subramanyam 1998) additionally considers possible discretionary revenue changes 
caused by manipulated changes in receivables, while Dechow and Sloan (1991) propose 
another model, which relaxes the assumption of constant non-discretionary accruals in 
their so-called „Industry Model“. The authors also use an estimation model, but assume 
that variations in the determinants of non-discretionary accruals are similar in firms of 
the same industry. Several other attempts to improve the modelling process exist.52 
McNichols (2002) develops one of the more recent models by combining Jones with the 
quality of accruals model proposed by Dechow and Dichev (2002). The McNichols model 
therefore adds regressors for lagged, current and forward operating cash flows to the spec-
ification and shows that the enhanced model has a significantly higher explanatory power 
than the Jones model. 
Dechow et al. (1995) analyse the applied models and find that the modified Jones model 
has the highest explanatory power53, while correlation with financial performance seems 
                                                          
51 The model by DeAngelo (1986) is a special case of Healy (1985), in which the author assumes that EM is not present in periods 
without EM incentives, hence defining the non-discretionary part of accruals as the total accruals in the year before the incentive 
year. Both models suffer under the assumption of permanence of non-discretionary accruals while ignoring the economic context. 
52 See Dechow et al. (2003) and Dechow et al. (1995) for two major attempts to study and develop the discretionary accruals model-
ling process for the non-financial industries. 
53 However, the authors do not test the validity of the McNichols model. Since McNichols (2002) shows that this alteration is supe-
rior compared to the Jones models, this model is applied whenever data sufficiency is not an issue. Since the analysis in chapter 3 
would lose a considerable amount of observations, the McNichols model is only used for robustness tests. 
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to be an issue for all models. On top of that, Kothari et al. (2005) show that performance 
control can help decrease the probability of over-detection of EM (type I errors) resulting 
from a high correlation of firm performance and total accruals that would bias discretion-
ary accruals. Therefore appropriate performance control is applied by adding a regressor 
for firm performance to the models. Alternatively, Kothari et al. (2005) suggest matching 
firm-year observations of the year and industry and subtracting the discretionary accrual 
of the matched firm. However, the matching approach can lead to an over-correction for 
performance. E.g., when a firm has positive discretionary accruals due to high EM and 
the matched firm might have comparably high positive discretionary accruals, not due to 
bad fitting of the EM model, but because both firms have comparable EM incentives. 
Then performance matching would correct for actual EM and hence distort the results on 
the null hypothesis of no EM in a way that it accepts the null. Kothari et al. (2005) propose 
that only the even-related EM component is what is of interest for the researcher. When 
all other incentives as well as the remaining discretionary accrual component are equal, 
there is no need to worry about over-correction of performance matching. However, this 
assumption is very strict and many studies test for general EM behavior in special settings 
instead of only testing for special events like seasoned equity offerings. Performance 
matching therefore produces “abnormal” EM that is predestined to detect EM performed 
to meet special incentives that do not exist in the control group. Within the settings in 
chapter 3 & 4, the integration of an additional regressor for performance controls for the 
influence of the earnings position of the respective firm in a better way. 
The analyses in chapters 3 & 4 use several EM models for robustness reasons. Both stud-
ies focus on accrual-based and real activities-based types of EM. The first uses discre-
tionary components of the total accruals of firm i in year t (BB!"). It reflects activities of 
changing the methods or estimates in financial statements after the fiscal-year end without 
altering cash flows (e.g., Subramanyam 1996; DeFond & Subramanyam 1998; Dechow 
& Dichev 2002; McNichols 2002; Dechow et al. 2003; Kothari et al. 2005). Although 
being not a direct consequence of financial reporting choices, the amount of REM used 
relates to the quality of the reported earnings numbers. The proxies for REM used in the 
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analyses follow Roychowdhury (2006) and Gunny (2010)54, who introduce models that 
capture various situations where managers alter business actions of the firm. First, over-
production within the firm is used to decrease total costs per unit55 and consequently costs 
of goods sold, therefore increasing operating margin and earnings. Operating cash flows 
(production costs) are then abnormally low (high). Second, firms may conduct sales ma-
nipulation in form of accelerated timing, e.g., price discounts, to increase sales volumes 
in the current period. This will boost earnings for all positive profit margins following 
sales manipulation. The decreased profit margins entail abnormally high production costs 
relative to revenues. Firms may also incorporate altered credit terms, leading to lower 
cash inflows from sales when interest rates are low (or even zero). This entails lower 
operating cash flows relative to sales compared to ex-ante conditions. Third, real activities 
may reduce discretionary expenses, which would reduce earnings in the current period. 
Expenses such as R&D, advertising and selling, general and administrative (SGA) do not 
convert into earnings in the same period, which makes them a target for REM. The ex-
pectations are abnormally low (high) discretionary expenses (operating cash flow) in 
years of manipulation. 
2.2.1 Earnings management models for the analysis in chapter 3 
 
In chapter 3, we use a dataset from 2007-2014 containing all German publicly listed cli-
ents of non-Big4 auditors with a total of 1.052 firm-year observations.56 To compute dis-
cretionary accruals, we use the modified, performance-matched Jones model (e.g., 
Subramanyam 1996; DeFond & Subramanyam 1998; Dechow et al. 2003; Kothari et al. 
2005). We therefore include lagged return on assets as a separate regressor in our first-
stage regression to control for performance: 
Equation	12	
BB!"  !">6⁄ = )* + )6 1  !">6⁄ + 56 (∆7!" − ∆!")  !">6⁄
+ 5@ <<!"  !">6⁄ + 5F8!">6 + :!" 
                                                          
54 The models by Gunny (2010) are used for robustness reasons in chapter 3. 
55 Under the assumption that fixed overhead costs per unit decrease more than marginal costs per unit possibly increase. 
56 For further details, see section 3.4.1. 
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We estimate Equation	12 using industry-year specific cross-sectional regressions.57 BB is 
earnings before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations.   is total assets. 
∆7 is change in revenues and ∆ change in accounts receivable during the year and 
<< is net property, plant and equipment of the year.58 8!">6 is the lagged return on 
assets. 
To account for REM, we collect abnormal production costs, abnormal operating cash-
flows and abnormal discretionary expenses. We follow related literature (e.g., Dechow et 
al. 1998; Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Badertscher 2011; Zang 2012) and 
estimate normal levels of operating cash flows as a linear function of revenues (7!") 
and change in revenues (∆7!"):
59 
Equation	13	
BM8!"  !">6⁄ = )* + )6 1  !">6⁄ + 56 7!"  !">6⁄ + 5@ ∆7!"  !">6⁄ + :!" 
We keep discretionary accruals estimation procedures for all REM proxies and collect 
abnormal production costs as the residual of the following model: 
Equation	14	
<8!"  !">6⁄
= )* + )6 1  !">6⁄ + 567!"  !">6⁄ + 5@ ∆7!"  !">6⁄
+ 5F ∆7!">6  !">6⁄ + :!" 
<8!" is the sum of costs of goods sold and change in inventories. Roychowdhury 
(2006) therefore combines the regressions in Equation	15 and Equation	16 for abnormal 
changes in inventories and abnormal costs of goods sold: 
	 	
                                                          
57 First-stage regressions using cross-sectional estimation can only use one-digit SIC and year combinations due to the limited num-
ber of observations on a two-digit SIC and year level, thereby decreasing efficiency of the estimation. On the other hand, estimation 
on the one-digit SIC code only allows for an aggregated non-stationarity of the coefficients. Therefore, we alternatively use pooled 
first-stage regressions with two-way clustering and appropriate fixed effects or a one-step approach. We discuss our results in sec-
tion 3.6 and 3.7. 
58 We follow Roychowdhury (2006) and use an additional scaled intercept ()6) as a separate regressor. We therefore allow for cases 
of non-zero discretionary accruals when all other regressors are zero. Additionally, we control for spurious correlation between in-
dependent and dependent variable caused by variation in the scaling variable. However, we keep the unscaled intercept, because 
there is no theoretical reason for the regression to go through the origin. Another important point is that we rely on the r-squared for 
our goodness-of-fit test, while the reliability of the r-square is questionable when the intercept is suppressed. 
59 Abnormal operating cash flows can be negative and positive when firms use all possibilities of REM. These effects compensate 
each other and decrease explanatory power (e.g., Chen et al. 2014). 
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Equation	15	
∆97!"  !">6⁄ = )* + )6 1  !">6⁄ + 56 ∆7!"  !">6⁄ + 5@ ∆7!">6  !">6⁄ + :!" 
The model assumes firm’s change in inventory happens when revenues deviate from their 
expected value of a random walk. This leads to a divergence of inventories from their 
expected value, resulting in a built up or liquidation of inventory stocks. Roychowdhury 
(2006) assumes last year’s change in sales to influence inventories as well, due to last 
year’s change in inventories, which likewise influences changes in inventories in the cur-
rent year. 
Equation	16	
B8CD!"  !">6⁄ = )* + )6 1  !">6⁄ + 56 7!"  !">6⁄ + :!" 
The model for costs of goods sold propose that earnings are a fixed proportion of current 
year’s revenues, while the remaining part is regarded as abnormal costs of goods sold. 
Therefore, we estimate normal levels of these expenses as a linear function of the reve-
nues (Dechow et al. 1998). 
We further obtain abnormal discretionary expenses as the residual of the following re-
gression, assuming a linear relation between normal expenses and last year’s revenues: 
Equation	17	
9D<!"  !">6⁄ = )* + )6 1  !">6⁄ + 56 7!">6  !">6⁄ + :!" 
We calculate 9D<!" as the sum of R&D, advertising and SGA expenses. 11
60  
Following Cohen et al. (2008), Chi et al. (2011) and Greiner et al. (2017), we use a com-
prehensive measure of REM by combining the three individual standardized measures in 
the following way (see Kim et al. 2012): K!" = BM8__!" − <8__!" +
9D<__!". Consequently, this standardized proxy for REM has a negative scaling, 
e.g., negative REM entail income-increasing, positive REM income-decreasing EM. 
                                                          
60 In cases where R&D expenses are not available while advertising and selling, general and administrative expenses are, R&D ex-
penses are set to zero (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Ali & Zhang 2015). 
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Table 20 contains results for industry-specific regressions. Results in the first column show 
the cross-sectional performance-matched modified Jones model (DeFond & Subraman-
yam 1998; Kothari et al. 2005), which is used in the regressions reported in chapter 3. 
Column 2 comprises coefficients for the cross-sectional adapted Jones model (Dechow et 
al. 2003), which accounts for the expected change in receivables that is assumed not to 
be due to EM. The model is performance-matched to achieve consistency with the mod-
ified Jones model: 
Equation	18	
BB!"  !">6⁄ = )* + )6 1  !">6⁄ + 56 ((1 + v)∆7!" − ∆!")  !">6⁄
+ 5@ <<!"  !">6⁄ + 5F8!">6 + :!" 
The slope parameter v represents the part of change in accounts receivable, which can be 
explained by the change in revenue. It evolves from the following separate industry-year 
specific regression: 
Equation	19	
∆!"  !">6⁄ = )* + )6 1  !">6⁄ + v ∆7!"  !">6⁄ + :!" 
The mean (median) value for the slope parameter/coefficient v is 0.1280 (0.1266).61 The 
third column shows results for the industry-specific McNichols (2002) model, which is 
discussed in more detail in the following paragraph on the AEM proxies for chapter 4. 
  
                                                          
61 In contrast to Dechow et al. (2003), positive and negative values of slope parameter v are included. Importantly, negative values 
of v are at least possible in cases of decreasing (increasing) working capital management performances, which lead to dispropor-
tionate positive (negative) changes of accounts receivable when revenues actually decrease (increase). 
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Table 20 – First stage regression results for discretionary accrual models (chapter 3) 
Mean coefficient estimates of discretionary accrual models based on 44 cross-sectional one-digit SIC-
year regressions 
 
 
Modified Jones 
-wwxy 
Coefficient 
Adapted Jones 
-wwxy 
Coefficient 
McNichols 
-wwxy 
Coefficient 
1  !">6⁄  433.630 437.014 444.745 
∆7!" − ∆!" 0.037   
<<!" -0.024 -0.028 -0.018 
8!">6 -0.005 -0.003  
(1 + v)∆7!" − ∆!"  0.038  
BM8!">6   0.158 
BM8!"   -0.644 
BM8!"E6   0.160 
∆7!"   0.111 

L -0.042 -0.042 -0.021 
z. @ 0.17 0.17 0.44 
 1,052 1,052 872 
We calculate weighted means of the coefficients and adjusted r-squared based on the number of observations 
of the respective one-digit SIC-year combination. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
Table 21 shows results for the cross-sectional regressions for the REM proxies. 
<8__!" contains the residual of the cross-sectional regression in column three using 
Equation	14. Abnormal discretionary expenses (column 2) and abnormal operating cash 
flows (column 1) are the residuals from cross-sectional regressions of Equation	17 and 
Equation	13. 
Table 21 – First stage regression results for REM models (chapter 3) 
Mean coefficient estimates of real activities earnings management models based on 44 cross-sectional 
one-digit SIC-year regressions 
 
 
Abnormal CFO 
w|}xy 
Coefficient 
Abnormal DISXP 
m~.Nxy 
Coefficient 
Abnormal PROD 
N}mxy 
Coefficient 
1  !">6⁄  -831.524 1,398.817 -911.538 
7!" 0.056  0.715 
∆7!" 0.062  -0.000 
7!">6  0.159  
∆7!">6   0.061 

L 0.014 0.154 -0.087 
z. @ 0.28 0.28 0.75 
 1,052 1,052 1,052 
We calculate weighted means of the coefficients and adjusted r-squared based on the number of observations 
of the respective one-digit SIC-year combination. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
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We additionally apply the models proposed by Gunny (2010) to comprehend an alterna-
tive proxy for REM. Specifically, estimation of discretionary expenses is split into sepa-
rate regressions for discretionary R&D and SGA expenses: 
Equation	20	
&!"  !">6⁄ = )* + )6 1  !">6⁄ + 56D!" + 5@ 	_′c!" + 5F 9 !"  !">6⁄
+ 5F &!">6  !">6⁄ + :!" 
Equation	21	
DC!"  !">6⁄ = )* + )6 1  !">6⁄ + 56D!" + 5@ 	_′c!" + 5F 9 !"  !">6⁄
+ 5S ∆7!"  !">6⁄ + 5T(∆7!"  !">6⁄ ) ∗ !" + :!" 
Compared to Roychowdhury (2006), Gunny (2010) uses additional market-based size 
(D!") as a control in both regressions. Greiner et al. (2017) further comment that this 
market valuation controls for auditor’s unrevealed information that has already been in-
corporated by the market. Gunny (2010) also implements  	_′c!", calculated as sum 
of market value of equity, preferred stocks, long- and short-term debt divided by lagged 
total assets as a new regressor to capture the effect of the marginal cost to benefit relation 
that could majorly influence decisions to invest. In addition, 9 !" controls for the actual 
funds available for investments, comprehended as sum of income before extraordinary 
items, R&D and depreciation. 
To estimate abnormal R&D expenses in Equation	20, &!">6 is further included and cap-
tures the R&D position of the firm at the beginning of the fiscal year.62 What is more, to 
estimate abnormal SGA expenses in Equation	21, Gunny (2010) includes two regressors 
for the change in revenue, which account for the “stickiness” of costs. Anderson et al. 
(2003) show that increases in costs associated with increases in revenues are more pro-
nounced than the decreases in costs with decreases in revenues due to adjustment costs to 
decrease cost levels being higher than maintaining costs levels for unutilized resources, 
                                                          
62 In contrast to Gunny (2010), we claim that estimating a dynamic model using cross-sectional regressions could be biased, since 
the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as a regressor results in considerable endogeneity. Therefore, we alternatively esti-
mate this model using system GMM panel estimator by Arellano and Bover (1995) as well as Blundell and Bond (1998) with Wind-
meijer correction (Windmeijer 2005) assuming &!">6 to be endogenous including all lags as possible instruments. 
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especially when cost decreases are not expected to be long-term. 5T captures the addi-
tional effect for decreases in revenues ( is an indicator that is one if there is an decrease 
from t-1 to t, zero otherwise), while 5S embodies the initial effect. 
To collocate alternative abnormal production costs, Gunny (2010) extends the regression 
proposed by Roychowdhury (2006) by the two already explained components D!" and 
 	_′c!": 
Equation	22	
<8!"  !">6⁄
= )* + )6 1  !">6⁄ + 56D!" + 5@ 	_′c!" + 5F 7!"  !">6⁄
+ 5S ∆7!"  !">6⁄ + 5T ∆7!">6  !">6⁄ + :!" 
We comprehend our alternative REM proxy in accordance with the already discussed 
negative scaled calculation from the residuals of Equation	20, Equation	21 and Equation	22.63 
2.2.2 Earnings management models for the analysis in chapter 4 
In chapter 4, we alternatively use a dataset with all European ASSET4 firms available in 
the Thomson Reuters database from 2005 to 2014 with 2.733 firm-year observations.64 
To compute AEM, we alternatively use the McNichols (2002) model, which links the 
discretionary accruals model by Jones (1991) and the accruals’ earnings quality model by 
Dechow and Dichev (2002): 
Equation	23	
BB!"  !">6⁄ = )* + )6 1  !">6⁄ + 56 BM8!">6  !">6⁄ + 5@ BM8!"  !">6⁄
+ 5F BM8!"E6  !">6⁄ + 5S ∆7!"  !">6⁄ + 5T <<!"  !">6⁄
+ 5U ∆C<I" C<I">6⁄ + :!" 
We estimate Equation	23 cross-sectionally for each industry-year combination based on 
the two-digit SIC code. BB!" is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items minus 
the cash flow from operations. BM8!" (BM8!">6, BM8!"E6) is the net cash flow from oper-
ations in year t (t-1, t+1). ∆7!" is the change in revenues, and <<!" is net property, 
                                                          
63 First-stage regression results are comparable to Gunny (2010) and are not tabulated here. 
64 For further details, see section 4.3.1. 
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plant and equipment. All these variables are scaled by lagged total assets ( !">6). Con-
tinuous control for macroeconomic effects is used due to the lack of a number of obser-
vations for an industry-year-country specific estimation. The study follows Cohen et al. 
(2008) and applies changes in the gross domestic product (∆C<I") of the respective 
country j, in which firm i is located, for year t.65 Consequently, we comprehend our AEM 
proxy, absolute discretionary accruals (BB__!"), as the absolute value of the residual 
from Equation	23. To measure the magnitude of REM (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen 
et al. 2008; Cohen & Zarowin 2010; Badertscher 2011; Zang 2012) we again follow the 
approach by Roychowdhury (2006).66  
Table 22 contains results for industry-specific regressions. Results in the first column show 
the McNichols (2002) model, which we use throughout the analysis in chapter 3. Column 
2 and 3 show the coefficients for the cross-sectional modified and adapted Jones models, 
which are used in robustness analyses.67 
Table 22 – First stage regression results for discretionary accrual models (chapter 4) 
Mean coefficient estimates of discretionary accrual models based on 160 cross-sectional two-digit 
SIC-year regressions 
 
 
McNichols 
-wwxy 
Coefficient 
Modified Jones 
-wwxy 
Coefficient 
Adapted Jones 
-wwxy 
Coefficient 
1  !">6⁄  2,302.885 -1,596.643 -2,594.696 
BM8!">6 0.223   
BM8!" -0.645   
BM8!"E6 0.160   
∆7!" 0.065   
<<!" -0.031 -0.067 -0.066 
∆C<I" 0.186 0.145 0.130 
∆7!" − ∆!"  0.001  
8!">6  0.205 0.209 
(1 + v)∆7!" − ∆!"   0.006 

L -0.035 -0.060 -0.059 
z. @ 0.40 0.19 0.18 
 2,733 2,733 2,733 
We calculate weighted means of the coefficients and adjusted r-squared based on the number of observations 
of the respective one-digit SIC-year combination. All variables are defined in Appendix D. 
                                                          
65 Various dichotomous country indicators control for equivalent effects but significantly decrease the estimation efficiency due to the 
overall limitation of observations within each two-digit SIC-year grouping. 
66 See chapter 2.2.1 for a detailed discussion of all other models. To account for the differences in the samples, we additionally in-
clude changes in gross domestic product to account for country specific macroeconomic effects. 
67 The mean (median) value for the slope parameter/coefficient v is 0.1561 (0.1464). Again, we include positive and negative values 
of v. 
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Table 23 shows results for the cross-sectional regressions for the REM proxies. Again, we 
report mean coefficients of the cross-sectional regression of Equation	13 in column one, 
Equation	17 in column two and Equation	14 in column three. 
Table 23 – First stage regression results for REM models (chapter 4) 
Mean coefficient estimates of real activities earnings management models based on 160 cross-sec-
tional two-digit SIC-year regressions 
 
 
Abnormal CFO 
w|}xy 
Coefficient 
Abnormal DISXP 
m~.Nxy 
Coefficient 
Abnormal PROD 
N}mxy 
Coefficient 
1  !">6⁄  11,337.080 41,966.920 -43,073.020 
7!" 0.042  0.810 
7!" 0.110  -0.057 
∆C<I" 0.015 -0.459 -0.478 
7!">6  0.130  
7!">6   -0.101 

L 0.075 0.140 -0.210 
z. @ 0.30 0.31 0.84 
 2,733 2,733 2,733 
We calculate weighted means of the coefficients and adjusted r-squared based on the number of observations 
of the respective one-digit SIC-year combination. All variables are defined in Appendix D. 
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3 The influence of client importance on accrual and 
real activities earnings management in the small and 
midsized audit market for listed clients68 
“Judging whether something is material or not is important, because it deter-
mines whether information is included or excluded from the financial state-
ments. […] We know this can be tricky.” Hoogervorst (2017) 
The IASB aims at providing intensive guidance on how companies should apply stand-
ards. However, in the case of opportunistic behaviour by the management, it is inevitable 
not only to provide thorough standards, but also further ensure reliability of the infor-
mation disclosed, i.e., whether the decision about the materiality of a transaction is rea-
sonable. 
Gaynor et al. (2016) distinguish between preparer’s characteristics, task characteristics 
and environmental characteristics in their framework shown in Figure 3. Among others, 
management’s opportunistic incentives can be seen as important preparer characteristics 
(Dechow et al. 1996; Cheng & Warfield 2005; Bergstresser & Philippon 2006). The com-
plexity of the business transactions of the firm and the attached degree of reporting dis-
cretion shape the task characteristics of financial reporting (Dechow & Dichev 2002; 
Bratten et al. 2016). In addition, various environmental characteristics exist, e.g., internal 
controls and internal audit, the legal system, the supervisory board and the audit commit-
tee. These can already help ensure the conformity of accounting decisions (Dechow et al. 
1996; Beasley 1996; Klein 2002; Leuz et al. 2003; Prawitt et al. 2009). However, the 
ambition to provide reliability of the disclosed information has raised the demand for 
external auditing. Again, certain auditor and task characteristics exist, while environmen-
tal characteristics prevail. 
                                                          
68 This chapter is based on a 2017 version of a working paper titled “Exerting oneself in the market for PIEs? A fresh look at client 
importance for small and midsized auditors”, which is co-authored by Hansrudi Lenz. The reasoning, results, and interpretations of 
this might change after the submission of this thesis and the completion of the doctoral degree. The most recent version of this study 
is available upon request. Please do not cite this working paper without permission. 
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Figure 3 – Input and environmental variables for audit quality and financial reporting quality 
 
Source: Gaynor et al. (2016), p. 8. 
Given the expertise and pursuit of profit of the auditor together with the underlying com-
plexity of the firm and therefore the financial information (Bonner 2008), the auditor 
pursues to confirm or enhance the quality of the financial reporting provided by the man-
agement. To be able to rely on audited financial information, it is important to study audit 
quality and its influence on the financial reporting quality, e.g., earnings management 
(EM). The following study deals with the independence of the auditor and question 
whether we can draw inferences from the degree of dependence on the quality of the audit 
and therefore the amount of EM possibly used by the management. 
3.1 Introduction 
Business activities of audit firms create an economic dependence from audit clients. An 
audit firm intends to keep existing client relations intact over time and looks for new 
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clients. If an auditor does not agree with management’s or the supervisory board’s view 
in accounting subjects and the dispute eventually leads to a modified, e.g., qualified or 
adverse opinion, she runs into the risk of losing the client because the responsible body 
of the client may threat the auditor with the loss of audit and non-audit services in the 
following years (e.g., Leffson 1995; European Commission 1996; Tepalagul & Lin 2015). 
This threat in conjunction with the intense competition in the audit market (e.g., Köhler 
et al. 2010; Zülch et al. 2010) may entice the auditor to acquiesce to the client’s demands. 
If the auditor does so she runs into reputation and/or litigation risks, e.g., she will lose 
future income streams from other audit clients. However, if the revenues from a single 
audit client represent a material percentage of the total revenues of the audit firm and a 
compensation of a potential client loss is not possible then there is a material threat with 
respect to the economic independence of the respective audit firm. Accounting research 
uses various terms for this phenomenon, e.g., client importance, economic bonding, in-
dependence or dependence threat, while most studies regard it as a crucial input factor for 
the quality of the audit (e.g., Gaynor et al. 2016). 
Furthermore, DeAngelo (1981a,b) proposes that small and midsized audit firms, having 
a smaller number of clients and rather empty pockets (e.g., DeFond & Zhang 2014), are 
more likely to run into the risk of economic bonding compared to their large Big N coun-
terparts. The risk of losing other audit clients in the case of a following audit failure should 
be comparably lower than the financial consequences of the loss of a significant single 
large audit client (e.g., DeAngelo 1981b; DeFond & Zhang 2014). What is more, the 
financial loss is even higher if the auditor not only loses the audit fees but also the non-
audit fees resulting from other permissible assurance and consulting services. Additional 
non-audit services lead to higher total revenues from a single audit client and are often-
times more lucrative than audit services, which is also why the economic interests of an 
audit firm may gradually shift from audit to non-audit services.69 The threat is that these 
financial incentives might dominate professional ethical standards of conduct, such as 
                                                          
69 Some auditors might see the mandatory audit only as a commodity, e.g., an “exchangeable service with the price as the central 
distinction criteria” (Naumann 2008), resulting in an increase of low balling incentives in the competition for new clients (e.g., priz-
ing the audit below costs; DeAngelo 1981a) in exchange for future quasi-rents, particularly from non-audit services. 
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objectivity and due care, and culminate in impaired audit quality (e.g., Ludewig 2002; 
Pfitzer 2006; European Union 2014). 
However, prior empirical studies focus on studying financial independence threats based 
on published audit fees of listed Prime Standard firms (e.g., Bauer 2005; Lenz et al. 
2006a; Krauß 2008; Petersen & Zwirner 2008; Zimmermann 2008; Bigus & Zimmer-
mann 2009; Zülch et al. 2009; Zülch et al. 2010; Lopatta et al. 2015), while these PIEs 
are predominantly audited by Big N auditors (e.g., for Germany the Big4 and BDO). In 
contrast, there are only few studies with special emphasis on smaller audit firms, partly 
because these auditors mainly provide audit services to firms that are not listed in the 
most prominent stock exchange segments. One reason for this focus on Big N auditors is 
their market share in the important U.S. market, while for other settings data insufficien-
cies have been prevalent for smaller audit firms.70 Decisively, since small auditors only 
have a small number of PIE clients, detailed information about the total revenue of the 
auditor is inevitable to calculate reasonable client importance indicators for non-Big N 
audit firms. Most prior studies measure client importance only based on a specific market 
segment, e.g., they use the sum of total revenues for an audit office or the audit firm from 
this specific setting as the denominator and do not consider the revenues from all clients 
of the office or firm.71 
Consequently, major parts of the related literature find higher quality audits for clients 
audited by Big N auditors (e.g., Francis et al. 1999; Kim et al. 2003; Farber 2005; Lennox 
& Pittman 2010), while the European Commission explicitly asked in its Green Book 
whether the maximum fee from a single client should be restricted (e.g., European Com-
mission 2010). As a result, the European legislator72 has decided that if total fees received 
from a public-interest entity (PIE) in each of the last three consecutive financial years are 
more than 15 % of the total fees received by the statutory auditor in each of these financial 
                                                          
70 E.g., for Germany the legislator introduced the duty to publish transparency reports according to sect. 55c WPO (old version) with 
some aggregated financial information only in April 2008. 
71 Notable exceptions are Chung and Kallapur (2003) for the U.S. Big4 market and Sattler (2011), Quick and Sattler (2011a,b) and 
Lopatta et al. (2015) for the German Big4 market using total revenues from all clients as a correct denominator for client importance 
ratios. We follow this line of research. 
72 According to Art. 10, par. 3 EU Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 (European Union 2014) for all financial years following June 
2016. 
D a n i e l  N o r b e r t  S c h a u p p  Earnings Management in the Context of Earnings Quality,  
Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
P a g e  70 | 220 
years, this fact has to be disclosed and discussed with the audit committee with respect to 
independence threats and possible safeguards. 
Based on this elaboration, we deliberately choose a regulatory-driven threshold approach 
and study the importance of clients for small and midsized auditors with greater im-
portance of economic bonding. In particular, we apply various regulatory thresholds for 
excessive client importance and study whether lower audit quality is related to lower fi-
nancial reporting quality, which we proxy with higher EM. 
We aim at describing and assessing the strength of the economic bonds between the au-
ditor and the clients for small and midsized German audit firms based on information 
from the transparency reports in the years 2009 to 2016 and the respective financial state-
ments of the audited entities. Being able to observe the total sales from all services and 
all clients for each of the small auditors, we apply a precise proxy for the client importance 
of small and midsized auditors, e.g., we comprehend B9D as total sales from the client in 
relation to total sales of the audit firm from all clients and. Furthermore, we apply the 
commonly used B9D measured as non-audit sales in relation to total sales from the 
client. Furthermore, the German has several other advantages for an analysis of small and 
midsized auditors, e.g., they have a significant market share based on the number of listed 
clients and there are relatively liberal restrictions with respect to non-audit services, while 
the audit environment is less litigious. 
Consequently, we apply non-linear client importance variables and study the effect on 
accrual earnings management (AEM). We further allow for another possible strategy and 
explicitly consider a trade-off between AEM and real earnings management (REM) for 
cases when AEM is limited/enhanced (Zang 2012). For this purpose, we analyze 1.052 
firm-years covering the years from 2007 to 2014 from all German PIEs being audited by 
a small or midsized auditor at least once in the sample period. The results indicate for B9D 
that firms with auditor’s client importance below the thresholds use lower amounts of 
AEM and higher amounts of REM as client importance increases. However, for firms 
with auditor’s client importance above 5%, 10% or 15% for one, two or three consecutive 
years, we find that AEM increases, while the relative weight of REM (trade-off REM vs. 
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AEM) decreases again. We find that these effects are more pronounced for higher thresh-
olds used for separation as well as for increasing number of consecutive years. However, 
for B9D we find no significant results, highlighting the distinction between non-audit 
service and total client importance proxies. What is more, we provide a reasoning for our 
results, which particularly signifies the eligibility of PIE engagements by small and 
midsized auditors and provides a fresh look at client importance for these auditors. Our 
results hold in various robustness tests and additional analyses, e.g., the inclusion of a 
best practice audit committee, de-facto office and partner level analyses and when focus-
ing only on extreme EM. 
This paper contributes to the literature about the relation between client importance and 
financial reporting quality in several ways. First, we provide the first empirical evidence 
that regulatory (audit and non-audit) importance thresholds might embody non-linear au-
dit quality effects. Our data indicates that overstepping certain thresholds of total client 
importance impairs audit quality and leads to more AEM. What is important, below these 
thresholds we observe a negative relationship between client importance and AEM. We 
conjecture that small and midsized audit firms, which successfully obtain a PIE engage-
ment, have higher reputation and litigation incentives73 that preserve independence up to 
certain thresholds where dependence excels and leads to higher AEM. We further find 
that clients seem to adapt their EM strategies by trading-off from AEM to REM when 
AEM is limited by high audit quality. We further control for effects of the supervisory 
board or audit committee, which may be a safeguard to impaired auditor independence 
due to an economic bond between auditor and client. 
Second, to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper analyzing the influence of 
client importance on the trade-off between AEM and REM. Therefore, we are able to 
answer the question of higher or lower earnings quality thoroughly and raise the aware-
ness and discussion about the possible substitution of AEM by REM when clients expe-
rience high audit quality. In addition, in our additional analyses we provide interesting 
results that best practice audit committees can help mitigate this trade-off issue.  
                                                          
73 In addition, the auditors know that they are under the spotlight of the German Auditor Oversight Commission and their clients are 
under the spotlight of the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel. 
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Third, we contribute to the discussion of whether small and midsized auditors deliver 
high or low quality audits, particularly when they pursue PIE audits. This might be im-
portant for future discussions and considerations by clients and regulatory bodies to ena-
ble more PIE mandates for small and midsized auditors. Decisively, we raise the aware-
ness for the magnitude of non-PIE mandates and the previous overestimation of the eco-
nomic bond when it comes to discussing PIEs and small and midsized auditors. All of 
these contributions can be of major interest for standard setters and various stakeholders. 
The following chapter briefly discusses the relevant mandatory framework for client im-
portance, the disclosure of audit and non-audit fees in financial statements and the disclo-
sure of information in transparency reports in Germany. Chapter 3.3 discusses the rela-
tionship between economic bonding, audit quality and financial reporting quality. We 
consider the relation between auditor size and economic dependence, present our theoret-
ical framework and discuss methodology and results of related previous studies about 
client importance as audit quality measure and financial reporting quality, whereinafter 
we develop our hypotheses. Chapter 3.4 discusses our measures for audit quality, e.g., 
client importance, and earnings quality, e.g., EM. We characterize the sample, the rele-
vant data and the empirical model. Chapter 3.5 presents descriptive statistics and univari-
ate results, while chapter 3.6 reports our multivariate tests. In chapter 3.7, we provide 
various additional analyses and robustness tests. Chapter 3.8 summarizes the results and 
discusses the limitations of our study. 
3.2 Client importance – mandatory framework in Europe 
To secure the economic independence of auditors, the German legislator has issued spe-
cific norms in the German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB) and in the Ger-
man Public Accounting Act (Wirtschaftsprüferordnung, WPO). Additionally, the German 
Chamber of Auditors (Wirtschaftsprüferkammer, WPK), a public law entity, specifies the 
professional duties when auditors are carrying out mandatory audits in the Professional 
Charter for auditors (Berufssatzung WP/vBP).74 These regulations – based on the Auditor 
                                                          
74 According to Art. 57 para. 4 WPO these rules are legally binding for auditors. 
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Directive of the European Union – have been triggered by national and international ac-
counting scandals.75 
3.2.1 Independence threats resulting from economic bonds 
The most relevant norms for securing the financial dependence of auditors in Germany 
in the period under study are Art. 319 para. 3 sent. 1 no. 5, para. 4 and 5 HGB and Art. 
319a para. 2 no. 1, para. 2 HGB. If an auditor has earned in the last five years more than 
30 % of his total revenues from professional services from a single audited entity or from 
entities the audited entity holds more than 20 % of the shares, and it is expected that the 
auditor also earns more than 30 % in the current year, then the auditor is not allowed to 
act as an auditor (cf. Art. 319 para. 2 no. 5). This stipulation holds for a sole practitioner, 
partnerships or corporations of professional accountants and is applicable for the audit of 
single statements and consolidated financial statements but is not applicable to network 
firms of the auditor (cf. Art. 319 para. 4, 5 HGB).76 If the audited entity is a capital market 
oriented entity according to Art. 264d HGB, then the critical threshold reduces from 30 
% to 15 % of the total revenues because of the more pronounced public interest in such 
firms.77 An undercut in a single year within the timespan of six years is sufficient to es-
cape from this rule. It is notable that the German government, in its reasoning for this 
legal rule, has admitted that the 15 % limit is an upper limit with respect to internationally 
discussed bandwidths from 5 % to 15 %.78 The argument in favor of this moderate thresh-
old is that smaller audit firms should also have the chance to win larger audit engage-
ments, whereas for large audit firms obeying even a stronger limit should be no problem.79 
These current German legal rules (15 % threshold over six years) with respect to client 
dependence of auditors for listed clients could be criticized because first, the percentage 
is very high and second, a time period of six years seems to be too long. 
For financial years after June 2016, the above-mentioned 15 % threshold has been re-
placed by Art. 10 par. 3 Regulation (EU) No 537/2014. When the total fees received from 
                                                          
75 Evidence is provided in BT-Drucksache 15/3419 (2004), BT-Drucksache 15/4054 (2004), BT-Drucksache 16/2858 (2006), BT-
Drucksache 16/10067 (2008) and BT-Drucksache 16/12407 (2009). 
76 Cf. for a network definition Art. 319b HGB and Lenz (2010). 
77 Cf. BT-Drucksache 15/3419 (2004). 
78 Cf. RegE BilReG, BT-Drucksache 15/3419 (2004) and Ebke (2008). 
79 Cf. RegE BilReG, BT-Drucksache 15/3419 (2004). 
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a public-interest entity (PIE) in each of the last three consecutive financial years are more 
than 15 % of the total fees received by the statutory auditor, this fact must be disclosed to 
and discussed with the audit committee with respect to independence threats and possible 
safeguards. 
Stronger rules of the Auditing Practices Board (APB) exist in the U.K. and will exist in 
the future even considering the new EU Regulation for PIE audits.80 According to APB 
Ethical Standard (ES) 4 (Revised December 2010, no. 31) “where it is expected that the 
total fees for both audit and non-audit services receivable from a listed audited entity and 
its subsidiaries audited by the audit firm will regularly exceed 10 % of the annual fee 
income […] the firm shall not act as the auditor of that entity and shall either resign as 
auditor or not stand for reappointment, as appropriate.” Insofar as profits are not shared 
on a firm-wide basis the reference for the 10 % benchmark is the basis on which the audit 
engagement partner’s profit share is calculated. „Regularly“ does not mean a longer time 
span of, for example six years like in Germany. We conclude this because APB ES 4 no. 
41 (Rev. Dec. 2010; now FRC 2016 par. 4.53) stipulates the following with respect to a 
new audit firm for which the requirements relating to economic dependence may be dif-
ficult to comply in the short term. “Such firms would: (a) not undertake any audits of 
listed companies, where fees from such an audited entity would represent 10 % or more 
of the annual fee income of the firm; and (b) for a period not exceeding two years, require 
external independent quality control reviews of those audits of unlisted entities that rep-
resent more than 15 % of the annual fee income before the audit opinion is issued.” APB 
ES 4 no. 35 (Rev. Dec. 2010) requires for audit firms for which the client importance 
measure exceeds 5% but will not regularly exceed 10% the consideration of appropriate 
safeguards to eliminate or reduce the independence threat to an acceptable level. To sum 
up, in the U.K. an “audit firm is deemed to be economically dependent on a listed audited 
entity if the total fees for audit and other audit services from that entity and its subsidiaries 
which are audited by the audit firm represent 10% of the total fees of the audit firm or the 
part of the firm by reference to which the audit engagement partner’s profit share is cal-
culated. Where such fees are between 5% and 10%, the audit engagement partner and the 
                                                          
80 Cf. Turley (2008) for an overview about UK-regulations in the past, especially with respect to economic dependence. 
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Ethics Partner consider the significance of the threat and the need for appropriate safe-
guards” (APB ES 4, Rev. Dec. 2010, no. 37; similar FRC 2016 par. 4.49). The UK regu-
lations were much stronger than the German rules and remain essentially unchanged in 
the Revised Ethical Standard 2016 of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC 2016). 
Based on APB ES 4 (Rev. Dec. 2010) and on the Revised Ethical Standard (FRC 2016) 
we consider as potential critical boundaries of client importance measures 5%, 10% and 
15% of the total fee income of the respective audit firm over a period of two or three 
consecutive years. The IESBA Code of Ethics 2012/2015 also refers to a critical limit in 
the specified time-period: “Where an audit client is a public interest entity and, for two 
consecutive years, the total fees from the client and its related entities […] represent more 
than 15% of the total fees received by the firm expressing the opinion on the financial 
statements of the client, the firm shall disclose to those charged with governance of the 
audit client the fact that the total of such fees represents more than 15% of the total fees 
received by the firm, and discuss which of the safeguards below it will apply to reduce 
the threat to an acceptable level, and apply the selected safeguard” (IESBA 2012, 
290.222; IESBA 2016, 290.217). 
With respect to fees from non-audit services, despite restrictions concerning the type of 
non-audit services, no explicit quantitative limits exist in Germany in the analyzed time-
period. In the U.K., APB ES 5 no. 5, 6 rules: “In relation to non-audit services, the main 
self-interest threat concerns fees and economic dependence and these are addressed in 
APB Ethical Standard 4. […] In the case of listed companies where the fees for non-audit 
services for a financial year are expected to be greater than the annual audit fees, the audit 
engagement partner shall provide details of the circumstances to the Ethics Partner and 
discuss them with him or her.” It can be concluded that the APB focuses on the relation-
ship between non-audit fees and audit fees. According to the new Art. 4 para. 2 EU Audit 
Regulation, the provision of non-audit services to the audited entity, its parent undertak-
ing or its controlled undertakings is only allowed if the total fees for such services for a 
period of three or more consecutive years are equal to or less than 70 % of the average of 
the audit fees paid in the last three consecutive financial years for the audited entity and 
its parent or controlled undertakings. In the Revised UK Ethical Standards 2016 fees from 
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network members are included (FRC 2016, 4.34R); if individual or aggregate non-audit 
fees are expected to be greater than the aggregate (or the individual firm’s) annual fees 
for the audit engagement, the engagement partner must disclose and discuss this fact with 
the ethics partner. 
Based on the presented regulations and rules, we consider 40% and 50% non-audit fees 
of the total fee income from the respective entity audited by the respective audit firm in 
two or three consecutive years as critical regulatory boundaries for the client importance 
measures in our study. 
3.2.2 Increased Transparency with Respect to Economic Dependence 
from Audit Clients  
In addition to the above-mentioned independence rules the German legislator has – in 
accordance with the Article 40 of the Directive 2006/43/EC and the Article 49 sent. 1 let. 
(a) no. 15 of Directive 2006/43/EC as amendment of the Article 43 sent. 1 of the Directive 
78/660/EEC of the European Parliament – initiated regulations that enable outside stake-
holders to evaluate the economic dependence of an audit firm. 
3.2.2.1 Audit and non-audit fee disclosure 
Since the financial year 2005 legal requirements (Art. 285 sent. 1 no. 17, Art. 314 para. 1 
no. 8 (former) HGB) concerning the mandatory disclosure of information about audit and 
non-audit fees have been in place in Germany.81 This fee information shall disclose a “too 
strong dependence of the auditor from audit and consulting fees”82 of a specific client and 
shall enable interested parties to react in single cases if there seems to be a violation of 
the independence requirements in Art. 319 para. 2 or para. 3 HGB. The fee disclosure 
rule shall further have an influence on auditor’s behavior because auditors may refrain 
from an audit engagement with too low fees even in a competitive audit market. Between 
2005 and 2008 the disclosure applied only for capital market oriented companies for sin-
gle and consolidated HGB and IFRS financial statements.83 Since the financial year 2009 
the disclosure obligation has been extended to all large limited companies with respect to 
                                                          
81 Cf. Art. 58 Abs. 3 S. 1 EGHGB, BT-Drucksache 15/3419 (2004), Sultana and Willeke (2005) and IDW (2005). 
82 BT-Drucksache 15/3419 (2004, p. 25). 
83 Cf. Bischof (2006) and Lenz et al. (2006b) with respect to US-GAAP financial statements. 
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single financial statements (Art. 285 sent. 1 no. 17, Art. 288 HGB) and without exceptions 
to all parent companies, which are obliged to prepare consolidated financial statements 
(Art. 315 para. 1 no. 9 HGB). There is an exemption for subsidiaries if the fee disclosure 
is contained in the consolidated financial statements of the parent company.  
According to Art. 315 para. 1 no. 9 HGB or Art. 285 sent. 1 no. 17 HGB the (parent) 
company has to disclose the fees which are charged for the respective financial year from 
the auditor of the consolidated financial statements itemized into the following four cat-
egories: (i) audit fees, (ii) fees for other assurance services, (iii) fees for tax consulting, 
and (iv) fees for other services. The current German rules do not require the disclosure of 
audit and non-audit fees, which are charged from the parent companies auditor to subsid-
iaries of the parent company but a statement from the German Auditor’s Association 
(IDW 2010) recommends this disclosure in an explicit way (“thereof fees charged to sub-
sidiaries”). If a company decides to voluntarily disclose fees charged from network mem-
bers of the auditor, this should also be made explicitly. We do not discuss further inter-
pretative problems of the disclosure rules and refer to the literature, which also discusses 
the diverse disclosure practice (e.g., Bischof 2006; Lenz et al. 2006b; Kirsch et al. 2013). 
We assume further that the recommendations of the German Auditors Association (IDW) 
are obeyed in practice.  
3.2.2.2 Financial disclosure in transparency reports 
The Professional Oversight Reform Act (Berufsaufsichtsreformgesetz, BARefG) of Sep-
tember 2007 implemented Art. 40 (Transparency Reports)84 into the German law (Art. 
55c WPO old version).85 Since April 2008 transparency reports of audit firms are acces-
sible over the homepage of the WPK or the respective audit firm itself. The aim of the 
German government was to give public information about “ownership, governance and 
quality structures of audit firms.”86 By this means, public trust into auditor’s work and 
into the oversight of the profession should be strengthened (e.g., Naumann and Hamannt 
2007). The German Chamber of Auditors (WPK) and the German Auditor Oversight 
                                                          
84 Cf. EU Directive 2006/43/EG (2006). 
85 Cf. Pfitzer et al. (2007) and BT-Drucksache 16/2858 (2006). 
86 BT-Drucksache 16/2858 (2006) 
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Commission (AOC; APAK) can use transparency reports as a source for potential disci-
plinary actions.87 According to Art. 55c para. 1 sent. 1 WPO auditors, who have at least 
one mandatory audit of a public interest entity (i.e. capital market oriented limited liability 
companies; Art. 319a HGB; Art. 264d HGB) have to disclose a transparency report within 
three months after the end of the fiscal year in which the audit was performed.88 For the 
purpose of our study, the following information items of transparency reports are of in-
terest: 
 A list of companies of public interest for which a mandatory audit has been per-
formed in the preceding financial year (Art. 55c para. 1 sent. 2 No. 5 WPO). 
 Firm level financial information according to Art. 55c para. 1 sent. 3 No. 3 WPO 
in conjunction with Art. 285 no. 17 HGB, i.e., the auditor or audit firm has to 
disclose in the transparency report the total annual fees from all clients split into 
the following categories: audit fees, fees from other assurance services, fees from 
tax consulting, fees from other services. 
3.3 Economic independence, audit and financial reporting qual-
ity 
In their extensive review, DeFond and Zhang (2014) emphasize that high audit quality is 
not the discrete verification of no GAAP violations in the financial statements (e.g., 
DeAngelo 1981a), but the assurance of a high quality financial reporting. Gaynor et al. 
(2016) affirm that even a correct audit opinion might not entail high audit quality, if the 
underlying audit performed by the auditor was insufficient. In this respect, the PCAOB 
(2013) defines audit quality as independent, reliable audits and robust audit committee 
communications to meet the criteria of investors, which highlights the demand for high-
quality audit processes, especially certain input factors such as engagement team compe-
tency, experience, audit firm’s internal system of quality control and, independence of 
the auditor or audit office. Consequently, DeFond and Zhang (2014) elaborate that, based 
                                                          
87 Cf. Schnepel (2013) and Art. 55c WPO, pt. 2. 
88 Cf. Schnepel (2013) and Art. 55c WPO, pt. 5. 
D a n i e l  N o r b e r t  S c h a u p p  Earnings Management in the Context of Earnings Quality,  
Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
P a g e  79 | 220 
on high-quality audit processes, pre-audited financial reporting quality, which is deter-
mined by the firm’s financial reporting system as well as innate characteristics such as 
the fit of the GAAP for mapping the firm’s assets into financial statements (e.g., Dechow 
et al. 2010), will be enhanced, particularly when pre-audited financial statements are of 
low quality. What is important, consistent definitions of financial reporting quality lack 
as well as holistic approaches to capture the degree of quality. When characterizing fi-
nancial reporting quality, related literature (e.g., Dechow et al. 2010; Gaynor et al. 2016) 
uses conceptual accounting frameworks. They see financial reporting as a way of provid-
ing decision-useful information to existing and future stakeholders. In more detail, the 
presented information requires relevance, e.g., influencing the decisions of stakeholders 
by confirming the past or predicting the future, and reliability, e.g., being free from error, 
neutral and complete. Because of the high complexity of financial reporting quality, sev-
eral dimensions exist (e.g., Dechow et al. 2010). Gaynor et al. (2016, p. 2) define higher 
quality financial reports as those that “are more complete, neutral, and free from error 
and provide more useful predictive or confirmatory information about the company’s un-
derlying economic position and performance.” 
In our study, we rely on client independence of the auditor as one major input determinant 
of the audit process, ultimately audit quality, and study the influence on EM as one major 
financial reporting quality measure.89 EM has been extensively used and captures a firm’s 
opportunistic incentives to influence stakeholders’ decisions, thereby decreasing the qual-
ity of financial reporting due to intentional decisionism. Prior EM studies two different 
types, AEM and REM. Accrual-based activities change methods or estimates in financial 
statements (e.g., DeFond & Subramanyam 1998; Dechow et al. 2003; Kothari et al. 2005; 
Dechow et al. 2010) after fiscal-year end without altering cash flows. On the other hand, 
recent literature focuses on possible real activities of earnings manipulation (e.g., Roy-
chowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen & Zarowin 2010; Badertscher 2011; Zang 
2012), which reflect alterations of cash-flow-affecting business processes prior to fiscal-
year end that ultimately change the presented earnings in the financial reporting. Besides 
auditor competence, auditor independence is an important component of audit quality, 
                                                          
89 DeFond and Zhang (2014) categorize financial reporting quality as an output-based audit quality measure, while we follow Gay-
nor et al. (2016) and regard financial reporting and audit quality as different constructs. 
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which influences the possibilities of AEM that the management of the entity can exert. 
However, this restricting effect may also indirectly affect the use of the other kind of EM, 
e.g., REM. In particular, although real activities might not be a part of audited reporting 
quality insofar as they are correctly represented in the financial statement according to 
the applicable accounting standards, managers might exert a switch from AEM to REM 
when AEM is limited, likewise causing deteriorated earnings numbers. 
3.3.1 Auditor size and economic dependence from clients 
The relation between auditor size and his/her potential financial dependence has been 
formulated in a simple and idealized way (e.g., DeAngelo 1981b, Simunic 1984, Reyn-
olds & Francis 2001, Chung & Kallapur 2003, Larcker & Richardson 2004, and Ewert 
2004). The financial importance of a client increases with increasing size of the client in 
terms of the present value of future rents as difference between audit fees and marginal 
audit costs. Likewise, it increases with decreasing size of the audit firm or office in terms 
of the present value of total rents from all clients less total audit costs of the audit firm or 
office. As this discrepancy between auditor and client size enlarges, potential incentives 
for auditors evolve to report favorably about the client, concede in negotiations about 
reporting decisions and issue going concern opinions. Decisively, auditing firm’s service 
line also plays an important rule, since high dependence on a client’s audit fees might not 
comprise independence of the auditor when the audit service line is less important for the 
overall firm’s sales. On the other hand, economic dependence, especially for publicly 
listed clients, may also impose greater audit risk in terms of possible reputation and liti-
gation costs associated with audit failures, controversies or financial distress of the client. 
Reputation and litigation risk might be even more pronounced if the auditor’s reputation 
in the market segment is undetermined, e.g., for smaller auditors with few publicly listed 
clients and high experience only in the audit of non-publicly listed clients. These opposing 
effects shape an ambiguous idea about the interaction between the two parties (e.g., Te-
palagul & Lin 2015). 
For empirical aims, additional premises are necessary. We cannot observe rents (profits) 
resulting from audit and non-audit services. Therefore, we assume a linear relation be-
tween rents and auditor’s revenues. Furthermore, most legal professional requirements 
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also define fee dependence as percentage of the total revenues of an audit firm. Especially, 
the analytical considerations for audit firm size’s influence on auditor independence 
should be empirically tested because it follows not conclusively that small and midsized 
audit practices are more economically dependent from their clients than larger audit firms 
are. Depending on the client and service structure of an audit firm, it is empirically pos-
sible and probable that smaller audit firms with respect to economic dependence do not 
exceed certain critical thresholds of 5 %, 10 % or 15 %. Therefore, an empirical analysis 
about the relation between audit firm size und economic dependence is necessary in this 
audit market segment. Most previous studies do not measure economic dependence of 
auditors in accordance with the above considerations.90 Notable exceptions are Chung 
and Kallapur (2003) for the U.S. audit market and Quick and Sattler (2011a,b), Lopatta 
et al. (2015) for Germany. Due to lacking data availability, even more recent studies, e.g., 
Hope and Langli (2010), Sharma et al. (2011), Coulton and Ruddock (2012) or Svanström 
(2013) only use fee data from publicly listed clients and do not use the total fees of an 
audit firm from public and private clients in the denominator of their measure of client 
importance. In our study that would lead to a severe overstatement of the economic bond-
ing of smaller auditors because these auditors regularly have only few listed clients. 
3.3.2 Theoretical framework 
Figure 4 shows our theoretical framework. Box I shows in a stylized way the responsible 
parties for the appointment of an auditor. They determine quantity, type and fees of the 
demanded audit and non-audit services. In the German context, the auditor is appointed 
by the shareholders at the annual meeting based on the supervisory board’s proposal (Art. 
119 para. 1 no. 4; Art. 124 para. 3 sent. 1 AktG). For PIEs with an audit committee91, the 
proposal rests on a recommendation by the audit committee (Art. 124, para. 3, sent. 2 
AktG). The supervisory board and in particular the audit committee, as the representative 
body of the shareholders, are responsible for the negotiation of the audit fees with the 
                                                          
90 E.g., Frankel et al. (2002) use the relation between non-audit fees to total fees of an audit client, the rank transformation of audit 
and non-audit fees and absolute value of total fees to measure economic dependence. Craswell et al. (2002) use the relation of audit 
fees to total fees of a client. Zimmermann (2006) measures client dependence with the absolute (logarithmic) values of non-audit 
and audit fees and the relation non-audit fees to total fees. 
91 The establishment of an audit committee is voluntary. If no audit committee exists, the tasks of the audit committee are taken over 
by the whole supervisory board (Art. 107 AktG). 
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auditor. The executive part of the board, e.g., CEO and CFO, is responsible for the prep-
aration of the financial statements and may decide to order non-audit services from the 
auditor when permission is granted by the supervisory board or the audit committee.  
Figure 4 – Theoretical framework for economic bonding and auditor independence 
 
Figure shows the theoretical framework for the underlying analysis. 
The engagement process of the auditor creates an economic bond between auditor and 
client (arrow 1 to Box II). The appointed auditor, being an (economic) agent of the firm, 
will consider the principal’s interest based on the resulting economic dependence. On this 
occasion, client’s and auditor’s incentives, e.g., for the client the increase in reliability 
and decrease in moral hazard concerns with stakeholders and for the auditor litigation and 
reputation risk, play an important role. On the other hand, more opportunistic incentives 
might exist on both sides, e.g., for the manager to use income-increasing or -decreasing 
EM and for the auditor to retain the client’s fees (e.g., DeFond & Zhang 2014). Our 
measures for economic dependence, e.g., client importance and non-audit fee importance, 
are two major audit process input measures. 
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Dependent on the set of audit process input measures, Box III symbolizes the unobserv-
able information process of the auditor or the audit team. A strong economic bond may 
impair auditor’s independence in the professional judgment process (dotted arrow be-
tween Box II and Box III), resulting in a lower audit quality. In particular, when the au-
ditor’s opinion is not congruent with his/her inner opinion about the true state of the fi-
nancial statements, the management might try to make use of the economic bond and 
influence financial reporting. Decisively, auditor’s professional judgment has a signifi-
cant influence on the quality of the published financial statements, i.e., the extent of AEM 
(arrow 2). 
However, if the interests of the supervisory board are perfectly aligned with shareholders’ 
interests, then there should be no impaired audit judgment due to economic bonding be-
cause the supervisory board effectively controls auditor’s appointment and remuneration, 
restricts non-audit services and implements an effective audit committee. Therefore, even 
in the case of a strong economic bond – created by a well-knowing supervisory board – 
the auditor may have incentives to deliver a high audit quality in order to become ap-
pointed again by the supervisory board while being controlled effectively by the audit 
committee. 
Arrow 5 symbolizes the direct influence of firm and regulatory attributes on financial 
reporting quality, e.g., the existence of a strong and independent supervisory board and/or 
audit committee. Consequently, if an independent auditor effectively restricts AEM, cli-
ent’s management may evade to REM, since auditors’ engagement does not explicitly 
involve the limitation of this kind of EM. Therefore, we control for a possible trade-off 
between AEM and REM (arrow 4). There are also direct effects between audit and non-
audit fees and REM (arrow 3). For example, the auditor may increase audit fees for clients 
with aggressive EM because they evaluate that as risky behavior and therefore increase 
their audit effort and/or the risk premium in audit fees (Greiner et al. 2017). Clients who 
use REM to meet earnings targets may also have an increased demand for consulting 
services. 
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3.3.3 Related literature and hypotheses development 
Tepalagul & Lin (2015) present an extensive literature review about auditor independence 
and audit quality. They highlight the focus on the relationship between client importance, 
mostly proxied by non-audit services, and financial reporting quality, proxied by AEM 
(Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Ferguson et al. 2004; Chung & Kallapur 2003; 
Sharma et al. 2011; Chi et al. 2012), modified audit opinions (Reynolds & Francis 2001; 
DeFond et al. 2002; Geiger & Rama 2003; Hope & Langli 2010) or earnings restatements 
(Raghunandan et al. 2003; Kinney et al. 2004).  
An overview of relevant prior studies for the U.S. (10 studies), U.K. (6 studies), Australia 
(6 studies) and New Zealand (4 studies) can also be found in Sharma et al. (2011). For a 
meta-analysis about the relationship between audit quality, corporate governance and EM 
Lin and Hwang (2010) identify 49 prior studies. Sattler (2011, Table 9-2, pp. 240-289) 
delivers a detailed discussion of 19 empirical studies. 
Interestingly, there are only few studies focusing on the influence of client importance 
resulting from the sum of audit and non-audit fees in relation to total sales (or total sales 
resulting from the listed client market) of the respective audit firm on AEM. These are 
(in chronological order): Chung and Kallapur (2003, USA, no association); Larcker and 
Richardson (2004, USA, no association); Mitra (2007, USA, no association); Cahan et al. 
(2008, NZ, pos. association); Sharma et al. (2011, NZ, pos. association moderated by 
audit committee characteristics); Coulton and Ruddock (2012, Australia, no association). 
There are only two German studies (see for details below): Quick and Sattler (2011b, no 
association) and Lopatta et al. (2015, pos. association with income increasing discretion-
ary accruals). 
There are some reasons why we might not expect that a strong economic bond between 
auditor and client may lead to a negative effect on financial reporting quality. First, audi-
tors are aware of the threats from impaired independence and therefore put in place safe-
guards like quality control and engagement reviews (Coulton & Ruddock 2012, p. 5 et 
seq.). DeFond and Zhang (2014) argue that especially for large clients’ auditor’s reputa-
tion and litigation concerns may offset threats from financial dependence but admit that 
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the evidence is mixed and different for discretionary accruals and GCOs. As argued 
above, a strong and effective supervisory board and/or audit committee should also be 
able to restrict and control threats from impaired audit quality due to economic bonding. 
In our setting – the small and midsized audit market segment – the average auditor has 
only a small number of listed clients. Gaining a listed firm as a client increases the repu-
tation of the non-Big4 auditors, i.e., they should have high incentives to retain this repu-
tation. In addition, the auditors know that they are under the spotlight of the German 
Auditor Oversight Commission and their clients are under the spotlight of the Financial 
Reporting Enforcement Panel. This should especially be the case for non-Big4 auditors, 
since they tend to have no matured reputation in the market for publicly listed clients. 
Combined, these effects may be effective in securing the audit quality despite a significant 
economic auditor-client bond. 
Regulators conjecture (in contrast to audit literature) that an auditor is economically de-
pendent on a specific client if the total fees for audit and other audit services from the 
audited entity and its subsidiaries exceed certain thresholds, e.g., 5%, 10% or 15%, in a 
specified time period. This may compromise audit independence and hence lead to im-
paired financial reporting quality. The competing theoretical arguments and the mixed 
empirical evidence lead us to the following (regulatory-driven) hypothesis stated in null 
form: 
H1: Client importance for audit clients  of auditor v exceeding a certain threshold, e.g. 
5%, 10% or 15% in a defined period of at least two or three consecutive years is 
not associated with lower financial reporting quality, i.e., higher AEM. 
It should be mentioned that the German context, in contrast to the U.K., entails no legal 
binding of the thresholds in H1, i.e., the auditor may exceed the limits without the fear of 
negative sanctions from auditor oversight bodies. Therefore, we can use this setting to 
test whether in a more liberal audit environment economic bonding has in fact had nega-
tive consequences on audit quality. With H1 we do not assume linear relationship be-
tween client importance and audit quality like most other studies (e.g., Chung & Kallapur 
2003; Sharma et al. 2011; Coulton & Ruddock 2012). With the exception of Chung and 
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Kallapur (2003) and Larcker and Richardson (2004)92 all other studies do not measure 
client importance as suggested in our study. Sharma et al. (2011) and Coulton and Rud-
dock (2012) admit that an inherent limitation in this line of research as a whole is that 
because “only publicly listed clients are required to disclose audit and NAS fees” leads 
to an understatement of the total fees earned by an audit firm and therefore overstates “the 
relative importance of a client to a partner or audit firm.” 
The bulk of prior studies concentrate on the effect of non-audit fees and it can be summa-
rized that “there is no unequivocal evidence that client importance measured as non-audit 
fees paid to the auditor affects the quality of financial reporting” (Sharma et al. 2011). 
Sharma (2014) reviews 45 studies about the relationship between NAS and auditor inde-
pendence and summarizes that the overall evidence is “far from conclusive”. DeFond and 
Zhang (2014) summarize that “studies using output-based proxies find that NAS does not 
impair auditor quality, and some NAS may even improve it.” Main controversial themes 
are measurement, i.e., with respect to client importance93 and financial reporting quality, 
and causality issues. On the other hand, a meta-analysis of 10 studies done by Lin and 
Hwang (2010, Table 3, p. 66, p. 70) states that “the evidence strongly supports the nega-
tive effect on earnings quality […] of a strong economic bond between the client and the 
external auditors, as measured by the high fees paid for non-audit services, relative to 
total fees” (i.e., the non-audit fee-ratio). 
A common assumption in this literature is that high non-audit fees may impair auditor 
independence and therefore financial reporting quality. Again, there are competing argu-
ments that non-audit services may improve audit quality by enabling knowledge spillo-
vers improving auditor competency and efficiency (Simunic 1984). Furthermore, poten-
tial negative effects on auditor independence may be controlled for by internal and exter-
nal safeguards, e.g., internal separation of audit and non-audit work, quality controls, au-
dit committees approval and oversight of non-audit work, reputation and litigation con-
cerns. 
                                                          
92 “As in Chung and Kallapur (2003) we obtain the total fee revenue for each auditor from Accounting Today” (Larcker & Richard-
son 2004). 
93 “However, there is no agreement on how to measure this economic bond” (Lin & Hwang 2010). 
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Most studies use the absolute value on non-audit fees, rank transformations, and the rela-
tion of non-audit fees to audit fees or total fees from the respective client, but seldom the 
relation of non-audit fees to total fees of the audit firm in conjunction with a threshold 
approach as we do.94 Regulators argue that the relation between non-audit fees and aver-
age audit fees should not exceed a certain limit, e.g., 70 % according to the new EU Audit 
Regulation. That translates into a 41 % non-audit fee threshold95 for non-audit fees with 
respect to total fees. Again, the competing theoretical arguments and the mixed empirical 
evidence leads us to the following (regulatory-driven) second hypothesis stated in null 
form: 
H2:  Client importance for audit clients i resulting from non-audit services of auditor k 
exceeding a certain threshold, e.g., 40 % or 50 % of total fees from client  in a 
defined period of at least two or three consecutive years is not associated with lower 
financial reporting quality, i.e., higher AEM. 
Again, in the period under study, in Germany no such quantitative restrictions for non-
audit services were in place. Additionally, we test other common measures, e.g., the re-
lation of non-audit fees to audit-fees. 
Since financial reporting quality as a theoretical construct is not directly observable, prox-
ies have to be used. A common measure therefore is AEM as a direct financial statement 
attribute. In contrast, REM “alters normal firm operations, impacts current and future cash 
flows, imposes additional costs, and sacrifices firm value” (Greiner et al. 2017, p. 86, 
with reference to Cohen & Zarowin 2010, Badertscher 2011 and Evans et al. 2015). REM 
is generally not a direct financial statement attribute and therefore less scrutinized by the 
auditor (e.g., Chi et al. 2011; Kim & Park 2014). To the best of our knowledge, there is 
only one study, which examines the association between audit quality and REM (Chi et 
al. 2011), but no study analyzing the relationship between auditor’s economic dependence 
on the client and REM. Chi et al. (2011) show for a sample of firms with strong incentives 
                                                          
94 We additionally use the relation of non-audit fees to audit fees as well as the absolute value of non-audit fees in our robustness 
tests. 
95  	M	( M) = %M(M) + 	%M	(M) and M = 0.7 ∙ M; M = 0.7 ∙ ( M − M) →

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=
*.V
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to manage earnings upwards that higher quality auditors (proxied by auditor industry ex-
pertise and audit firm size, i.e., BigN versus non-BigN) restrict AEM and, therefore, cli-
ents resort to REM. 
If there is a tradeoff between AEM and REM (Zang 2012) and generally, REM is costlier 
than AEM, then clients of more dependent auditors should prefer AEM and clients of 
independent auditors, who restrict AEM would switch to REM if there were enough in-
centives for them. However, since the relation between economic bonding and AEM is 
inconclusive, i.e., if there is no association between economic bonding and AEM, we 
expect also no association between economic bonding and REM. Therefore, we formulate 
the hypothesis H3 in null form: 
H3: Ceteris paribus, there is no association between auditor-client economic bond and 
REM. 
In general, auditors should be able to identify REM because a business risk-oriented audit 
approach requires a thorough understanding of the business strategy and the related op-
erational management decisions (e.g., Greiner et al. 2017). Commerford et al. (2016) 
show in a qualitative interview-based study that auditors are aware of REM and express 
concerns about REM. They respond by increasing engagement risk assessments and al-
tering audit procedures. Kim and Park (2014) find that REM is associated with auditor 
resignations and Greiner et al. (2017) show that aggressive income-increasing REM is 
positively associated with both current and future audit fees, whereas the economic im-
pact on (current and future) audit fees is low (1.57 % versus 1.53 %). 
Prior German evidence  
Quick and Sattler (2011b) analyze whether client importance, measured as the fraction of 
total fees from a client to the total revenues of the audit firm, has an influence on discre-
tionary accruals comprehended from the performance-adjusted Jones model. They use a 
pooled sample comprising 329 consolidated IFRS financial statements of firms (exclud-
ing banks and insurance companies) listed in the German Prime Standard at the respective 
year-end of 2005-2007. No significant statistical relation can be identified but it should 
be noted that this specific audit market segment is heavily dominated by Big4 auditors 
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(market share measured by number of clients between 77% and 83% within the three 
years) and generally Big4 auditors do not heavily depend on single clients. In our study, 
we focus on Non-Big4 auditors. 
Using essentially the same sample, Quick and Sattler (2011a) follow Sattler (2011) and 
analyze for the German audit market if non-audit services impair auditor independence. 
They apply different fee ratio variables, e.g., the ratio of non-audit fees or tax consulting 
fees to total fees, to measure an impaired independence resulting from non-audit services. 
An OLS regression with 341 firm-year observations shows that an increasing tax consult-
ing fee ratio increases positive (income-increasing) discretionary accruals, while increas-
ing other non-audit fees96 increase AEM in terms of the absolute and positive discretion-
ary accruals. The authors conclude that particularly other non-audit fees may impair au-
ditor independence. They additionally test certain thresholds for non-audit fees or cate-
gories of non-audit fees (> 10 % or > 25 % of total fees) and their effects on AEM. The 
results show a statistically positive impact on the absolute discretionary accruals, while 
this effect seems to be driven by other non-audit fees. In addition, exceeding the 10 % 
limit of other non-audit fees leads to higher positive discretionary accruals (e.g., Quick & 
Sattler 2011a). 
The studies together as well as international evidence seems to imply that it may be ap-
propriate to differentiate between effects on discretionary accruals of different categories 
of non-audit fees despite the fact that we currently have no clear theory about the under-
lying reasons. With respect to non-audit fee client importance, there should be no differ-
ence between the categories but it may be argued that, for example, other assurance ser-
vices, e.g., reviews of interim reports, which are closely related to audit fees can lead to 
knowledge spillovers and therefore increase audit efficiency, but will particularly not dis-
tract the auditor from audit objectives. We also have no precise theoretical understanding 
of why the effects for absolute, positive (income increasing) or negative (income decreas-
ing) discretionary accruals should be different. While absolute values assume both kinds 
of EM as comparably erroneous and detectable for the auditor, possible reasons for in-
consistent results on signed discretionary accruals could include unequal distribution of 
                                                          
96 Other non-audit fees means fees other than assurance and tax consulting fees, i.e. fees for M&A consulting. 
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positive and negative values. E.g., excessive insistence on strict financial reporting by the 
auditor could restrict income-increasing EM to such a high degree that all discretionaries 
from accruals models turn more negative. Altogether, interpretation of the Quick and Sat-
tler (2011a) results remains inconsistent.  
The sample of Lopatta et al. (2015) is comprised of 840 firm-years from listed firms 
(without banks and insurance companies and firms domiciled in foreign countries) from 
the premium segments of the German stock market over the period 2005-2011. They con-
jecture a positive relationship between economic dependence – measured as total audit 
client’s fees to total auditor’s revenues – and the level of AEM proxied by discretionary 
working capital accruals estimated using the performance-adjusted modified Jones 
model. They further assume a positive relation between the percentage of non-audit fees 
to total client’s fees and AEM. Their regression results cannot reject the hypotheses with 
respect to positive discretionary working capital accruals, i.e., if the audit client uses in-
come-increasing AEM. Total audit firm’s revenues in Lopatta et al. (2015) stem from 
Lünendonk market studies based on voluntary audit firm’s disclosure. In our opinion this 
source is not really trustworthy because (i) Lünendonk reports mostly voluntary disclosed 
fees for national networks of audit firms and (ii) in several cases this is not the appropriate 
basis for matching fees from a specific audit client with total network turnover, e.g., if 
the network is not the relevant economic entity for measuring economic bonding. 
3.4 Research design 
3.4.1 Sample 
Table 24 summarizes the sample selection procedure. We use an initial dataset from 2007-
2014 of 2,441 firm-years containing all German publicly listed clients (i.e., capital market 
oriented limited liability companies; Art. 319a HGB; Art. 264d HGB) of non-Big4 audi-
tors.97 We hand-collect financial information of the non-Big4 auditors from the respective 
                                                          
97 We keep each client in the sample as long as it has been audited by a non-Big4 auditor at least once within the sample period. 
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transparency reports 2009-201698. We use Thomson Reuters Datastream to collect finan-
cial information of the audited entities.99 Furthermore, we use the financial reports of the 
audited entities to collect sufficient data concerning economic bonding, audit engagement 
and corporate governance controls. We exclude all financial institutions due to disparate 
balance sheets and ways to pursue EM, which accounts for a loss of 104 observations. 
Consequently, we account for a loss of 1.097 firm-years due to insufficient financial in-
formation for the estimation of our EM models. We further account for a loss of 111 firm-
years due to missing data on economic bonding and 47 firm-years due to missing data on 
control variables. In addition, we require each industry-year combination to account for 
at least 10 observations, resulting in a loss of 30 firm-years. Subsequently we use an un-
balanced panel with adequate information for all dependent and independent variables 
consisting of 1.052 firm-year observations. 
Table 24 – Sample selection procedure 
Selection mode  Number of observations 
All PIEs with a non-Big4 auditor with available financial information in 
transparency reports from 2009-2016 (2007-2014) 
 2,441 
Less:   
Financial institutions  104 
Missing data in Thomson Reuters Datastream for estimation of EM 
models 
 1,097 
Missing data in financial reports on economic bonding  111 
Missing data in financial reports on control variables for corporate 
governance & audit engagement 
 47 
Firm-years with less than 10 industry-year firm years available  30 
Final Sample: Adequate information for all independent (economic bonding 
& controls) and dependent (EM) variables 
 1,052 
3.4.2 Measurement of important variables and empirical design 
3.4.2.1 Measurement of financial reporting quality 
Although DeFond and Zhang (2014) regard EM as an output-based accrual quality meas-
ure, we distinguish audit and financial reporting quality following Gaynor et al. (2016) 
and see EM as a direct measure of financial reporting quality rather than an indirect meas-
ure of audit quality. As already discussed in chapter 2.2, we use the cross-sectional and 
                                                          
98 Financial information in the transparency reports is presented for the preceding financial year, while this financial data includes 
fees from the preceding financial year of the client. Therefore, using transparency reports from 2009-2016, we are able to analyze a 
publicly listed client dataset from 2007-2014. 
99 In particular, we use Thomson Reuters Datastream to collect financial information of the PIEs to enable inclusion of control varia-
bles for market-based size and market-to-book ratio. 
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pooled modified, performance-matched Jones model (e.g., Subramanyam 1996; DeFond 
and Subramanyam 1998; Dechow et al. 2003; Kothari et al. 2005) to comprehend AEM, 
while we apply the cross-sectional and pooled models for REM proposed by Roychow-
dhury (2006), standardize each of the proxies and calculate a combined signed measure 
K!" (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Greiner et al. 2017).
100 
To study apply they the trade-off relation between AEM and REM in more detail, we 
introduce a separate decile-based proxy following Bozzolan et al. (2015). We therefore 
compute deciles for AEM (BB__!") and REM (K!") to comprehend the trade-off 
proxy KK!" as the ratio of the K!" decile to the sum of the two deciles for 
AEM and REM.101 
3.4.2.2 Measurement of audit quality & measurement issues 
We have to transform theoretical concepts into valid and reliable operational measures. 
In general, measurement issues and the selected statistical method have a material effect 
on the empirical result and therefore should be considered carefully. 
When studying the heterogeneity of our sample, we find several probable measurement 
issues concerning economic bonding. First, the determination of economic units with 
Non-Big4 audit entities can be challenging due to interrelations between the entities. This 
can have a considerable influence on the resulting economic bond used in the respective 
study. Likewise, it might affect the decisions of regulators with respect to intolerable au-
ditor dependence. E.g., the audit firm Dr. Kleeberg & Partner GmbH holds 100% of the 
shares of the Crowe Kleeberg Audit GmbH. Both the parent and subsidiary have audit 
mandates in our sample. When measuring economic bonding, it is debatable whether the 
total audit sales of the subsidiary are relevant for the mandates of the subsidiary, or 
whether economic bonding should rather be measured based on the total sales of the 
whole audit group.102 Likewise, the audit firm Crowe Horwarth Deutschland GmbH has 
only one PIE client and the transparency report contains only the fees from this client, 
                                                          
100 We follow the calculation proposed by Kim et al. (2012), which is also used in chapter 4: K!" = BM8__!" − <8__!" +
9D<__!". This proxy for real activities EM is negatively scaled and standardized. 
101 To demonstrate the validity of our results, we use alternative proxies for AEM and REM. We discuss the results in section 3.7. 
102 Another related problem occurs when there is a change in audit mandates between the parent audit firm and the subsidiary. Meas-
uring economic bonding as the ratio of audit fees to total sales of the entity performing the audit, there might be a major increase in 
the dependence proxy when in reality there is only a shift between parent and subsidiary audit firm. 
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e.g., without further considerations we would conclude that economic dependence is 100 
percent. A further look reveals that this company is a joint venture of two other audit 
firms (HSA Horwart GmbH and RWT Horwarth GmbH), has no own personnel and 
therefore uses the personnel of the audit firms from the RWT group and HSA Horwarth 
GmbH. Naturally, using the considerably higher group revenues to calculate economic 
dependence results in a significant change of the economic dependence proxy.  
What is more, we find constellations where several audit firms bundle their activities with 
respect to PIE clients in a joint legal entity without own personnel (see for example PKF 
Deutschland GmbH). This legal audit entity is the auditor of the PIE but in conducting 
the audit this entity uses personnel from one of its shareholder audit firms. Whenever we 
are able to identify the audit firm, which in effect has performed the audit, we use the 
revenues of this entity to measure economic dependence. 
Subsequently, we always try to identify the controlling audit entity on the supply side to 
measure economic dependence from audit clients as precise as possible. Therefore, we 
apply the audit firm group revenues as relevant denominator whenever the parent audit 
firm controls the subsidiary.103 
When dealing with information published by the audit firms, another problem arises. 
When date of fiscal year end of the audited company is December 31 of the year, financial 
information of the auditing company two years forward is relevant, since for example the 
transparency report published in March 2016 includes sales of the year 2015, i.e., reve-
nues from audits for the financial year 2014. Whenever fiscal year end of the audited 
company lies considerably before that date, i.e., end of June 2015, usage of the financial 
information of the transparency report two years ahead might bias the proxies, since the 
actual audit fee has already been paid before, which means the transparency report one 
year ahead is relevant. We paid attention to this bias during the collection of our data in 
the best possible way. 
                                                          
103 However, the economic dependence could still be biased in cases where there is no sufficient information about parent-subsidiary 
constellations. While these cases are very rare, they could work in favor or against our hypotheses. 
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3.4.2.3 Empirical model 
To perform multivariate tests on our hypotheses, we apply the following empirical model 
to test the influence of client importance from the importance of total sales of the client 
on the separate types of EM, while controlling for the confounding nature of several var-
iables: 
Equation	24	
BB__!"  !">6⁄ 	(K!"  !">6⁄ )
= )* ++w~xy + +imNxy + +w~xy ∗ mNxy
+ 5S K!"  !">6⁄ (BB__!"  !">6⁄ ) + 5TD!">6 + 5UK;!">6
+ 5V=8DD!" + 5W=	!" + 5Y BB!">6  !">6⁄
+ 56* BM8!"  !">6⁄ + 566=
!">6 + 56@ ∆ !"  !">6⁄
+ 56F ∆!"  !">6⁄ + 56S8!" + 56TM
!"
+ 56U<
Bℎ!" + 56V%Bℎ!" + 56W%8B!"
+ 56Y;	
D!" + 5@*;	
9!" + 5@67	BC'!" + 

+ 9%
 + :!" 
where BB__!" is the absolute discretionary accruals and K!" is the combined 
signed standardized measure for REM of firm i in year t.104 B9!" is either client importance 
from sales (B9D!"), calculated as ratio of total fees received from client i to the total sales 
of the audit firm from all services, or client importance from client’s non-audit fee im-
portance, calculated as ratio of non-audit fees to total fees received from the client 
(B9D!"). <!" is an indicator variable, which is 1 for firms where certain B9 thresholds 
are exceeded, e.g., 5 %, 10 % or 15 % client importance from total fees and 40 % or 50 
% client importance from non-audit fees are exceeded for two or three consecutive 
years.105 B9 ∗ <!"  is an interaction effect variable capturing distinct effects of client 
importance for the high dependence part of the sample. We include either BB__!" 
or K!" as separate control in Equation	24 to capture the substitution effects between the 
two types (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 2012).  
                                                          
104 See chapter 2.2 for a detailed discussion of the measurement of the applied EM proxies. 
105 To complement the time perspective of the independence threat, we additionally analyse whether exceeding the high dependence 
threshold in a single year already has a significant outcome. 
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We incorporate various confounding control variables to minimise omitted variable bi-
ases. While inclusion of collider or mediator controls might also cause type I errors of 
false rejection of the null hypothesis, we only use well-established controls from prior 
literature and assume them to be confounding (e.g., Gow et al. 2016).106 We therefore 
follow Roychowdhury (2006) and include market-based size and growth control. EM lit-
erature has found that these influencing factors can help explain considerable variation in 
the discretionary proxies (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002; Gunny 2010; Sharma et al. 2011; Ab-
bott et al. 2016). D!">6 is the natural logarithm of lagged market value of equity, 
whereas K;!">6 is market to book value of equity. =8DD!" is an indicator that is one if 
earnings are negative, zero otherwise, hereby considering the adverse EM incentives of 
these situations (e.g., Hope & Langli 2010; Sharma et al. 2011; Abbott et al. 2016). 
=	!" is an indicator control for litigation risk (e.g., DeFond & Subramanyam 
1998; Cohen et al. 2008; Sharma et al. 2011). BB!">6 and BM8!" are included to decrease 
influences of EM measurement errors caused by the first-stage regressions (e.g., Kang & 
Sivaramakrishnan 1995; Young 1999; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Ferguson et al. 2004; Prawitt 
et al. 2009). In addition, we follow Kim and Park (2005) and include =
!">6 as 
another regressor, since the degree of leverage can likewise shape EM opportunities (e.g., 
Ferguson et al. 2004; Li 2009; Abbott et al. 2016). 
Following Chi et al. (2011) and Ali and Zhang (2015), we consider two measures for 
business growth. Total asset growth (∆ !") captures the changes in assets, which influ-
ence the magnitude of total accruals due to correlation with firm’s working capital. 
∆!" on the other hand controls for the change in earnings from year t-1 to t. 8!" 
is earnings before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets, allowing and con-
trolling for possible non-linearity of the performance influence in the second-stage, com-
plementing the already performance-matched discretionary accrual approach in the first-
stage.107 We capture differences in the accounting behaviour for firms with different mat-
uration by implementing M
!" as the natural logarithm of the age of the firm, where 
age is calculated as 1+ year of incorporation to the Thomson Reuters database minus the 
                                                          
106 However, we address the problem by testing for the robustness of our results when using a baseline model, which only includes 
control variables where we can cancel out mediation or collision. 
107 See chapter 2.1.4.4 for a discussion of possible non-linearities of performance for the banking models. We regard this issue as 
comparably important in the industry models. 
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fiscal year (e.g., Prawitt et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2012; Abbott et al. 2016). We additionally 
try to disentangle certain auditing process characteristics, which could have a significant 
influence on the magnitude of EM. Therefore, <
Bℎ!" is an indicator for the 
change in one or both of the partners that manage the audit client. Additionally, 
%Bℎ!" is an indicator for a change in the audit firm. Audit quality research has 
shown that both changes in partners and audit firms can have significant influences on 
the quality of the earnings numbers (e.g., Ferguson et al. 2004; Antle et al. 2006; Lopatta 
et al. 2015). Likewise, prior literature includes auditor’s opinion, which captures influ-
ences from opportunistic EM whenever the opinion is not clean (Larcker & Richardson 
2004; Antle et al. 2006; Lopatta et al. 2015). We therefore add %8B!", indicating 
whether there has been a clean opinion for the financial year. 
We also control for Corporate Governance impacts on the decisions about EM. We there-
fore include ;	
D!", which captures the numbers of members on the board and is a 
common control for Corporate Governance (e.g., Bradbury et al. 2006; Marra et al. 2011; 
Badolato et al. 2014). Accounting research has extensively studied the question of 
whether larger boards can increase monitoring through more experience, knowledge and 
better environmental bonds. The majority of the results show that firms with a larger 
board can increase monitoring and therefore restrain EM (e.g., Dalton et al. 1999, Klein 
2002). Alternatively, Jensen (1993) claims that larger boards are less effective since they 
have a lot of coordination effort and processing problems (e.g., Dechow et al. 1996; 
Peasnell et al. 2005). We further include ;	
9!", measured as the supervisory 
board’s magnitude compared to the total board size. Various studies report significant 
outcomes indicating that higher amounts of independent members on the board can help 
to increase monitoring, hence decreasing the degree of EM used (e.g., Fama & Jensen 
1983; Beasley 1996; Klein 2002; Bradbury et al. 2006). Another important measure for 
Corporate Governance is 7	BC'!". Art. 161 of the German Stock Corporation Act 
(Aktiengesetz) obliges every capital market oriented German corporation to declare either 
compliance with recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Codex 
(Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex (DCGK)) or may choose to deviate from them, 
but then they are obliged to disclose deviations on an annual basis (“comply or explain-
principle”). The DCGK contains recommendations on how corporations can implement 
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and maintain good Corporate Governance. These recommendations include establish-
ment of an audit committee as well as collocation of the board, requirements for the com-
pensation of board members etc. Therefore, good Corporate Governance in the shade of 
few or none violations on the DCGK entails a favourable auditing process, aligned with 
Larcker and Richardson (2004), thereby limiting the use of EM.108  
We additionally use the following specification to study the trade-off between AEM and 
REM, while we exclude the control for the respective other type of EM (5S in Equation	
24): 
Equation	25	
KK!" = )* ++w~xy + +imNxy + +w~xy ∗ mNxy + 5SD!">6
+ 5TK;!">6 + 5U=	!" + 5V=	!" + 5W BB!">6  !">6⁄
+ 5Y BM8!"  !">6⁄ + 56*=
!">6 + 566 ∆ !"  !">6⁄
+ 56@ ∆!"  !">6⁄ + 56F8!" + 56SM
!"
+ 56T<
Bℎ!" + 56U%Bℎ!" + 56V%8B!"
+ 56W;	
D!" + 56Y;	
9!" + 5@*7	BC'!" + 

+ 9%
 + :!" 
KK!" is a decile-based variable that captures the trade-off between AEM and 
REM (e.g., Bozzolan et al. 2015). We split both BB__!" and K!" distrubutions 
into deciles and calculate KK!" as the decile for K!" in relation to the sum of 
the deciles for both BB__!" and K!". We estimate Equation 24-Equation 25 using 
OLS with two-way clustering at the firm and time level (e.g., Petersen 2008; Gow et al. 
2010).109 
                                                          
108 We additionally address the importance of a best practice audit committee in chapter 3.7.4 and study the moderating effect on our 
initial results. 
109 Since the standard errors of our regressions may be influenced by cross-sectional and serial correlation, we apply two-way clus-
tering by firm and year. Petersen (2008) and Gow et al. (2010) show that when both sources of correlation are existent and consider-
ably high, sole parametrical formulation, e.g., inclusion of firm or year dummies, might not solve the problem whenever the firm 
and/or time effect is not fixed. Two-way clustering accounts for non-fixed effects and remains unbiased as long as the number of 
clusters is sufficiently high. We assume our estimation procedure with 236 firm and 6 year clusters to be appropriate. However, to 
address the problem of too few clusters, we apply the Cameron et al. (2011) adjustment in robustness analyses. Using industry in-
stead of firm clustering yields no estimation advantage compared to simple one-way clustering, since only 8 industry clusters exist 
and these effects might be nested in firm clusters. We additionally include time and industry fixed effects to control for an industry 
and time fixed effect. Additional firm fixed effects would significantly decrease estimation efficiency due to high number of firms 
compared to the total number of observations. On top of that, we assume our hypothesized effects to be between firms. 
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3.5 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 25 reports descriptive statistics for all relevant variables. We winsorize at the top 
and bottom 1 percent of the respective distribution to account for outliers. The mean val-
ues of signed discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation account for -0.1 and 
0.3 percent of lagged total accruals. They are not significantly different from zero, indi-
cating a favorable setting with no systematic upward or downward bias of the EM prox-
ies.110 The sample firms are relatively young with a mean firm age of 2.449 years and 
have comparable market-based size with a mean natural logarithm of market value of 
equity of 10.829 and an interquartile range of only 1.99. However, expected growth op-
portunities differ significantly with a mean market-to-book ratio of 1.746 and a standard 
deviation of 2.219. Compared to German settings with mainly large audit firms (e.g., 82.4 
percent Big4 companies in Lopatta et al. 2015), our sample firms account for a loss in 29 
percent of the years (14.3 percent in Lopatta et al. 2015), while around every third firm is 
located in a high-litigation risk industry. What is more, we have considerable discontinu-
ity concerning the engagement and review partners (change of at least one partner in 41.2 
percent observations), while audit firms change in 13.4 percent of the years. Corporate 
governance variables show a board size of on average seven members, while 65.2 percent 
of them are independent. Sample firms account for 6.516 violations of the DCGK, while 
Lopatta et al. (2015) observe only 2.825. This difference might be due to the low maturity 
of our firms, since implementing all corporate governance devices in accordance with the 
DCGK might take some time. 
Unlike with Lopatta et al. (2015) (0.7 percent), our client importance from total sales is 
of substance, with a mean value of 4.1 percent. However, a median value of 0.3 percent, 
skewness of 3.699 and kurtosis of 17.409 imply that few extreme observations with pro-
nounced economic bonding drive the mean, while the magnitude of the observations is 
located beneath the mean. We regard this as a univariate sign for distinct situations of 
high economic dependence that should be analyzed separately. Client importance from 
                                                          
110 Untabulated tests show that BB!" and K!" are not statistically different from zero at 0.01 levels. Mean value of 0.503 for 
KK!" also shows no systematic trade-off for the total sample. 
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non-audit services is 20.4 percent on average (against 31.7 percent in Lopatta et al. 2015), 
while an interquartile range of 30.5 percent also shows considerable variation. 
Table 25 – Descriptive statistics of relevant variables 
Panel: Full sample     
  N  Mean  fgh  Std. Dev.  fig  fjg 
Dependent variables             
BB__!"  1,052  0.068  0.045  0.077  0.020  0.088 
BB!"  1,052  0.000  0.000  0.102  -0.041  0.047 
K!"  1,052  -0.000  -0.153  2.141  -1.226  1.109 
KK!"  1,052  0.502  0.500  0.207  0.345  0.643 
Variables of interest             
B9D!"  1,052  0.041  0.003  0.101  0.001  0.020 
B9D!"   1,052  0.209  0.175  0.187  0.036  0.341 
Control variables 
D!">6  1,052  10.829  10.739  1.523  9.793  11.783 
K;!">6  1,052  1.746  1.167  2.329  0.753  1.874 
=8DD!"  1,052  0.290  0.000  0.454  0.000  1.000 
=	!"  1,052  0.313  0.000  0.464  0.000  1.000 
BB!">6  1,052  -0.052  -0.039  0.145  -0.091  0.006 
BM8!"  1,052  0.046  0.064  0.165  0.008  0.114 
=
!">6  1,052  0.533  0.526  0.315  0.339  0.673 
∆ !"  1,052  0.055  0.019  0.282  -0.055  0.111 
∆!"  1,052  0.019  0.002  0.184  -0.027  0.037 
8!"  1,052  0.006  0.030  0.179  -0.014  0.070 
M
!"  1,052  2.449  2.565  0.507  2.398  2.708 
<
Bℎ!"  1,052  0.412  0.000  0.492  0.000  1.000 
%Bℎ!"  1,052  0.134  0.000  0.341  0.000  0.000 
%8B!"  1,052  0.969  1.000  0.174  1.000  1.000 
;	
D!"  1,052  7.071  6.000  2.942  5.000  8.000 
;	
9!"  1,052  0.652  0.600  0.117  0.600  0.750 
7	BC'!"  1,052  6.516  6.000  4.011  4.000  9.000 
All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
The correlation among the most relevant variables are shown in Table 26. The highest 
correlations between independent variables is the correlation between D9H and 
;	
D (0.506) and 8 and =	 (-0.608).111 
                                                          
111 These results are not surprising. We conclude that there are no serious problems concerning high correlations that could majorly 
distort the results of our multivariate analyses. We check for the multicollinearity of our variables in all regressions. 
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Table 27 contains descriptive statistics by audit firm size. We include this analysis to get 
a better impression of whether size differences within our sample of small and midsized 
auditors might be driving any of our results.112 Panel A highlights that smaller audit firms 
are significantly higher dependent on their clients with a mean (median) value of client 
importance of 8.5 (2.7) percent for the smaller sized audit firms compared to 0.2 (0.1) 
percent for the larger sized audit firms, which is in line with the considerations by DeAn-
gelo (1981b).113 However, there is no significant difference in our EM proxies, which 
either indicates that there is no relation or a relation that cannot be captured by univariate 
linear testing. Interestingly, we find no significant difference for our second client im-
portance proxy (non-audit service importance). In particular, a separate multivariate anal-
ysis of both proxies seems to be important. What is more, panel B shows that firms au-
dited by a smaller audit firm tend to significantly trade-off AEM through REM in com-
parison to their counterparts audited by larger audit firms. 
We split the sample once more using the respective economic bonding thresholds dis-
cussed earlier. What is more, we find that our two client importance proxies only once 
(>5% CIS in two consecutive years) show mutual significant differences. E.g., for the 
>10% threshold, a B9D!" of 26.9 percent and a B9D!" of 21.4 percent for the threshold 
firms face 1.6 percent B9D!" respectively 20.8 percent B9D!" for the remaining firms. 
This complements our view that both proxies measure diverse dimensions of economic 
bonding, which is why separate analyses are important. 
  
                                                          
112 Size categorization (1-4) follows EU SME definition from May 2003. See Appendix for a detailed definition. 
113 The difference even increases when we put together the two groups or size 3 & 4 as the larger firms. Then, mean (median) client 
importance for the smaller firms is 14.1 (8.5) percent in comparison to 0.4 (0.2) percent for the larger firms. 
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Table 28 illustrates the statistics for each of the subsamples. We find for the B9D thresholds 
that firms with client importance above 5%, 10% and 15% in two consecutive years on 
average have comparable levels of EM. Only for the 5% threshold, univariate tests show 
a significant higher use of REM compared to the remaining sample. In line with this re-
sult, KK!" indicates that firms above the economic bonding barrier show more 
REM than AEM, while it is the other way round for the remaining sample. Altogether, 
our univariate results seem to contradict the argument that firms with a highly dependent 
auditor have lower audit quality and therefore lower financial reporting quality, indicating 
that auditors’ increased reputation and litigation risk compensates the increase in depend-
ence. 
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Table 27 – Descriptive statistics by audit firm size 
Panel A: Full sample split by size 4 
 
 
-x 4 
(1) 
 
-x 1-3 
(2) 
 Difference 
(1) – (2): 
p-value 
  
N Mean cT*  N Mean cT*  
Wilcoxon 
Test 
 t-test 
Dependent Variables 
BB__!"  553 0.071 0.046  499 0.064 0.044  0.372  0.109 
K!"  553 0.011 -0.063  499 -0.012 -0.205  0.571  0.860 
KK!"  553 0.494 0.500  499 0.510 0.529  0.142  0.201 
Variables of Interest 
B9D!"   553 0.002 0.001  499 0.085 0.024  <0.001*  <0.001* 
B9DD!"   553 0.214 0.168  499 0.203 0.179  0.773  0.349 
%_
B!"  553 23 17  499 7 3  <0.001*  <0.001* 
Panel B: Full sample split by size 3-4 
 
 
-x 3-4 
(1) 
 
-x 1-2 
(2) 
 Difference 
(1) – (2): 
p-value 
  
N Mean cT*  N Mean cT*  
Wilcoxon 
Test 
 t-test 
Dependent Variables 
BB__!"  765 0.069 0.046  287 0.063 0.042  0.281  0.254 
K!"  765 0.012 -0.084  287 -0.032 -0.252  0.286  0.768 
KK!"  765 0.495 0.500  287 0.519 0.533  0.066*  0.092* 
Variables of Interest 
B9D!"   765 0.004 0.002  287 0.141 0.085  <0.001*  <0.001* 
B9DD!"   765 0.212 0.175  287 0.200 0.173  0.635  0.341 
%_
B!"  765 20 16  287 2 1  <0.001*  <0.001* 
To split firm-year observations by the size of the audit firm, we use a size system that follows EU SME definitions from May 2003. Therefore, we 
define audit firms with sales <=2 m. EUR as midget audit firms (size 1) and audit firms with sales >2 m. EUR and <=10 m. EUR as small audit firms 
(size 2). We define audit firms with sales >10 m. EUR and <=50 m. EUR as medium audit firms (size 3) and audit firms with sales > 50 m. EUR as 
large audit firms (size 4). We evaluate significances of means and medians based on t-tests and Wilcoxon tests, respectively. We calculate p-values and 
Z-statistics based on two-tailed tests. * indicates statistical significance at conventional levels. Variables are defined in Appendix C. 
What is more, we find that our two client importance proxies only once (>5% CIS in two 
consecutive years) show mutual significant differences. E.g., for the >10% threshold, a 
B9D!" of 26.9 percent and a B9D!" of 21.4 percent for the threshold firms face 1.6 per-
cent B9D!" respectively 20.8 percent B9D!" for the remaining firms. This complements 
our view that both proxies measure diverse dimensions of economic bonding, which is 
why separate analyses are important. 
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Table 28 – Descriptive statistics by CI limits for the full sample 
 
 >5% CIS in two consecutive 
years 
(1) 
 
Remaining sample 
(2) 
 Difference 
(1) – (2): 
p-value 
  
N Mean cT*  N Mean cT*  
Wilcoxon 
Test 
 t-test 
Dependent Variables 
BB__!"  171 0.062 0.043  881 0.069 0.045  0.487  0.252 
K!"  171 -0.182 -0.431  881 0.035 -0.087  0.046*  0.224 
KK!"  171 0.523 0.556  881 0.498 0.500  0.092*  0.144 
Variables of Interest 
B9D!"   171 0.198 0.139  881 0.011 0.002  <0.001*  <0.001* 
B9DD!"  171 0.233 0.230  881 0.204 0.167  0.028*  0.063* 
 
 >10% CIS in two consecutive 
years 
(1) 
 
Remaining sample 
(2) 
 Difference 
(1) – (2): 
p-value 
  
N Mean cT*  N Mean cT*  
Wilcoxon 
Test 
 t-test 
Dependent Variables 
BB__!"  103 0.064 0.047  949 0.068 0.045  0.990  0.588 
K!"  103 -0.249 -0.367  949 0.027 -0.124  0.127  0.213 
KK!"  103 0.519 0.538  949 0.500 0.500  0.342  0.381 
Variables of Interest 
B9D!"   103 0.269 0.203  949 0.016 0.002  <0.001*  <0.001* 
B9DD!"  103 0.214 0.220  949 0.208 0.170  0.701  0.781 
 
 >15% CIS in two consecutive 
years 
(1) 
 
Remaining sample 
(2) 
 Difference 
(1) – (2): 
p-value 
  
N Mean cT*  N Mean cT*  
Wilcoxon 
Test 
 t-test 
Dependent Variables 
BB__!"  70 0.066 0.046  982 0.068 0.045  >0.999  0.882 
K!"  70 -0.290 -0.326  982 0.021 -0.135  0.189  0.241 
KK!"  70 0.524 0.542  982 0.500 0.500  0.331  0.357 
Variables of Interest 
B9D!"   70 0.330 0.273  982 0.021 0.003  <0.001*  <0.001* 
B9DD!"  70 0.202 0.213  982 0.209 0.173  0.637  0.76 
 
 >40% CINAS in two  
consecutive years 
(1) 
 
Remaining sample 
(2) 
 Difference 
(1) – (2): 
p-value 
  
N Mean cT*  N Mean cT*  
Wilcoxon 
Test 
 t-test 
Dependent Variables 
BB__!"  94 0.076 0.054  958 0.067 0.044  0.163  0.249 
K!"  94 0.020 -0.052  958 -0.002 -0.161  0.605  0.92 
KK!"  94 0.473 0.500  958 0.505 0.500  0.161  0.164 
Variables of Interest 
B9D!"   94 0.055 0.005  958 0.040 0.003  0.094*  0.164 
B9DD!"  94 0.534 0.513  958 0.177 0.152  <0.001*  <0.001* 
 
 >50% CINAS in two  
consecutive years 
(1) 
 
Remaining sample 
(2) 
 Difference 
(1) – (2): 
p-value 
  
N Mean cT*  N Mean cT*  
Wilcoxon 
Test 
 t-test 
Dependent Variables 
BB__!"  38 0.088 0.050  1,014 0.067 0.045  0.631  0.104 
K!"  38 0.020 -0.083  1,014 -0.001 -0.157  0.486  0.952 
KK!"  38 0.479 0.464  1,014 0.503 0.500  0.389  0.491 
Variables of Interest 
B9D!"   38 0.017 0.005  1,014 0.042 0.003  0.975  0.128 
B9DD!"  38 0.625 0.615  1,014 0.193 0.167  <0.001*  <0.001* 
A firm is defined as a dependent firm when the client importance concerning the respective proxy (B9D or B9D) lies above the respective 
threshold in two consecutive years, whereas all other observations are attributed to the remaining sample. We evaluate significances of means 
and medians based on t-tests and Wilcoxon tests, respectively. We calculate p-values and Z-statistics based on two-tailed tests. * indicates 
statistical significance at conventional levels. Variables are defined in Appendix C. 
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3.6 Multivariate analysis 
We conduct multivariate regressions on the influence of client importance from sales 
(B9D!") using Equation 24-Equation	25 and report the results in Table 29, Table 30 and Table 
31. All regressions are statistically significant at the 0.01 levels and explanatory power 
(@) ranges from 5-16 percent using cross-sectional EM proxies. These numbers are on 
average slightly higher than with Sharma et al. (2011), though slightly lower than with 
Svanström (2013). Results in Table 29 show the multiple regressions of AEM, e.g., 
BB__!", on CIS. Columns (1)-(3) use a <!" indicator with client importance above 
5% in one, two or three consecutive years. Coefficients on B9D!" are negative and signif-
icant, indicating that firms with higher dependence tend to use lower discretionary accru-
als. Initially, this opposes the hypothesized link that firms with higher dependence can 
use this dependence in financial reporting negotiations to pursue more AEM. Further-
more, this works in favor of our argument for higher reputation and litigation risk for 
publicly listed clients as fees increase, which seems to overcompensate increased eco-
nomic dependence. The suspected high-dependence firms with above 5% total sales im-
portance show mixed results for the coefficients on <!" and the interaction variable 
(B9D!" ∗ <!"). We find a significant negative coefficient on <!", while the coefficient 
on B9D!" ∗ <!" is significant and positive for one and three consecutive years. We re-
gard this as a weak sign for an increase of the economic dependence effect as the depend-
ence gets pronounced, e.g., exceeds the regulatory thresholds.  
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Table 29 – Multiple regressions of AEM on CIS 
Dependent variable: absolute positively scaled value of discretionary accruals: BB__!" 
 >5 % w~ >10 % w~ >15 % w~ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 one year two years three years one year two years three years one year two years three years 
B9D!" -0.716 -0.105 -0.095 -0.219 -0.120 -0.119 -0.161 -0.115 -0.106 
 (3.83)*** (3.24)*** (3.32)*** (2.22)** (3.34)*** (3.93)*** (2.62)*** (3.94)*** (4.78)*** 
<!" -0.012 -0.013 -0.018 -0.016 -0.018 -0.021 -0.015 -0.016 -0.029 
 (1.76)* (1.78)* (2.19)** (2.26)** (1.66)* (1.86)* (1.10) (0.71) (1.30) 
B9D!" ∗ <!" 0.700 0.108 0.117 0.221 0.143 0.161 0.161 0.132 0.162 
 (3.77)*** (1.59) (1.78)* (2.10)** (1.89)* (2.69)*** (2.45)** (1.58) (2.09)** 
K!" -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.90) (0.90) (0.90) (0.91) (0.88) (0.78) (0.91) (0.87) (0.77) 
D!">6 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (2.48)** (2.38)** (2.36)** (2.37)** (2.32)** (2.33)** (2.48)** (2.37)** (2.44)** 
K;!">6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (0.36) (0.31) (0.36) (0.38) (0.35) 
=8DD!" 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
 (1.83)* (1.82)* (1.86)* (1.88)* (1.83)* (1.86)* (1.87)* (1.79)* (1.84)* 
=	!" -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.25) (0.18) (0.20) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.23) (0.26) 
BB!">6 -0.025 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.026 -0.025 -0.023 -0.026 -0.025 
 (0.67) (0.67) (0.66) (0.66) (0.71) (0.71) (0.65) (0.73) (0.71) 
BM8!" -0.019 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.023 -0.017 -0.018 -0.022 
 (0.39) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.36) (0.46) (0.34) (0.36) (0.45) 
=
!">6 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 -0.013 -0.015 -0.014 -0.013 
 (1.03) (1.01) (1.02) (1.03) (0.90) (0.83) (1.02) (0.89) (0.88) 
∆ !" -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) 
∆!" 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 
 (0.15) (0.22) (0.26) (0.23) (0.17) (0.19) (0.25) (0.16) (0.19) 
8!" 0.031 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.033 0.029 0.029 0.033 
 (0.70) (0.63) (0.61) (0.65) (0.66) (0.75) (0.65) (0.67) (0.75) 
M
!" 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.35) (0.42) (0.47) (0.39) (0.41) (0.46) (0.41) (0.36) (0.41) 
<
Bℎ!" -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
 (1.36) (1.39) (1.42) (1.41) (1.44) (1.54) (1.48) (1.44) (1.52) 
%Bℎ!" 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.004 
 (0.12) (0.36) (0.31) (0.21) (0.43) (0.44) (0.23) (0.42) (0.39) 
%8B!" -0.035 -0.034 -0.035 -0.035 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 -0.035 
 (1.44) (1.40) (1.43) (1.43) (1.40) (1.39) (1.41) (1.38) (1.43) 
;	
D!" -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.89) (0.89) (0.93) (0.97) (0.90) (0.95) (0.97) (0.91) (0.93) 
;	
9!" -0.036 -0.034 -0.034 -0.035 -0.033 -0.033 -0.034 -0.033 -0.033 
 (1.23) (1.15) (1.14) (1.17) (1.12) (1.11) (1.15) (1.11) (1.11) 
7	BC'!" 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.70) (0.70) (0.63) (0.61) (0.74) (0.75) (0.61) (0.75) (0.74) 
9
L 0.188 0.181 0.181 0.185 0.180 0.179 0.185 0.180 0.182 
 (3.74)*** (3.57)*** (3.60)*** (3.63)*** (3.41)*** (3.42)*** (3.59)*** (3.46)*** (3.50)*** 
9%
	M Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 

	M Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
@ 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
M 2.82 2.76 2.95 2.63 2.91 3.23 2.62 2.86 2.96 
 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test statistics are calculated using OLS with 
two-way clustering at the firm and time level. We additionally include appropriate fixed effects. Mean VIF for all regressions are considerably below 5. BB__ 
is comprehended as the residual from cross-sectional industry-year specific first-stage regressions of Equation	12. B9D is client importance, calculated as ratio of 
total client sales to total sales of the audit firm. All other variables are defined in Appendix C. 
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Still, whenever we find a significant coefficient on <!", the total effects remains nega-
tive, e.g., the economic dependence effect is still offset by an increased effect of reputa-
tion and litigation risk, only by a decreased margin. This can be seen from simple calcu-
lation of 
||
|>|
, indicating a turning point for dependence levels outside of the distribu-
tion.114 
Taking a closer look at the 10% (column (4)-(6)) thresholds, we find similar results. What 
is important and in line with considerations of an increasing economic dependence as the 
time period increases, we find for all regressions that coefficient 56 gradually decreases, 
while coefficient 5F increases. We propose that as the number EM incidents increases, 
the tendency of the auditor to rule these out decreases as the dependence on the client 
increases. 
When we consider the results for the 15% threshold in columns (7)-(9), results change 
considerably. For firms in this threshold, there in an overcompensating dependence ef-
fects (5F ≥ 56), especially for a time-period of three consecutive years. We conclude that 
exceeding both the high dependence level (e.g., 15% B9D) and the long time-period could 
be a drawback for audit quality and might open up opportunities for the client to pursue 
AEM.115 
Results on K!" are reported in Table 30. Being negatively scaled, higher auditor de-
pendence from clients would go hand in hand with more REM when coefficients are neg-
ative. However, we do not find significant results for an influence of client importance 
on the use of REM. Following Greiner et al. (2017), we note that this result could be due 
to the fact that audit characteristics only influence the extreme parts of the distribution of 
REM, which is why we again focus on this part of EM in our additional analysis in section 
3.7.  
  
                                                          
114 E.g., for >5 % B9D for three consecutive years (column (3)), the total effects turns positive when dependence exceeds a level of 
81.82 percent, while maximum B9D is 57.57 percent. 
115 However, we not that only few observations with a dependence threshold above 15% in three consecutive years exist. Therefore, 
we consecutively test the robustness of our results using pooled AEM proxies and in section 3.7 for extreme observations of AEM. 
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Table 30 – Multiple regressions of REM on CIS 
Dependent variable: comprehensive negatively scaled standardized REM proxy: K!" = BM8__!" − <8__!" + 9D<__!" 
 >5 % w~ >10 % w~ >15 % w~ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 one year two years three years one year two years three years one year two years three years 
B9D!" -0.889 -1.338 -1.278 -1.219 -0.550 0.536 -2.114 -0.480 0.565 
 (0.11) (1.31) (1.27) (0.25) (0.62) (0.36) (0.62) (0.39) (0.39) 
<!" -0.303 -0.264 -0.189 -0.535 -0.272 0.104 -0.412 -0.255 0.100 
 (0.75) (0.58) (0.36) (1.08) (0.55) (0.20) (1.05) (0.63) (0.20) 
B9D!" ∗ <!" 1.348 1.854 1.640 2.237 0.927 -1.508 2.805 0.749 -1.594 
 (0.18) (0.85) (0.73) (0.40) (0.48) (0.61) (0.74) (0.50) (0.70) 
BB__!" -0.849 -0.870 -0.872 -0.868 -0.845 -0.761 -0.864 -0.832 -0.761 
 (0.86) (0.86) (0.86) (0.87) (0.85) (0.75) (0.87) (0.84) (0.75) 
D!">6 -0.052 -0.051 -0.050 -0.060 -0.055 -0.052 -0.055 -0.053 -0.052 
 (0.66) (0.64) (0.64) (0.74) (0.67) (0.65) (0.70) (0.68) (0.67) 
K;!">6 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.024 
 (0.45) (0.44) (0.44) (0.48) (0.46) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) 
=8DD!" -0.341 -0.346 -0.341 -0.342 -0.340 -0.334 -0.341 -0.340 -0.335 
 (1.98)** (2.01)** (1.95)* (1.96)* (1.95)* (1.90)* (1.97)** (1.92)* (1.89)* 
=	!" 0.393 0.392 0.393 0.383 0.394 0.407 0.387 0.396 0.409 
 (1.61) (1.61) (1.61) (1.56) (1.60) (1.64) (1.58) (1.61) (1.66)* 
BB!">6 0.019 0.007 0.008 0.031 0.017 0.051 0.017 0.018 0.056 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.06) (0.17) (0.05) (0.06) (0.19) 
BM8!" 6.280 6.271 6.261 6.276 6.259 6.295 6.268 6.252 6.301 
 (6.50)*** (6.47)*** (6.44)*** (6.57)*** (6.49)*** (6.42)*** (6.48)*** (6.46)*** (6.41)*** 
=
!">6 0.279 0.279 0.280 0.270 0.283 0.268 0.273 0.283 0.266 
 (0.62) (0.63) (0.63) (0.61) (0.65) (0.62) (0.61) (0.65) (0.62) 
∆ !" 0.352 0.351 0.354 0.356 0.356 0.367 0.354 0.358 0.368 
 (1.66)* (1.68)* (1.70)* (1.63) (1.70)* (1.75)* (1.68)* (1.74)* (1.79)* 
∆!" 0.475 0.466 0.467 0.473 0.472 0.493 0.468 0.473 0.498 
 (1.06) (1.03) (1.04) (1.13) (1.13) (1.17) (1.08) (1.13) (1.18) 
8!" -2.348 -2.343 -2.327 -2.334 -2.307 -2.322 -2.326 -2.302 -2.326 
 (2.07)** (2.07)** (2.04)** (2.08)** (2.03)** (2.08)** (2.05)** (2.01)** (2.08)** 
M
!" -0.018 -0.017 -0.015 -0.020 -0.021 -0.024 -0.020 -0.021 -0.019 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
<
Bℎ!" 0.024 0.025 0.021 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.025 0.023 0.022 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) 
%Bℎ!" -0.073 -0.055 -0.050 -0.080 -0.063 -0.074 -0.076 -0.059 -0.072 
 (0.32) (0.23) (0.20) (0.34) (0.26) (0.29) (0.33) (0.26) (0.31) 
%8B!" 0.181 0.189 0.197 0.182 0.194 0.207 0.178 0.189 0.202 
 (0.47) (0.49) (0.52) (0.46) (0.50) (0.54) (0.46) (0.50) (0.54) 
;	
D!" 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.038 0.036 0.037 0.038 
 (0.94) (0.95) (0.96) (0.98) (0.99) (1.02) (0.97) (1.00) (1.03) 
;	
9!" -0.858 -0.852 -0.858 -0.839 -0.846 -0.882 -0.853 -0.859 -0.895 
 (0.85) (0.84) (0.85) (0.84) (0.84) (0.87) (0.85) (0.85) (0.88) 
7	BC'!" -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.014 -0.016 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.85) (0.77) (0.76) (0.84) (0.75) (0.74) (0.82) (0.75) (0.74) 
9
L 0.427 0.386 0.360 0.506 0.400 0.362 0.466 0.388 0.352 
 (0.41) (0.38) (0.35) (0.48) (0.38) (0.34) (0.46) (0.39) (0.35) 
9%
	M Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 

	M Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
@ 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
M 6.13 6.42 6.43 6.14 6.08 6.31 6.06 6.03 6.28 
 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test statistics are calculated using OLS with 
two-way clustering at the firm and time level. We additionally include appropriate fixed effects. Mean VIF for all regressions are considerably below 5. K is 
comprehended as the standardized value of the residuals from cross-sectional industry-year specific first-stage regressions of Equation	13,Equation	14 and Equation	
17. B9D is client importance, calculated as ratio of total client sales to total sales of the audit firm. All other variables are defined in Appendix C. 
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When we take a closer look at the trade-off relation proxy (KK!") in Table 31, we 
find a positive and significant effect of higher client importance, indicating that higher 
dependence leads to a trade-off from AEM to real activities. These results are only con-
sistent for cases in which we study the respective threshold for two consecutive years. 
Here we find significant (at least 0.05 levels) results for a trade-off from AEM to REM, 
which is decreasing with an increasing dependence threshold, indicating the already dis-
cussed increase in dependence effects with increasing dependence threshold. Further-
more, for 10% and 15% thresholds, we also find a significant negative coefficients for 
our interaction term (columns (5) & (8)), indicating a trade-off back to AEM when the 
threshold is met. 
Altogether, these results work against the understanding that a less independent auditor 
will yield opportunities for the client to purse AEM. In contrast, increasing economic 
dependence seems to enhance audit quality, e.g., the higher dependence as an input factor 
causes higher audit effort due to the pronounced reputation and litigation risk effects, 
causing the client to use lower AEM. Consequently, clients could take into consideration 
the trade-off between AEM and REM (e.g., Zang 2012) and use costly REM to compen-
sate decreased opportunities of AEM. 
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Table 31 – Multiple regressions of the trade-off proxy REMvsAEM on CIS 
Dependent variable: decile-based trade-off proxy between REM and AEM: KK!" 
 >5 % w~ >10 % w~ >15 % w~ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 one year two years three years one year two years three years one year two years three years 
B9D!" 1.579 0.372 0.326 0.591 0.357 0.260 0.362 0.288 0.218 
 (2.23)** (2.23)** (2.26)** (1.26) (2.80)*** (1.59) (1.28) (2.57)** (1.52) 
<!" 0.030 0.031 0.044 0.039 0.034 0.036 0.043 0.046 0.048 
 (1.08) (1.05) (1.40) (1.83)* (1.55) (1.14) (3.91)*** (2.69)*** (1.34) 
B9D!" ∗ <!" -1.540 -0.391 -0.393 -0.587 -0.394 -0.299 -0.367 -0.341 -0.272 
 (2.21)** (1.55) (1.64) (1.26) (2.44)** (1.22) (1.46) (2.20)** (1.11) 
D!">6 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 (2.11)** (2.03)** (2.00)** (2.03)** (2.03)** (2.06)** (2.17)** (2.13)** (2.16)** 
K;!">6 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (1.53) (1.54) (1.49) (1.49) (1.50) (1.45) (1.59) (1.60) (1.56) 
=8DD!" -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
 (0.68) (0.62) (0.65) (0.72) (0.67) (0.71) (0.73) (0.68) (0.71) 
=	!" -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 
 (0.97) (0.97) (0.96) (0.99) (0.96) (0.98) (0.99) (0.95) (0.98) 
BB!">6 -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 -0.019 -0.013 -0.017 -0.021 -0.014 -0.018 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.40) (0.40) (0.28) (0.39) (0.46) (0.34) (0.43) 
BM8!" -0.391 -0.393 -0.395 -0.394 -0.394 -0.385 -0.395 -0.394 -0.386 
 (5.73)*** (5.73)*** (5.77)*** (5.66)*** (5.85)*** (5.57)*** (5.76)*** (5.88)*** (5.78)*** 
=
!">6 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.023 0.022 0.027 0.024 0.024 
 (0.89) (0.90) (0.92) (0.92) (0.78) (0.76) (0.93) (0.83) (0.80) 
∆ !" -0.037 -0.039 -0.039 -0.038 -0.038 -0.038 -0.039 -0.038 -0.039 
 (1.94)* (2.17)** (2.20)** (1.99)** (2.04)** (2.06)** (2.13)** (2.11)** (2.15)** 
∆!" -0.047 -0.047 -0.048 -0.049 -0.045 -0.048 -0.049 -0.046 -0.048 
 (0.97) (0.99) (1.03) (1.05) (0.97) (1.03) (1.10) (1.01) (1.05) 
8!" 0.080 0.087 0.089 0.086 0.086 0.076 0.085 0.085 0.077 
 (1.02) (1.10) (1.13) (1.09) (1.08) (0.95) (1.09) (1.08) (0.99) 
M
!" -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.24) (0.29) (0.33) (0.27) (0.28) (0.29) (0.27) (0.24) (0.27) 
<
Bℎ!" -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 
 (1.09) (1.03) (0.96) (1.02) (1.01) (0.94) (0.99) (1.03) (0.97) 
%Bℎ!" 0.026 0.018 0.019 0.024 0.017 0.019 0.023 0.019 0.020 
 (1.18) (0.68) (0.75) (1.11) (0.65) (0.71) (1.07) (0.72) (0.77) 
%8B!" 0.018 0.015 0.016 0.018 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.015 0.016 
 (0.70) (0.60) (0.64) (0.71) (0.59) (0.59) (0.66) (0.57) (0.59) 
;	
D!" -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (1.12) (1.00) (0.97) (1.01) (1.00) (1.01) (1.02) (1.02) (1.03) 
;	
9!" 0.113 0.108 0.108 0.111 0.106 0.107 0.109 0.106 0.108 
 (1.50) (1.40) (1.38) (1.48) (1.39) (1.38) (1.42) (1.36) (1.36) 
7	BC'!" 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.68) (0.57) (0.67) (0.75) (0.53) (0.56) (0.73) (0.59) (0.59) 
9
L 0.316 0.334 0.334 0.322 0.338 0.337 0.323 0.332 0.332 
 (4.19)*** (4.44)*** (4.51)*** (4.31)*** (4.24)*** (4.20)*** (4.36)*** (4.30)*** (4.45)*** 
9%
	M Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 

	M Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
@ 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
M 5.57 5.68 5.82 5.47 5.76 4.98 5.36 5.61 5.04 
 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test statistics are calculated using OLS with 
two-way clustering at the firm and time level. We additionally include appropriate fixed effects. Mean VIF for all regressions are considerably below 5. KK 
is comprehended as the ratio of the decile of K to the sum of the deciles of K and BB__, where K is the standardized value of the residuals from 
cross-sectional industry-year specific first-stage regressions of Equation	13, Equation	14 and Equation	17 BB__ is the residual from cross-sectional industry-
year specific first-stage regressions of Equation	12. B9D is client importance, calculated as ratio of total client sales to total sales of the audit firm. All other variables 
are defined in Appendix C. 
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As already mentioned in section 2.2.1, results from first-stage cross-sectional regressions 
might lack efficiency, which is why we alternatively use pooled first-stage regressions 
with two-way clustering at the firm and year level. Using residuals from these regressions 
in Table 32, adjusted r-squares are considerably higher between 12-31 percent.116 We find 
significant and reassuring results for AEM in columns (1)-(2), while for REM we find 
significant negative coefficients in columns (3)-(4), indicating a continuous increase of 
REM with increasing dependence of the auditor. The results for our trade-off proxy sup-
port this and show a holistic picture of an increasing audit quality when dependence in-
creases, which is why clients seem to trade-off from AEM to REM. On the other hand, 
audit quality seems to decrease when thresholds are met, followed by a higher use of 
AEM while REM seems to remain increasing, though at a lower level, therefore decreas-
ing the trade-off relation between REM and AEM again. 
We test the influence of the relation of non-audit fees to total fees from a specific audit 
client (B9D)	on EM and report the regression results in Table 33. The binary variable 
< is 1 if non-audit fee ratios are larger than 40% or 50%, respectively. Again, we focus 
on two consecutive years as the respective time-period of dependence.117 The results 
show that an increasing client importance, proxied by the non-audit fee to total fee ratio, 
does not significantly explain any variation in our EM proxies. Conjectured interaction 
effects (non-linearities) are not significant. If only, the results in column (4) for the de-
pendence threshold and the separate influence of B9D for this group show results, 
which are in line with our results for our first client importance proxy. This result is in 
line with our null hypotheses. However, it is important to note that these regression results 
are opposed to the results on B9D. Given that B9D is a much more precise and particularly 
direct proxy for client importance, we note that studies using non-audit fee importance 
should be careful when it comes to drawing conclusion about client importance using this 
proxy. There might be diverse incentives captured by the B9D proxy, which could lead 
to false inferences, at least for comparable non-BigN settings. 
                                                          
116 To ensure clarity of our study, we only report results for 5% and 10% for two consecutive years. Results for one and three con-
secutive years are comparable, while results for the 15% threshold lack number of firm-years with this feature, again reducing the 
efficiency of our estimations. 
117 The results for one or three consecutive years are qualitatively the same, which is why we do not report them. 
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Table 32 – Multiple regressions of alternative EM proxies on CIS for two consecutive years 
 Dependent variable: BB__!" Dependent variable: K!" Dependent variable: KK!" 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 >5 % B9D >10 % B9D >5 % B9D >10 % B9D >5 % B9D >10 % B9D 
B9D!" -0.119 -0.109 -1.798 -1.780 0.196 0.212 
 (8.09)*** (3.50)*** (1.72)* (2.27)** (2.59)*** (2.45)** 
<!" -0.020 -0.044 -0.261 -0.352 0.059 0.098 
 (2.25)** (2.77)*** (0.79) (0.87) (2.14)** (2.40)** 
B9D!" ∗ <!" 0.148 0.203 2.085 2.335 -0.280 -0.400 
 (4.02)*** (3.59)*** (1.32) (1.39) (2.80)*** (4.05)*** 
K!" -0.001 -0.001     
 (1.03) (1.08)     
BB__!"	 	 	 -0.451	 -0.464	 	 	
   (1.02) (1.07)   
D!">6 -0.011 -0.012 -0.137 -0.139 0.027 0.028 
 (3.06)*** (3.02)*** (1.84)* (1.87)* (4.02)*** (4.15)*** 
K;!">6 0.001 0.001 0.061 0.062 -0.009 -0.009 
 (1.81)* (1.82)* (1.51) (1.50) (2.62)*** (2.62)*** 
=8DD!" 0.018 0.018 -0.270 -0.268 -0.011 -0.011 
 (1.83)* (1.77)* (1.60) (1.57) (0.45) (0.42) 
=	!" -0.007 -0.008 0.988 0.985 -0.049 -0.047 
 (0.85) (0.90) (5.22)*** (5.17)*** (2.29)** (2.20)** 
BB!">6 -0.029 -0.030 -0.749 -0.770 0.032 0.035 
 (0.55) (0.57) (1.47) (1.67)* (0.75) (0.91) 
BM8!" -0.115 -0.115 7.455 7.451 -0.443 -0.441 
 (0.92) (0.93) (13.76)*** (14.48)*** (4.37)*** (4.50)*** 
=
!">6 0.014 0.015 -0.079 -0.063 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.94) (0.93) (0.17) (0.14) (0.26) (0.29) 
∆ !" 0.040 0.040 0.345 0.345 -0.086 -0.087 
 (1.93)* (1.98)** (1.61) (1.61) (3.25)*** (3.29)*** 
∆!" 0.023 0.023 0.180 0.169 -0.050 -0.047 
 (0.66) (0.67) (1.24) (11.59)*** (1.37) (1.45) 
8!" 0.053 0.054 -2.485 -2.464 0.148 0.143 
 (0.53) (0.55) (2.79)*** (2.82)*** (1.61) (1.61) 
M
!" -0.004 -0.005 0.157 0.154 0.006 0.007 
 (0.63) (0.68) (0.80) (0.78) (0.35) (0.39) 
<
Bℎ!" -0.011 -0.010 -0.043 -0.042 -0.007 -0.008 
 (1.79)* (1.80)* (0.42) (0.42) (0.67) (0.72) 
%Bℎ!" 0.007 0.006 -0.137 -0.130 0.006 0.005 
 (0.58) (0.53) (1.18) (1.26) (0.32) (0.25) 
%8B!" -0.024 -0.025 0.306 0.309 0.040 0.039 
 (0.90) (0.93) (0.77) (0.75) (1.44) (1.35) 
;	
D!" -0.002 -0.002 -0.010 -0.010 0.001 0.001 
 (1.32) (1.27) (0.21) (0.21) (0.46) (0.44) 
;	
9!" -0.032 -0.029 0.115 0.132 0.014 0.008 
 (0.97) (0.90) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.10) 
7	BC'!" -0.001 -0.001 -0.012 -0.012 0.002 0.002 
 (0.68) (0.70) (0.68) (0.66) (1.55) (1.45) 
9
L 0.267 0.271 0.309 0.313 0.201 0.193 
 (3.16)*** (3.09)*** (0.37) (0.35) (1.65)* (1.52) 
9%
	M Included Included Included Included Included Included 

	M Included Included Included Included Included Included 
@ 0.12 0.13 0.31 0.31 0.14 0.14 
M 5.90 5.87 16.83 17.24 8.43 8.41 
 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test statistics are calcu-
lated using OLS with two-way clustering at the firm and time level. We additionally include appropriate fixed effects. Mean VIF for all 
regressions are considerably below 5. BB__ (K) is comprehended as the residual from pooled first-stage regressions of Equation	12 
(Equation	13, Equation	14 and Equation	17) with two-way clustering.	KK is comprehended as the ratio of the decile of K to 
the sum of the deciles of K and BB__. B9D is client importance, calculated as ratio of total client sales to total sales of the audit firm. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix C. 
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Table 33 – Multiple regressions of EM proxies on CINAS for two consecutive years 
 Dependent variable: BB__!" Dependent variable: K!" Dependent variable: KK!" 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 >40 % B9D >50 % B9D >40 % B9D >50 % B9D >40 % B9D >50 % B9D 
B9D!" 0.032 0.030 -0.110 -0.092 -0.036 -0.049 
 (1.44) (1.65)* (0.19) (0.17) (0.64) (0.93) 
<!" -0.015 0.163 0.708 4.456 -0.086 -0.430 
 (0.44) (1.43) (0.57) (3.96)*** (1.02) (1.15) 
B9D!" ∗ <!" 0.036 -0.233 -1.224 -6.996 0.123 0.669 
 (0.61) (1.46) (0.51) (3.18)*** (0.76) (1.22) 
K!" -0.001 -0.001     
 (0.84) (0.91)     
BB__!"	 	 	 -0.770	 -0.840	 	 	
   (0.80) (0.88)   
D!">6 -0.005 -0.005 -0.045 -0.045 0.012 0.012 
 (2.62)*** (2.55)** (0.57) (0.57) (2.33)** (2.32)** 
K;!">6 0.001 0.001 0.023 0.024 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.45) (0.49) (0.43) (0.45) (1.64) (1.66)* 
=8DD!" 0.017 0.017 -0.342 -0.342 -0.013 -0.014 
 (1.87)* (1.83)* (1.92)* (1.92)* (0.69) (0.70) 
=	!" -0.000 -0.000 0.411 0.412 -0.022 -0.022 
 (0.08) (0.05) (1.67)* (1.68)* (1.15) (1.10) 
BB!">6 -0.023 -0.024 0.028 -0.005 -0.023 -0.019 
 (0.61) (0.65) (0.08) (0.02) (0.51) (0.43) 
BM8!" -0.014 -0.011 6.264 6.313 -0.401 -0.406 
 (0.30) (0.25) (6.30)*** (6.37)*** (6.01)*** (6.08)*** 
=
!">6 -0.016 -0.017 0.271 0.266 0.030 0.031 
 (1.08) (1.10) (0.63) (0.61) (1.07) (1.09) 
∆ !" -0.002 -0.000 0.372 0.396 -0.038 -0.040 
 (0.12) (0.02) (1.90)* (1.99)** (2.11)** (2.37)** 
∆!" 0.007 0.006 0.500 0.475 -0.058 -0.054 
 (0.48) (0.42) (1.18) (1.11) (1.44) (1.27) 
8!" 0.029 0.026 -2.346 -2.401 0.090 0.094 
 (0.67) (0.59) (2.01)** (2.12)** (1.12) (1.22) 
M
!" 0.002 0.002 -0.019 -0.027 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.61) (0.54) (0.10) (0.15) (0.32) (0.27) 
<
Bℎ!" -0.005 -0.005 0.018 0.027 -0.009 -0.010 
 (1.52) (1.59) (0.15) (0.23) (1.08) (1.17) 
%Bℎ!" 0.005 0.006 -0.053 -0.055 0.016 0.017 
 (0.63) (0.65) (0.24) (0.25) (0.78) (0.80) 
%8B!" -0.032 -0.031 0.227 0.215 0.008 0.010 
 (1.30) (1.29) (0.62) (0.57) (0.61) (0.54) 
;	
D!" -0.001 -0.001 0.039 0.038 -0.003 -0.003 
 (1.38) (1.40) (1.05) (1.00) (1.04) (1.03) 
;	
9!" -0.034 -0.033 -0.865 -0.848 0.109 0.107 
 (1.17) (1.15) (0.86) (0.84) (1.45) (1.42) 
7	BC'!" 0.000 0.000 -0.013 -0.013 0.001 0.001 
 (0.65) (0.72) (0.70) (0.69) (0.58) (0.61) 
9
L 0.175 0.175 0.246 0.269 0.354 0.352 
 (3.54)*** (3.54)*** (0.25) (0.28) (5.12)*** (5.07)*** 
9%
	M Included Included Included Included Included Included 

	M Included Included Included Included Included Included 
@ 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.09 
M 2.63 2.67 5.90 6.10 5.37 5.45 
 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test statistics are calcu-
lated using OLS with two-way clustering at the firm and time level. We additionally include appropriate fixed effects. Mean VIF for all 
regressions are considerably below 5. BB__ (K) is comprehended as the residual from pooled first-stage regressions of Equation	12 
(Equation	13, Equation	14 and Equation	17) with two-way clustering.	KK is comprehended as the ratio of the decile of K to 
the sum of the deciles of K and BB__. B9D is client importance, calculated as the ratio of client non-audit fees to total fees received 
from the client. All other variables are defined in Appendix C. 
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3.7 Additional analyses 
3.7.1 Economic bonding, audit service line and the importance of PIEs 
We try to present additional evidence and explanation for our findings in chapter 3.6, in 
particular a reasoning why small and midsized auditors might not be subject to high de-
pendence threats from their publicly listed clients. Figure 5 contains a matrix showing two 
importance ratios, e.g., the importance of the audit service line sales for the total sales of 
the auditor itself (		) and the importance of total fees from all PIEs for the total 
sales of the auditor (		;). 
Figure 5 – Economic bonding and the importance of PIEs 
 
Figure shows a matrix of the distributions of firm-year observations for 		, 		;, the number of PIEs of the auditor and CIS. 
We find that the importance of all PIEs (		;) is below 50 percent for the largest part 
of the sample, indicating that the general dependence from fees from PIEs is not at a 
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critical level.118 Likewise, while small and midsized audit firms might have only a limited 
number of PIEs, their overall importance for the total sales (		;) is not systematically 
beyond values of 50 percent, which might be considered as a critical value. We also find 
for 		 that there are several auditors with low audit service line importance, even 
though values for B9D are considerable.119 
Altogether, small and midsized auditors seem to be highly engaged in in the market for 
non-PIEs, which provides them with a healthy base from there on to operate in the market 
for PIEs, while they are likewise considerably differentiated along their service lines, e.g., 
audit, tax & advisory services. To check whether our initial tendency of B9D in the mul-
tivariate results of chapter 3.6 is driven by these influencing factors, we add two indicators 
(D9=!" and  M9<=!") for low values of the discussed ratios to our specification for AEM 
and interact them with B9D.120 Results are reported in Table 34. In particular, we find for 
both situations (columns (1) & (2)), e.g., low importance of the audit service line and low 
importance of the PIEs for the total sales of auditor, that our results for B9D are driven by 
firm-years with auditors, who are located in these parts of the distributions. Hence, both 
could be a possible explanation for our finding. In column (3), we check for the existence 
of both effects and only find a significance for the coefficient on B9D!" ∗  M9<=!". Based 
on this finding, we propose that the dominance of reputation and litigation effects is pre-
dominantly caused by auditors with high differentiation in markets for PIEs and non-
PIEs, giving them a favourable position when it comes to negotiating accounting num-
bers, thereby increasing audit quality. 
  
                                                          
118 Our sample firms account for a mean importance of all PIEs (		;) of 9.94 percent of the total sales of the audit firm. 
119 However, we note that losing a client’s audit fees might entail the loss of non-audit services from the same client, e.g., non-audit 
fees and audit fees are highly correlated.  
120 D9=!" is a low audit service line importance indicator, calculated as 1 when 		 is below median 		, 0 otherwise. 
 M9<=!" is a low total fees from PIEs importance indicator, calculated as 1 when 		; is below median 		;, 0 otherwise. 
For reasons of clarity, we exclude the dependence threshold proxies here.  
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Table 34 – Multiple regressions of AEM on audit service line 
and PIE client importance 
Multiple regressions of alternative - on w~ 
Dependent variable: BB__!" 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 		 		; 			&	; 
B9D!" -0.019 -0.032 -0.020 
 (0.62) (1.22) (0.66) 
D9=!" 0.007  0.006 
 (0.87)  (0.91) 
B9D!" ∗ D9=!" -0.246  -0.218 
 (1.82)*  (1.58) 
 M9<=!"  0.007 0.003 
  (0.96) (0.45) 
B9D!" ∗  M9<=!"  -0.870 -0.707 
  (3.00)*** (2.30)** 
K!" -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.99) (0.87) (0.94) 
B	
	 Included Included Included 
9%
	M Included Included Included 

	M Included Included Included 
@ 0.12 0.12 0.13 
M 5.76 5.83 5.42 
 1,052 1,052 1,052 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, re-
spectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test statistics are calculated using OLS 
with two-way clustering at the firm and time level. We additionally include ap-
propriate fixed effects. Mean VIF for all regressions are considerably below 5. 
BB__ is comprehended as the residual from pooled first-stage regressions 
of Equation	12 with two-way clustering.	 B9D is client importance, calculated as 
ratio of total client sales to total sales of the audit firm. D9=!" is a low audit 
service line importance indicator, calculated as 1 when 		 is below median 
		, 0 otherwise.  M9<=!" is a low total fees from PIEs importance indica-
tor, calculated as 1 when 		; is below median 		;, 0 otherwise. All 
other variables are defined in Appendix C. 
3.7.2 De-facto office and partner level analysis 
Auditing research papers have gradually reshaped their level of analysis, since respective 
audit quality input and output proxies might cause effects on an office or partner level, 
particularly when studying settings with auditors with large size, e.g., Big 4 settings. Alt-
hough we focus on small and midsized auditors, size differences are considerable. We try 
to adapt this approach by re-estimating our main regressions for different levels of anal-
ysis in terms of auditor sizes included. We split our sample between auditors with size 1-
3 and size 4 following the EU SME definition, resulting in a mean (median) number of 
clients of 7 (3) for auditors with size 1-3. This level of analysis seems to be comparable 
to audit office level analyses (e.g., Chung & Kallapur 2003; Sharma et al. 2011). When 
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we alternatively split the sample between auditors with size 1-2 and size 3-4, mean (me-
dian) number of clients of 2 (1) for auditors with size 1-2 is comparable to an audit partner 
level of analysis. We report our multivariate results for these alternative samples in Table 
35 (%D 1-3) and Table 36 (%D 1-2). In Table 35, coefficients on our variables of 
interest show identical signs and partly better significances, indicating that on an office 
level, our proposed considerations hold, e.g., there seems to be a dominating reputation 
and litigation effect together with a trade-off from AEM to REM until a certain threshold 
is met. 
What is more, when we take a closer look at a de-facto partner level of analysis in Table 
36, we find significant results that are once more in line with the already discussed coher-
ences. We conclude that these effects are not caused by any aggregation noise on an audit 
firm level, but it seems that partners and audit offices pursue increased audit quality for 
an increasing client importance and do not acquiesce to the client’s demands. Their clients 
tend to switch to a potentially value decreasing trade-off strategy from AEM to REM until 
a certain critical threshold, where effects tend to reverse. 
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Table 35 – Multiple regressions of EM proxies on CIS for two consecutive years for AudSize 1-3 
 Dependent variable: BB__!" Dependent variable: K!" Dependent variable: KK!" 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 >5 % B9D >10 % B9D >5 % B9D >10 % B9D >5 % B9D >10 % B9D 
B9D!" -0.069 -0.063 -2.054 -2.193 0.192 0.212 
 (2.58)** (1.52) (1.75)* (2.14)** (2.46)** (2.84)*** 
<!" -0.017 -0.045 -0.323 -0.382 0.070 0.123 
 (1.28) (2.44)** (0.87) (0.92) (2.51)** (3.03)*** 
B9D!" ∗ <!" 0.107 0.174 2.301 2.675 -0.291 -0.452 
 (1.68)* (1.93)* (1.30) (1.39) (2.42)** (3.51)*** 
K!" 0.003 0.003     
 (2.26)** (2.45)**     
BB__!"	 	 	 1.253	 1.210	 	 	
   (2.33)** (2.55)**   
D!">6 -0.012 -0.013 -0.177 -0.184 0.035 0.038 
 (3.04)*** (2.98)*** (2.14)** (2.15)** (3.92)*** (4.42)*** 
K;!">6 0.001 0.002 0.090 0.091 -0.013 -0.013 
 (1.51) (1.55) (1.86)* (1.85)* (3.06)*** (3.05)*** 
=8DD!" 0.000 -0.001 -0.496 -0.496 0.020 0.022 
 (0.00) (0.07) (2.32)** (2.21)** (0.61) (0.62) 
=	!" -0.025 -0.027 1.042 1.026 -0.012 -0.007 
 (4.47)*** (4.58)*** (3.88)*** (3.86)*** (0.40) (0.22) 
BB!">6 -0.084 -0.086 -1.371 -1.429 0.111 0.116 
 (1.89)* (1.81)* (1.91)* (2.22)** (2.42)** (3.53)*** 
BM8!" -0.154 -0.152 7.897 7.893 -0.461 -0.459 
 (0.87) (0.87) (9.54)*** (10.03)*** (2.46)** (2.58)** 
=
!">6 0.020 0.020 0.271 0.298 -0.020 -0.018 
 (1.44) (1.47) (0.54) (0.59) (0.38) (0.35) 
∆ !" 0.011 0.012 0.267 0.261 -0.070 -0.072 
 (0.54) (0.59) (0.71) (0.67) (1.53) (1.62) 
∆!" -0.034 -0.035 -0.998 -1.024 0.042 0.047 
 (1.23) (1.23) (1.58) (1.73)* (0.56) (0.71) 
8!" 0.054 0.053 -3.112 -3.079 0.226 0.218 
 (0.32) (0.32) (2.73)*** (2.76)*** (1.41) (1.41) 
M
!" -0.012 -0.013 0.138 0.130 0.012 0.015 
 (1.17) (1.24) (0.52) (0.49) (0.51) (0.63) 
<
Bℎ!" 0.004 0.004 -0.074 -0.072 -0.024 -0.026 
 (0.69) (0.84) (0.30) (0.29) (1.32) (1.34) 
%Bℎ!" -0.023 -0.025 -0.126 -0.101 0.043 0.042 
 (1.34) (1.36) (0.42) (0.33) (1.33) (1.28) 
%8B!" -0.019 -0.021 0.349 0.354 0.046 0.048 
 (0.69) (0.83) (0.84) (0.80) (1.11) (1.02) 
;	
D!" -0.003 -0.003 0.018 0.017 0.003 0.003 
 (1.36) (1.32) (0.34) (0.35) (0.56) (0.56) 
;	
9!" -0.044 -0.039 -0.299 -0.261 0.024 0.011 
 (1.24) (1.10) (0.28) (0.25) (0.23) (0.11) 
7	BC'!" -0.001 -0.001 -0.011 -0.009 0.003 0.003 
 (0.60) (0.60) (0.52) (0.41) (1.13) (1.00) 
9
L 0.305 0.320 0.553 0.576 0.067 0.029 
 (4.39)*** (4.21)*** (0.58) (0.52) (0.59) (0.23) 
9%
	M Included Included Included Included Included Included 

	M Included Included Included Included Included Included 
@ 0.14 0.14 0.32 0.32 0.16 0.16 
M 3.79 3.67 9.84 10.54 4.65 4.67 
 499 499 499 499 499 499 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test statistics are cal-
culated using OLS with two-way clustering at the firm and time level. We additionally include appropriate fixed effects. Mean VIF for all 
regressions are considerably below 5. BB__ (K) is comprehended as the residual from pooled first-stage regressions of Equation	12 
(Equation	13, Equation	14 and Equation	17) with two-way clustering.	KK is comprehended as the ratio of the decile of K to 
the sum of the deciles of K and BB__. B9D is client importance, calculated as ratio of total client sales to total sales of the audit firm. 
%D is a categorical variable based on the EU SME definition from May 2003. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
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Table 36 – Multiple regressions of EM proxies for two consecutive years for AudSize 1-2 
 Dependent variable: BB__!" Dependent variable: K!" Dependent variable: KK!" 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 >5 % B9D >10 % B9D >5 % B9D >10 % B9D >5 % B9D >10 % B9D 
B9D!" -0.124 -0.128 -1.910 -1.699 0.189 0.153 
 (2.62)*** (1.89)* (1.88)* (2.57)** (2.72)*** (2.59)** 
<!" -0.019 -0.049 -0.412 -0.410 0.060 0.104 
 (1.07) (2.05)** (1.11) (1.12) (1.55) (1.97)** 
B9D!" ∗ <!" 0.150 0.229 2.125 2.083 -0.274 -0.362 
 (1.95)* (2.09)** (1.26) (1.33) (2.67)*** (2.23)** 
K!" 0.002 0.002     
 (0.98) (0.98)     
BB__!"	 	 	 1.034	 0.963	 	 	
   (1.07) (1.07)   
D!">6 -0.009 -0.011 -0.254 -0.282 0.031 0.038 
 (2.04)** (1.91)* (1.92)* (2.19)** (1.92)* (2.50)** 
K;!">6 0.001 0.001 0.053 0.056 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.40) (0.47) (0.85) (0.87) (1.29) (1.31) 
=8DD!" 0.010 0.008 -0.019 -0.022 -0.034 -0.031 
 (0.84) (0.65) (0.09) (0.10) (0.80) (0.66) 
=	!" -0.023 -0.026 1.316 1.303 -0.081 -0.076 
 (2.27)** (2.51)** (4.06)*** (3.85)*** (2.03)** (1.81)* 
BB!">6 -0.113 -0.117 -0.440 -0.536 0.150 0.158 
 (1.76)* (1.79)* (0.42) (0.54) (1.34) (1.71)* 
BM8!" -0.186 -0.179 7.438 7.387 -0.387 -0.385 
 (1.54) (1.55) (6.79)*** (7.33)*** (2.11)** (2.23)** 
=
!">6 0.040 0.043 -0.257 -0.257 0.019 0.022 
 (1.75)* (2.01)** (0.38) (0.38) (0.21) (0.25) 
∆ !" 0.038 0.040 0.479 0.496 -0.103 -0.109 
 (1.15) (1.11) (0.75) (0.78) (1.99)** (2.23)** 
∆!" -0.110 -0.111 -0.218 -0.296 0.088 0.096 
 (1.88)* (1.80)* (0.17) (0.23) (0.99) (1.15) 
8!" 0.098 0.091 -2.421 -2.278 0.030 0.019 
 (0.75) (0.74) (1.34) (1.30) (0.17) (0.11) 
M
!" -0.020 -0.022 0.039 0.026 0.035 0.040 
 (1.27) (1.40) (0.14) (0.09) (1.11) (1.20) 
<
Bℎ!" 0.005 0.006 -0.032 -0.022 -0.024 -0.027 
 (0.46) (0.59) (0.18) (0.12) (2.32)** (2.72)*** 
%Bℎ!" -0.001 -0.004 -0.309 -0.277 0.016 0.020 
 (0.05) (0.14) (1.61) (1.32) (0.36) (0.44) 
%8B!" -0.029 -0.031 0.275 0.244 0.053 0.061 
 (0.80) (0.94) (0.59) (0.49) (0.98) (1.07) 
;	
D!" -0.002 -0.002 0.103 0.100 0.002 0.002 
 (0.71) (0.55) (1.05) (1.03) (0.20) (0.20) 
;	
9!" 0.006 0.015 -0.680 -0.640 -0.067 -0.081 
 (0.17) (0.44) (0.50) (0.47) (0.47) (0.55) 
7	BC'!" -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.001 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.10) (0.23) (0.47) (0.41) 
9
L 0.251 0.273 1.590 1.834 0.125 0.053 
 (3.59)*** (3.19)*** (0.94) (1.01) (0.65) (0.28) 
9%
	M Included Included Included Included Included Included 

	M Included Included Included Included Included Included 
@ 0.16 0.18 0.35 0.35 0.18 0.19 
M 2.50 2.39 5.30 5.56 3.55 3.60 
 287 287 287 287 287 287 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test statistics are calcu-
lated using OLS with two-way clustering at the firm and time level. We additionally include appropriate fixed effects. Mean VIF for all 
regressions are considerably below 5. BB__ (K) is comprehended as the residual from pooled first-stage regressions of Equation	12 
(Equation	13, Equation	14 and Equation	17) with two-way clustering.	KK is comprehended as the ratio of the decile of K to 
the sum of the deciles of K and BB__. B9D is client importance, calculated as ratio of total client sales to total sales of the audit firm. 
%D is a categorical variable based on the EU SME definition from May 2003. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
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3.7.3 Additional analysis of extreme EM 
To address the claim that EM is not a systematic phenomenon, we follow Greiner et al. 
(2017) and use only top quintile EM observations as a proxy where EM is used to foster 
opportunistic goals. We therefore introduce two dummy variables (c1, c1K) as 
dependent variables of Equation 24-Equation 25. These are equal to 1 if the EM proxy 
(BB__!", K!") is located in the top quintile of the industry-year distribution, and 
0 otherwise. Results from this alteration are reported in Table 37.121 We find that all of our 
major results remain the same. Still, we consistently find that small and midsized audit 
firms might have higher reputation and litigation risk incentives, which increases audit 
quality, while these are superimposed by economic bonding effects when the importance 
of the client reaches the hypothesized thresholds, particularly when the bond maintains 
for a certain period of time, e.g., two or three years. We also test for the robustness of no 
significances of B9D when using extreme EM proxies. Again, there are no significant 
coefficients for our client importance proxies based on non-audit service importance. 
                                                          
121 We use logit estimations with two-way clustering and respective fixed effects to remain consistent and address our change in 
specification. Greiner et al. (2017) use signed discretionary accruals for their analysis, because Abbott et al. (2006) highlight the 
asymmetry of the fee response to income increasing or decreasing EM. For our purposes, we regard both income increasing and 
decreasing EM as a distortion of financial reporting quality, which is why we use distributions of absolute values of discretionary 
accruals. 
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3.7.4 Audit committee moderating effects 
Sharma et al. (2011) provide insights into the possible moderating role of an audit com-
mittee meeting best practice requirements. To address this issue, we further control for 
the existence of such an audit committee as well as possible moderation of our effects. 
DCGK paragraph 5.3.2 requires the establishment of an audit committee, which has the 
duty to appoint and monitor the auditor, in particular with regard to dependence threats. 
Furthermore, DCGK paragraph 5.3.2 lays down requirements for the chair of the audit 
committee, e.g., (1) being an independent member, (2) being an accounting expert, (3) 
not having been an executive member of the board recently (last three years) nor (4) being 
the chair of the supervisory board.122 However, as mentioned above, the DCGK is a vol-
untary commitment to high-quality corporate governance, while Art. 161 AktG requires 
an annual declaration by the supervisory and executive board with regard to the accord-
ance of the corporate governance of the firm with the DCGK. We follow Sharma et al. 
(2011) and add a dummy variable (B!") for the existence and best practice conformity 
of the audit committee to our specification and include interaction with our B9 variables 
to study the moderating effects of the audit committee. Results are reported in Table 38.  
We find that our results are very robust to the inclusion of a possible moderation by a best 
practice audit committee. Even more, the significance of our results improves. In partic-
ular, this alteration provides additional interesting insights, e.g., in columns (3)-(4) we 
find that the existence of a best practice audit committee seems to improve the financial 
reporting quality in terms of a decrease in the use of REM. This is surprising taking into 
account the original task of the audit committee to mediate in accounting decisions. What 
is important, audit committee’s duties have to be carried out by the board if there is no 
audit committee. Based on a mean ;	
9!" of 65.16 percent and a mean ;	
9!" 
of 63.24 percent when there is no audit committee, best practice audit committees might 
monitor beyond accounting based EM and even restrict use of REM, while the highly 
independent boards might do a comparably good job in monitoring AEM (e.g., Klein 
2002; Bradbury et al. 2006). This finding is supported by a look at the results in columns 
                                                          
122 These requirements are highly aligned with the ones used by Sharma et al. (2011), who find that a best practice audit committee 
can help secure independence. 
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(5)-(6) for KK!", while the trade-off relation for our hypothesized thresholds 
remains. 
Table 38 – Multiple regressions of alternative EM proxies on CIS and AC for two consecutive years 
 Dependent variable:  
BB__!" 
Dependent variable: 
K!" 
Dependent variable: 
KK!" 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 >5 %B9D >10 % B9D >5 % B9D >10 % B9D >5 % B9D >10 % B9D 
B9D!" -0.116 -0.103 -1.326 -1.616 0.171 0.142 
 (32.03)*** (2.79)*** (1.23) (2.17)** (2.33)** (1.65) 
B!" 0.006 0.006 0.435 0.418 -0.047 -0.049 
 (0.86) (0.84) (2.04)** (1.98)** (2.78)*** (2.80)*** 
B9D!" ∗ B!" -0.011 -0.023 -2.014 -0.319 0.100 0.293 
 (0.23) (0.32) (1.02) (0.14) (0.57) (0.99) 
<!" -0.019 -0.044 -0.232 -0.353 0.055 0.098 
 (2.14)** (2.79)*** (0.71) (0.87) (1.95)* (2.40)** 
B9D!" ∗ <!" 0.155 0.210 2.147 2.914 -0.299 -0.377 
 (3.11)*** (3.03)*** (1.29) (1.80)* (2.21)** (2.95)*** 
B9D!" ∗ <!" ∗ B!"  -0.030 -0.025 -0.241 -2.352 0.097 -0.108 
 (0.45) (0.34) (0.11) (1.09) (0.47) (0.36) 
K!" -0.002 -0.002     
 (1.09) (1.17)     
BB__!"	 	 	 -0.495	 -0.513	 	 	
   (1.07) (1.14)   
B	
	 Included Included Included Included Included Included 
9%
	M Included Included Included Included Included Included 

	M Included Included Included Included Included Included 
@ 0.12 0.13 0.31 0.31 0.15 0.15 
M 5.16 5.18 16.54 17.21 8.16 8.09 
 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 
*, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test statistics are cal-
culated using OLS with two-way clustering at the firm and time level. We additionally include appropriate fixed effects. Mean VIF for all 
regressions are considerably below 5. BB__ (K) is comprehended as the residual from pooled first-stage regressions of Equation	12 
(Equation	13, Equation	14 and Equation	17) with two-way clustering.	KK is comprehended as the ratio of the decile of K to 
the sum of the deciles of K and BB__. B9D is client importance, calculated as ratio of total client sales to total sales of the audit firm. 
B!" is existence of a best practice audit committee, calculated as 1 when firms have an audit committee in accordance with the DCGK 5.3.2, 
0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix C. 
3.7.5 Robustness analyses 
To address the problem of biased EM proxies, we use the alternative models discussed in 
section 2.2. For AEM, we apply the adapted performance-matched Jones model and the 
McNichols (2002) model, while for REM, we apply the Gunny (2010) models. We addi-
tionally use going concern opinions as a dependent variable in our regressions to be able 
to study another frequently used audit quality output based measure. All results from these 
alterations are qualitatively the same and remain untabulated. 
Another common criticism is focusing on residual proxies with insufficient separation of 
non-discretionary and discretionary accrual parts. This could lead to false inferences from 
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second-step regressions when omitted correlated non-discretionary variables exist, which 
explain considerable variation in the discretionary proxies because these still include non-
discretionary variation. We therefore use one-step models with non-discretionary and dis-
cretionary controls and our variables of interest and estimate these regressions again using 
pooled OLS with two-way clustering on the firm and year level. Decisively, our results 
are very robust to this alteration and further convince us of the validity of our analysis.123 
We also try to address the possible simultaneity of the decisions to pursue AEM and 
REM. Although REM has to be performed throughout the fiscal year, managers might try 
to include expected AEM possibilities in their decision to pursue REM. Therefore, we set 
up a simultaneous equation model and apply 3SLS to comprehend residuals from the 
simultaneous equations. These changes in residuals leave us with the same results as al-
ready presented, which is why we assume the problem of simultaneity in our setting to be 
considerably low.124  
Likewise, our two-way clustering on the year level on the second stage might suffer from 
low number of clusters (Cameron et al. 2011). Therefore, we check for the robustness of 
our results when we cluster only on one level (firm) or on the two levels of firm and audit 
firm. We keep our fixed effects setting based on our discussion above. Results from these 
untabulated tests remain qualitatively the same and quantitatively almost equal, affirming 
our findings in chapter 3.6 and 3.7. 
What is more, we further address the non-linearity of our relationship and alternatively 
estimate a regression using a linear and squared regressor for our client importance proxy 
B9D. In addition, we follow Chi et al. (2011) and alternatively test these specifications 
with the natural logarithm of the total fees from a client and the total non-audit fees from 
a client as proxies for auditor independence (e.g., DeFond et al. 2000; Francis 2004). We 
find significant coefficients for these EM proxies, implying that the opposing incentives 
superimpose each other diversely in different parts of the distributions. Signs of the coef-
ficients affirm our results presented in chapter 3.6 and 3.7. 
                                                          
123 Again, we do not report the respective tables for these robustness regressions. 
124 Since our results remain qualitatively the same, we do not tabulate the regressions. 
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To test the robustness of our results with respect to type I errors, we extend the specifica-
tion and add confounding compensation controls for the executive and supervisory part 
of the board (compensation magnitude per board members, degree of short- and long-
term variable compensation of executives). We further address possible type I errors 
caused not by the omission but the inclusion of collider or mediator variables in our em-
pirical model. We therefore exclude <
Bℎ!", %Bℎ!" and %8B!" 
since these variables might collide with our variables of interest and dependent variables. 
However, untabulated regressions show that this alteration does not change our results, 
nor does stepwise inclusion. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This study analyses the effect of client importance on the magnitude and type of EM used 
in PIE client firms of the German small and midsized auditor market. In particular, we 
try to disentangle the total effect by introducing critical thresholds for client importance, 
thereby separating the effect for clients with pronounced economic bonding. We apply 
two precise measures for client importance, e.g., client importance from client’s total fees 
for audit and non-audit services and client importance from client’s non-audit services, 
while we use the total sales of the auditor from all clients and services in the denominator. 
Furthermore, we study a possible trade-off relationship between AEM and REM, check 
for the moderation effects of a best practice audit committee, check for possible changes 
in the results in de-facto office and partner level analyses and provide a reasoning for our 
results by analyzing the importance of PIEs for the small and midsized auditors in more 
detail. 
For normal levels of client importance from total fees, our results indicate that increasing 
client importance decreases AEM and increases REM. However, when client importance 
reaches the 5%, 10% or 15% threshold for one, two or three consecutive years, the results 
show that effects reverse, particularly for increasing time-period and threshold. Hence, 
the opposing incentives related to client importance dominate in different parts of the 
distribution. Below the hypothesized thresholds, higher dependence effects tend to be 
overcompensated by higher reputation and litigation effects, which results in an improved 
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audit quality that forces clients to trade-off AEM with REM. When the hypothesized 
thresholds are met, the magnitude of the diverse incentives reverse and hence impairs 
audit quality, leaving more room for AEM and a trade-off back from REM to AEM. For 
client importance measured by the percentage of non-audit fees to total client's fees (non-
audit fees ratio), we find no significant effects on AEM or REM. We conclude that both 
proxies measure diverse aspects of the relationship between client and the auditor, while 
the client importance from total client fees is clearly the best indicator for client im-
portance. Our study furthermore shows that small and midsized auditors with only a few 
number of PIE clients do not necessarily deliver a low audit quality, but may have a solid 
foundation of non-PIE clients, from there they can deliver high audit quality without be-
ing too dependent on the respective publicly listed client. We also show that our results 
are not dependent on omitted correlated variables like a best practice audit committee, 
while including this aspect sheds some light on to how shareholders can effectively limit 
the use of REM and AEM. Furthermore, our results hold in both de-facto office and de-
facto partner level analyses and do not seem to be subject to design choices or caused by 
biased EM proxies. 
Our study contributes to the existing research in the following ways. First, existing studies 
about the influence of client importance on EM often noisily measure client importance, 
particularly when drawing inferences about the non-Big N auditors, which might not have 
a considerable number of non-PIE clients. We complement these studies by using more 
precise proxies for client importance for a setting of small and midsized auditors. We 
show that this alteration makes an important difference when studying the economic 
bonding for this auditor market segment and therefore provide a fresh look at small and 
midsized auditors when it comes to their eligibility for PIE client engagements. Second, 
we investigate regulatory-driven dependence thresholds to study the non-linearity of the 
effects caused by opposing incentives associated with client importance. This might also 
be useful for regulatory bodies to assess the validity of the respective rules and standards. 
Third, we consider the trade-off between the two different types of EM, raising the aware-
ness of the option for clients to circumvent high quality audits by simply using more 
REM, which is harder to detect and/or challenge for any auditor during the audit process. 
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Here, we provide another interesting result showing the contribution of a best practice 
audit committee. 
Naturally, our analysis has some limitations. First, studies on EM decisively hinge on the 
question of whether the proxies for EM have been collocated using the right models and 
estimation procedures to ensure the discretionary components are not biased. We try to 
use the most sophisticated approaches to minimize biases, although there is no guarantee 
for that. What is more, we control for the commonly used confounding controls to explain 
the variation of the discretionary EM proxies. Nevertheless, although comparable to the 
level of prior studies, the explanatory power of our multivariate regressions is only mod-
erate, which is why considerable influence of omitted variables might be possible.125 We 
also have a considerable amount of excluded observations, e.g., a sample selection bias 
cannot be cancelled out. In particular, financially distressed firms do not publish their 
financial statements during insolvency proceedings, while these observations might be 
indeed of above-average interest, since they might be more likely to use EM. 
 
                                                          
125 However, a high heterogeneity of our sample firms could be another explanation for a moderate r-squared. 
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4 Differentiated analysis of the influence of corporate so-
cial responsibility on earnings management and the role 
of corporate governance126 
The need for uniformity in the multitude of sustainability standards. In his speech, the IASB 
chair Hoogervorst also comments on the non-financial information about social and environ-
mental issues: 
“That is not our area of expertise. […] Our remit is, and will remain, financial 
reporting – with focus on the participants in the capital markets. That is in-
vestors and potential creditors.” (Hoogervorst 2017) 
Following the outline by Penman and Sougiannis (1998), our aggregated construct  in-
cluded all attributes of a firm that capture value-creating activities. Hoogervorst (2017) de-
liberately acknowledges the fact that shareholders, and not only stakeholders, are interested 
in sustainability issues as means of creating value in certain, if not all industries. Likewise, 
since Corporate Social Responsibility has developed more into a vehicle of systematic non-
financial opportunities and risks to foster reputation and create value (e.g., Gastinger & Gaggl 
2015), there is need for the analysis of the interrelation between CSR, sustainability reporting 
and financial reporting, since all can be means of considerable discretion and reputation en-
hancement strategies (e.g., Jasch 2015). What is more, Graham et al. (2005) implicitly show 
in their study when asking about meeting certain earnings benchmarks that CEOs/CFOs use 
discretion to foster earnings numbers to build external reputation and credibility with the 
market (see Figure 6) as two of the key incentives. 
                                                          
126 This chapter is based on a 2017 version of a working paper titled “Corporate social responsibility and earnings management – a differ-
entiated view on CSR incentives and the role of corporate governance”. The reasoning, results, and interpretations of this might change 
after the submission of this thesis and the completion of the doctoral degree. The most recent version of this study is available upon re-
quest. Please do not cite this working paper without permission. 
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Figure 6 – Importance of certain incentives behind EM from survey by Graham et al. (2005) 
 
Figure shows results for 304-307 survey responses to the question: “Meeting earnings benchmarks helps…” based on a survey of 401 
financial executives. Numbers show percentages of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with the respective statement. Source of 
information: Graham et al. (2005), p. 26-27. 
Chapter 4 tries to present an extensive analysis of the coherence between CSR performance 
and the quality of earnings to disentangle the existent incentives and effects, particularly with 
respect to reputation incentives, while integrating the influence of Corporate Governance 
(CG) as the environmental characteristic shaping the quality of financial information. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The importance of disclosing adequate financial information has led to major changes in the 
nature and scope of reporting. Concerning this adequacy, the interests and needs of all stake-
holders play an important role since they consider the presented information in their deci-
sions. As a result, the requirements on corporate disclosure have diversely evolved over time. 
The endeavours for CSR and well-functioning CG have been two important influencing fac-
tors since they are inevitable characteristics and fields of commitment for every entity. First, 
society expects firms to be ethical and socially responsible to a certain degree, which simi-
larly influences and extends the disclosure of companies. Analysing the influence in more 
detail, the actual motivations for pursuing CSR can be diverse. Some firms may want to 
masquerade themselves as socially responsible when they actually are not to improve their 
image, whereas others may act out of intrinsic motivation. The difference in incentives also 
shapes the relationship between CSR engagement and financial reporting, particularly with 
regard to earnings management (EM) and deciding about the various types of EM. Reputa-
tional and intrinsic CSR incentives may lead to less accrual-based EM (AEM) and therefore 
accounting controversies, though the former principally tries to prevent them from affecting 
reputation. This may have an influence on the use of real activities EM (REM). Second, CG 
has been highlighted as a firm’s moral legitimacy in relation to stakeholders through major 
regulations, e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) for the USA or the CG framework 
green paper of 2011 for the EU. Although there are many influencing factors in the govern-
ance of a company, corporate board functions and structures play an integral role (e.g., 
Scherer & Palazzo 2011; Zhang et al. 2013). Effective CG to ensure proper financial report-
ing thus means the efficient collocation and functioning of boards to limit EM. Firms must 
decide about how many internal and external members ensure proper monitoring as well as 
what personnel characteristics are important to strengthen the viability of disclosure and em-
phasize the interests of all stakeholders (e.g., Johnson & Greening 1999; Webb 2004; Dalton 
& Dalton 2010). Although this is straightforward for AEM, business alterations for REM 
reasons are likely to be more difficult to detect and prohibit. 
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Altogether, there is a concurrent influence of CSR and CG on accounting information, which 
either increases or decreases both types of EM in favour or at the expense of the various 
stakeholders. The overall direction depends on the relevant incentives behind the EM strate-
gies. Prior research on CSR claims that CSR incentives are important (e.g., Kim et al. 2012; 
Bozzolan et al. 2015), which is why we try to disentangle these in more detail and regard 
them as a possible moderator of the success of CG in limiting EM. In particular, we include 
the trade-off decision between AEM and REM. Intrinsic CSR may highlight moral integrity 
and therefore foster the functioning of CG, whereas reputational CSR may entail a more 
opportunistic use of EM. Good CG can prevent AEM, whereas there may be a shift in EM 
activities towards REM, thus potentially threatening the long-term objectives of stakehold-
ers. 
To determine the various relationships, this study examines whether firms that act socially 
responsible use lower or higher EM, though analysing the related CSR incentives in a differ-
entiated manner. Further, we take a closer look at whether CSR incentives moderate the in-
fluence of CG characteristics on EM. In particular, we focus not only on the respective mag-
nitude but also on the trade-off relationship between the two types of EM. Therefore, this 
study uses an ASSET4EU ESG data set, which contains accounting as well as CSR and CG 
data of the most important European companies. For the sample period of 2005-2014, the 
findings show that firms with a higher performance in CSR engage in different levels of EM 
and that incentives play an important role. We show that more intrinsically motivated firms 
use lower total EM and trade off shareholder hostile REM with AEM. We further elaborate 
that firms with somewhat more reputational CSR incentives use lower AEM, though mini-
mizing reputational damage through accounting controversies. However, they use consider-
ably more REM and trade off AEM with REM, thereby minimizing controversies while 
maintaining high earnings that further foster their image. Additionally, we provide interesting 
results for the effect of board independence on earnings quality in terms of lower AEM and/or 
REM, taking into account the respective CSR incentives. 
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This study contributes to the actual strand of literature in the following ways. First, the in-
vestigation illuminates the question of whether CSR is positively or negatively linked to EM. 
To date, the answers to this question have not been satisfying. Many studies find mixed re-
sults, which is why further research is essential. In addition, we try to develop previous ap-
proaches by further disentangling the incentives behind CSR. Thus, we provide additional 
insights about what drives firms and their decision in the respective situation. Second, the 
study provides insights concerning the relationship between CG characteristics and EM. 
Here, again, the previous findings are mixed and require further research. Third, we connect 
both research areas and elaborate significant moderating effects of CSR incentives on the 
relationship between CG characteristics and EM, which can be of major importance for both 
the CSR and CG areas of research. Our results can also be of interest for both standard setters 
and regulators interested in the earnings quality of firms with various types of CSR and CG. 
It also presents various incentives and control variable links that should be useful. Fourth and 
finally, stakeholders can use the results to obtain credibility for possible future interaction. 
The remainder of this part of the doctoral thesis is structured as follows. The next section 
addresses the theoretical background, related literature and hypothesis development. We in-
troduce our research design in section 4.3, and section 4.4 presents the results of the study. 
Section 4.5 conducts additional analyses and robustness tests; section 4.6 concludes, provides 
some remarks and highlights limitations. 
4.2 Background, related literature and research hypotheses 
4.2.1 Corporate social responsibility and earnings management – a differ-
entiated view 
Accounting research has studied EM in a wide variety of ways. Entities use various types of 
EM in the process of financial reporting and significantly affect the presented picture. How-
ever, this picture is highly relevant for contractual outcomes and decisions that rely on the 
disclosed information. The asymmetry between inside directors and outside stakeholders 
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plays an important role when studying fiscal reports because it makes selfish behaviour a 
considerable problem. Therefore, financial statements may reflect the underlying conditions 
inaccurately when EM is conducted (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003). Despite these limiting factors for 
the quality of financial information, the accounting literature reports extensive evidence of 
the use of managed numbers in stakeholders’ actions, e.g., successful EM. 
More recently, accounting studies have taken great interest in CSR. Society has gradually 
become more sophisticated about how entities should interact with all types of stakeholders, 
e.g., investors, customers, suppliers and the respective governments. Regarding this sophis-
tication, presently, firms are expected to act and communicate in a manner that can be re-
garded as ethical and commensurate with the various interests of all stakeholders (e.g., Reyn-
olds & Yuthas 2008; Shafer 2015). With several high-profile theoretical and analytical re-
search contributions about CSR and its qualities being available (e.g., Carroll 1979; Jones 
1995; McWilliams & Siegel 2001; Garriga & Melé 2004; Porter & Kramer 2006; Mackey et 
al. 2007), Carroll (1979) prompts enterprises to dispute with aspects apart from profitability 
and maximizing shareholder value. He regards legal, ethical and philanthropic responsibility 
to be important amplifications for a firm’s overall success. These comprise actions that foster 
social goods that go beyond a firm’s interest and legal requirements (e.g., McWilliams & 
Siegel 2001). Jones (1995) notes that corporations can signal credible interest in trustworthy 
and cooperative interaction with all stakeholders through CSR activities. However, a holistic 
approach to CSR will also influence accounting decisions (e.g., Victor & Cullen 1988; Atkins 
2006; Thornton 2008; Hong & Andersen 2011). Intrinsic motivation strives for transparency 
and reliability as fundamental parameters in reporting. Since transparency can be viewed as 
a function of whether EM is used, firms that characterize themselves as socially responsible 
should engage less due to their intrinsic motivation.127 Consequently, there should be a de-
                                                          
127 In line with this consideration, the common admission is that EM reduces the information content of the reporting and quality of earn-
ings. This assumption is disputable, particularly in cases of incorrect measurement. Moreover, the inadequacy of accounting systems 
limits the ways in which firms can state a true and fair earnings picture. They can also signal this picture by using EM. However, inade-
quacy most likely occurs on an industry-specific basis. We mainly rule out this variation by incorporating respective industry fixed-ef-
fects in our analyses. Altogether, the study follows Dechow et al. (2010) and considers the EM variation apart from signalling as quality 
reducing. 
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crease in EM with increasing amounts of CSR engagement. The related literature has pre-
dominantly studied this negative relationship, often called the “myopia avoidance hypothe-
sis”. 
Chih et al. (2008) find results that support a negative coefficient of CSR on income smooth-
ing and loss avoidance in their international setting, whereas the overall outcomes are mixed. 
Calegari et al. (2010) state a negative coherence between CSR and AEM and, therefore, en-
hanced reporting quality in their paper using USA firms. Hong and Andersen (2011) and Kim 
et al. (2012; KPW) extend these considerations and take REM into account, whereas KPW 
and, in particular, Bozzolan et al. (2015; BFMM) focus on a possible trade-off relationship 
between the different types of EM and their coherence with CSR. KPW find extensive proof 
of a lower use of AEM and REM when CSR performance is high as well as a general trade-
off relationship between both types of EM. They also find that CSR firms are less likely to 
be the subject of SEC investigations on GAAP violations in Accounting and Auditing En-
forcement Releases (AAER). Their results hold for substitution of the KLD measure by 
Domini 400 Social Index affiliation and the separate consideration of the strengths and weak-
nesses that are part of the KLD measure. BFMM analyse the trade-off relationship between 
AEM and REM in more detail, taking into account a probable moderating effect of CSR on 
the effect of legal enforcement of EM. They find that firms with high CSR tend to substitute 
REM through AEM in favour of the long-term objectives of shareholders and at the risk of a 
more likely detection of AEM. Their results show that in a strong legal enforcement, CSR 
firms tend to use even lower long-term adverse REM and higher AEM, which is easier for 
regulators to investigate. In short, CSR firms tend to emphasize share- and stakeholder value 
more than reporting perception or the probable enforcement consequences. All of these stud-
ies provide confirmation of the “myopia avoidance hypothesis”. CSR firms act socially re-
sponsible due to their intrinsic motivation and are willing to trim back their performance 
goals to meet this incentive. 
In a resumption of CSR incentive analysis, Porter and Kramer (2006) postulate that compa-
nies can increase their market value by acting socially responsible. This holds because they 
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strengthen their corporate image and reputation. This resumption introduces a new dimension 
of CSR incentives since entities without all types of responsible intentions may make use of 
CSR to gain a strategic positioning in the market. Several studies review a positive coherence 
between CSR performance and reputation enhancement (e.g., Verschoor 2005; Linthicum et 
al. 2010). The predominant CSR approaches can even enhance competitive advantages (e.g., 
Cohen 2009). If this holds true, then firms with low intrinsic motivation for social responsi-
bility can also have incentives to invest in CSR activities, and it may be interesting to study 
their EM behaviour separately. 
In the following, we elaborate a differentiation of the two groups of higher intrinsic motiva-
tion and higher reputational motivation to invest in CSR. Therefore, we make use of common 
voluntary disclosure considerations. With respect to CSR, reporting is one the most important 
factors in regard to signalling the corporate image to the market. Not exclusively but partic-
ularly for firms with a higher reputational motivation, the importance of an optimized CSR 
disclosure may therefore be of interest. Correspondingly, Graham et al. (2005) document in 
their survey of 400 USA firms that 92% of all CFOs regard enhancement of reputation as 
one major advantage of voluntary disclosure. In detail, voluntary CSR disclosure can func-
tion as a signal of the unobservable social responsibility of the firm to the market (e.g., Teoh 
& Hwang 1991). Mutual high CSR performance and optimized reporting can therefore help 
strengthen the corporate image of social responsibility. However, disclosed information re-
quires certain characteristics to be able to influence decision-making processes. The most 
important among these characteristics are the relevance for the decisions of addressees and 
the reliability of the information (e.g., Dechow et al. 2010). Given the sophistication of soci-
ety concerning CSR noted above, the presented information in CSR reports should be rele-
vant to a variety of stakeholders. The reliability of the presented information is attached to 
the uncertainty of the addressees and the trustworthiness of the company. The use of com-
monly accepted reporting standards in the provision of CSR reports can be a necessary 
method of enhancing the reliability of the presented information. Naturally, all companies 
with vast investments in CSR may be interested in reporting their actions. However, they 
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may compare the benefits from a higher reliability of CSR information with the incurred 
costs for CSR reporting (e.g., Lev 1992).128 Elaborate CSR reports that follow sustainability 
reporting guidelines incur more costs than CSR reports without this feature. Hence, the re-
spective firm is likely to expect higher benefits from a disclosure; thus, higher costs to in-
crease the reliability of the information are justifiable. Given these theoretical considerations, 
we assume that companies with high CSR performance and more reputational incentives 
(hereinafter, “high-reputation firms”) will predominantly appear in the group with more 
costly CSR reports, whereas their more intrinsically motivated counterparts (hereinafter, “in-
trinsic firms”) may be less distressed to invest more money in the perception of the CSR 
report.129 
When thinking about their respective EM decisions, firms will compare the impact of the two 
EM types on the long-term value of the firm and the respective probability of accounting 
controversies, e.g., the detection of EM actions. Following these considerations, high-repu-
tation firms may be interested in decreasing AEM to ensure that it does not negatively affect 
their reputation enhancement. Accounting controversies cause severe reputational damage 
and may unmask a firm’s CSR incentive. A scaling back of AEM will likely prevent this 
from occurring. Meanwhile, intrinsic firms may act similarly due to their motivation to sup-
port stakeholders’ decisions. However, high-reputation firms draw a more extrinsic picture 
than the frequently noted “myopia avoidance hypothesis”. The prior literature on CSR and 
AEM has mostly ignored this incentive. Only KPW incorporate listing in Fortune’s Amer-
ica’s Most Admired companies as a control variable. Consideration of the listing may capture 
similar incentives compared to the disclosure of CSR reports and therefore shape reputation. 
However, they omit further considerations. We try to incorporate this dimension throughout 
our analyses to disentangle the various incentive groups, proposing the following hypothesis: 
                                                          
128 Following the commonly known unraveling principle (e.g., Verrecchia 1983), CSR disclosure will only exist if the benefits exceed the 
costs. Thus, all companies providing a report assign a certain value to the reporting of their CSR activities.  
129 We cannot observe the actual incentive or motivation behind CSR investments, which is why we deliberately use the restriction 
“higher”. It is likely that all firms investing in CSR have a certain degree of intrinsic motivation, which does not cancel out the use of 
CSR to influence corporate image and reputation. However, we propose that our differentiation captures the main incentives of the sam-
ple firms. 
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:  Ceteris paribus, firms with higher engagement in CSR use lower AEM. This coher-
ence holds for both high-reputation and intrinsic firms. 
An alternative explanation for a negative coefficient of CSR on EM is the positive association 
between firm performance and CSR. One major strand of the literature covers the coherence 
between CSR and firm performance, finding more support for a positive relationship (e.g., 
Griffin & Mahon 1997; Waddock & Graves 1997; Callan & Thomas 2009). Companies with 
a high performance may also be less distressed to take action in EM to improve their perfor-
mance. We incorporate respective control variables to capture the influence of performance 
on our results.130 The related literature additionally claims that CSR practices can be a means 
of opportunistic use to cover up selfish actions through CSR activities. In terms of financial 
reporting, selfish actions mean higher EM to mislead the addressees of financial reports in 
their decisions (e.g., Jensen & Meckling 1976; Davidson et al. 2004; Hemingway & 
Maclagan 2004; McWilliams et al. 2006; Petrovits 2006; DeMaCarty 2009). However, the 
respective studies have very mixed outcomes and concentrate on AEM. Moreover, increasing 
amounts of AEM will lead to a higher probability of accounting controversies, ultimately 
unmasking opportunistic CSR.131 We claim that our more differentiated view of CSR can 
shape the incentives of firms to a higher degree, also because we apply differentiation be-
tween the use of AEM and REM in the following. 
4.2.2 The earnings management trade-off relationship and the role of cor-
porate governance 
We study the two incentives for CSR investments in more detail by disentangling their influ-
ence on the use of REM and the trade-off decision between AEM and REM. The prior liter-
ature has shown that firms substitute between the two types of EM when considering their 
                                                          
130 We also apply non-stationary cross-sectional regressions to compute our AEM and REM proxies to receive much more conservative 
discretionary proxies. We additionally incorporate an AEM model that cancels out the respective influences of firm performance on the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals to a higher degree than alternative AEM models. See sections 4.3.2.2 and 2.2.2. 
131 Although there are also results on a positive coefficient of CSR on EM, most of them are ambiguous for various EM measures (e.g., 
Trébucq & Russ 2005; Chih et al. 2008; Salewski & Zuelch 2014) or valid only in regulated industries (e.g., Prior et al. 2008; Kim & 
Venkatachalam, 2011). 
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costs and/or regulative conditions. Cohen et al. (2008) find that firms are aware of the possi-
ble costs associated with accounting investigations following AEM. On the other hand, Roy-
chowdhury (2006), Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012) elaborate that REM requires 
alterations in business activities that can have severe impact on the future performance of the 
firm. Various factors shape the direction and intensity of this trade-off relationship. In par-
ticular, high enforcement, high monitoring through CG, auditing or regulative entities may 
limit the possibilities of using AEM without detection and may lead to a higher use of REM. 
“While auditors can second-guess the firm’s accounting policies, they cannot 
readily challenge real economic actions […].” (Graham et al. 2005) 
In their survey, Graham et al. (2005) confirm that CFOs use REM not only when needed in 
excess of AEM but as a substitute, despite knowing that they burn real future cash. The de-
mand for a substitution is driven by the probability of being the subject of investigations, 
which increases with the amount of AEM used. Intrinsic firms may have a different evalua-
tion of this situation since they supposedly weigh shareholder value more than a probable 
investigation, regardless of the fact that they will already use less EM. For high-reputation 
firms, accounting controversies may be a worst-case scenario and heavily damage their rep-
utation. Hence, such an unmasking will burn all of the invested money in CSR engagement 
and reporting. Consequently, high-reputation firms will be more likely to use more REM 
than AEM at the expense of future shareholder value. Altogether, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
i:  Ceteris paribus, intrinsic firms substitute REM through AEM. This coherence re-
verses for high-reputation firms. 
Moreover, CFOs are aware of the fact that the regulative and monitoring setting drives the 
probability of investigations concerning AEM (e.g., Chun et al. 2012). The importance of the 
company’s board in monitoring the management properly is commonly known, particularly 
when ownership is widespread. Jensen (1993) notes that the board chair has the duty to con-
trol the status of the firm and represent the interests of shareholders responsibly. The board 
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places great importance on ensuring the presented picture reflects the financial situation to a 
high degree (e.g., Fama & Jensen 1983). 
However, the related literature has mainly ignored considering the interplay of CSR strate-
gies and CG as the monitoring device of the firm. There are only a few studies that incorpo-
rate CG when studying the coherence of CSR and EM, and none of them includes the trade-
off relationship between REM and AEM. Choi et al. (2013) study ownership concentration 
in Korea and show that highly concentrated firms use higher AEM than other firms with the 
same levels of CSR. Cho and Chun (2016) analyse the interaction effects of various CG 
aspects on the relationship of CSR and REM using a composite CG index. KPW alternatively 
control for CG influences using an aggregate performance score, whereas BFMM completely 
omit CG aspects and focus on enforcement.132 
We incorporate the effects of potentially non-linear CG aspects in the form of board inde-
pendence on EM. Numerous studies on CG aspects show that independent members on the 
board are predestined to have an impartial view of the business and represent stakeholders’ 
interests in their monitoring duty in a superior manner (e.g., Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 
1996; Xie et al. 2003; Davidson et al. 2005; Peasnell et al. 2005). Consequently, these studies 
show that a higher number of independent members on the board decreases the amounts of 
AEM used.133 We use board independence and study its effect on both types of EM. In par-
ticular, it may be interesting to determine whether higher monitoring comes along with a 
higher or lower use of REM. Moreover, there may be a U-shaped relationship. Higher inde-
pendence in the board may not infinitely improve monitoring. Rather, at a certain point, more 
members who are independent may decrease the monitoring ability of the board again since 
coordination and processing problems or a lack of expertise overcompensate for the inde-
pendence effects (e.g., Jensen 1993; Bradbury et al. 2006). Following Haans et al. (2016), 
these two opposing effects may lead to a U-shaped or inverted U-shaped relationship between 
                                                          
132 Naturally, an aggregate score or index can only control for the sum of strengths and weaknesses, and it might be useful to study the 
individual effect of certain monitoring devices. 
133 In addition, there is some evidence of a negative relationship between the proportion of outside directors and financial fraud (e.g., 
Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996). 
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our independent and dependent variable, building a solid foundation for further considera-
tions (e.g., Sutton & Staw 1995).134  
We further incorporate the CSR incentives as a probable moderator of the effectiveness of 
CG aspects in limiting EM. As stated above, we distinguish between intrinsic and high-rep-
utation firms. These incentives may shape the effects of monitoring, e.g., good CG, on both 
types of EM since they provide a foundation for the preference of AEM or REM as EM 
vehicles. Although intrinsic firms prefer AEM over REM, they may not be able to trade off 
from REM to AEM when higher monitoring limits AEM to a certain degree. In this case, 
there can be a counterbalancing effect on AEM, and we expect that CG works well in limiting 
EM. Conversely, high-reputation firms prefer REM over AEM, which is why they will use 
even more REM than AEM when AEM is limited, potentially leaving the magnitude of total 
EM unchanged. The use of REM will then increase with increasing independence in the 
board.135 Altogether, we propose the following hypothesis: 
:  Ceteris paribus, CSR incentives moderate the relationship between CG and EM. 
4.3 Research design 
4.3.1 Data and sample selection 
We use an initial dataset containing 10,637 firm-year observations from all European AS-
SET4 firms available in the Thomson Reuters database from 2005 to 2014. We exclude 1,277 
observations in which disclosures following either the IFRS or US-GAAP standards were 
not made.136 Financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999) account for 2,002 firm-years and 
are omitted due to the disparate balance sheet structure and business model, which leads to 
inaccurate EM measures. Furthermore, we require each firm-year grouping to consist of at 
                                                          
134 Possible explanations of why firms exceed the optimal degree of independent members can be irrational decision-making, escalated 
commitment to CG or ambiguous goals (e.g., Haans et al. 2016). 
135 We are aware of the fact that this only holds if higher independence has no significant decreasing effect on REM, which is ex-ante 
undetermined. 
136 Although there are some differences in accounting standards between the IFRS and US-GAAP, they are highly aligned regarding basic 
principles, objectives and possibilities to pursue EM. Further, Van der Meulen et al. (2007) find no significant differences in the quality 
of accruals and the attributes of earnings for the two accounting systems, which is why we accept alignment. 
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least ten observations, which accounts for a loss of 939 observations. Subsequently, the paper 
uses an unbalanced panel with adequate information to conduct the analyses using AEM and 
REM proxies with regard to all controls and variables of interest. A total of 2.733 firm-year 
observations remain. 
4.3.2  Measurement of applied variables 
4.3.2.1 Measurement of CSR performance, CG characteristics and differentiation 
of CSR incentives 
Numerous approaches to measuring CSR performance exist. KPW apply the extensively used 
(e.g., Turban & Greening 1997; Waddock & Graves 1997; Szwajkowski & Figlewicz 1999) 
measure proposed by KLD Research and Analytics Inc. (2006). It evaluates each firm on the 
strengths and weaknesses of several dimensions. They also construct the Social Index 
Domini 400, whose affiliation can be used as an alternative measure for CSR (e.g., 
McWilliams & Siegel 2000; Kim et al. 2012). In their international study, BFMM use an 
equally weighted CSR measure from EIRIS scaled between 3 and 12. We apply an overall 
score for the CSR performance of European companies using ASSET4 ESG data from Thom-
son Reuters. The data consist of 250 key performance indicators, classified within 18 cate-
gories or 4 pillars, for 967 European companies. The pillars are (1) environmental, (2) social, 
(3) CG and (4) economic performance. For each pillar, there are indicator z-scores that can 
be applied to calculate the pillar z-scores. Subsequently, we comprehend an overall CSR 
score assuming equal weights between pillars. For purposes of distinction in the further anal-
yses, we exclude the CG pillar from the CSR score computation.137 Instead, we use only the 
(1) environmental and (2) social performance to acquire an overall score (BD_DL	
!") for 
firm i in year t between 1 and 100.138 Chatterji et al. (2016) investigate all major CSR ratings 
and document the high validity and agreement of ratings for the respective rater’s location. 
                                                          
137 Larcker et al. (2007) show that corporate governance importance correlates with separation of ownership and control and improves the 
extent to which managers act in line with stakeholders’ interests. On the other hand, KPW claim that CSR incorporates social and envi-
ronmental commitment. A distinct treatment and formulation of the two concepts is therefore mandatory, particularly since the relation-
ship between corporate governance and CSR is not predetermined. 
138 To obtain an overall score between zero and one for better coefficient interpretation, we divide each score by 100. For further details 
about the CSR and CG performance scores, see Appendix E. 
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With KLD being the valid standard for CSR ratings within the USA, we consider ASSET4 
ESG to be the valid approach for European analyses (e.g., Cheng et al. 2014; Huang & Wat-
son 2015). 
To distinguish high-reputation firms from intrinsic firms, we make use of the elaborated ex-
pected differences in CSR reporting. As stated above, the provision of a CSR report following 
internationally accepted guidelines for sustainable reporting can be viewed as a method of 
further increasing the reliability of the CSR reports and, therefore, the reliability and reputa-
tion of the firm. Therefore, we apply a reporting indicator (<!"), which takes the value of 
one if firms collocate a CSR report and use GRI standards, zero otherwise.139 They represent 
the global best practice approach for CSR reporting (e.g., Menichini & Rosati 2014; Vukic 
2015; Calabrese et al. 2016; Lozano et al. 2016; Global Reporting Initiative 2017), optimize 
the presentation of CSR information and therefore maximize the probable outcomes concern-
ing the reputation of the firm. Importantly, for our sample, there is no legal requirement to 
collocate any CSR report or to obey any reporting standards.140 Using this indicator to sepa-
rate the incentives, we define “intrinsic firms” as firms with above median net CSR perfor-
mance scores, whereas “high-reputation firms” are firms with above median net CSR perfor-
mance scores and G4 GRI CSR reporting. Although incentives will most likely only exist 
when considerable (above median) CSR investments are made, we will assess the validity of 
this definition in our uni- and multivariate analyses. 
To control for CG aspects when studying CSR, we use the excluded, equally weighted CG 
pillar score (C87_DL	
!"). When studying the moderating role of CSR in the relationship 
between CG and EM, we focus on explicit board independence, not the overall CG pillar. 
Therefore, we use the indicator value for board independence (;9!") as the percentage of 
                                                          
139 To ensure the validity of this indicator in the formulation, we test all ESG ASSET4 CSR reporting indicator values together with our 
new indicator in principal and maximum likelihood factor analyses to obtain the optimal representation of the variation of all factors by 
the combined factor used in the regressions. Untabulated results ensure the high validity of our proxy. The divergence in the computation 
of score-based CSR performance and indicator value-based CSR reporting dimension further demonstrates the validity of distinct inter-
pretation. 
140 Our data still contain only observations where reporting is voluntary; meanwhile, the European Union has passed the Directive 
2014/95/EU to oblige all companies of public interest to collocate a mandatory CSR report for all firm-years beginning with 2017. 
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strictly independent members on the total board.141 For our multivariate analyses, we adjust 
the CG score to capture all aspects apart from the analysed independence characteristic. 
Therefore, we exclude the particular KPI category of board independence from the respective 
CG score calculation.142 
4.3.2.2 Measurement of earnings management 
As discussed in chapter 2.2, we use the cross-sectional McNichols (2002) model to compre-
hend AEM, while we apply the cross-sectional models for REM proposed by Roychowdhury 
(2006) to comprehend a combined signed measure K!", calculated in accordance with 
KPW for reasons of better comparison.143 
Alternatively, we apply the two decile-based proxies for EM proposed by BFMM. Therefore, 
we sort BB__!" and K!" into deciles. We calculate a total EM proxy (K_==!") as 
the sum of the two deciles, whereas KK!"  is a distinct proxy for the trade-off rela-
tionship between the two types of EM, calculated as the ratio of the K!" decile and 
K_==!". 
  
                                                          
141 We conform to the related literature and define independence as the percentage of members on the board who are not employed by the 
firm, have not served on the board for more than ten years, have holdings of less than 5 percent, do not have cross-board membership, do 
not have recent, immediate family ties to the firm and do not accept any compensation other than compensation for board service (e.g., 
Bradbury et al. 2006). See Appendix D for detailed definitions of the variables. 
142 See Appendix D for a detailed definition of these variables. 
143 K!" = BM8__!" − <8__!" + 9D<__!". This proxy for real activities EM is negatively scaled. 
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4.3.3 Empirical models 
To perform tests on the relationship between CSR performance and EM, we estimate the 
following basic empirical models: 
Equation	26	
BB__!"  !">6⁄ 	(K!"  !">6⁄ )
= )* + 56BD_DL	
!" + 5@<!" + 5F<!" ∗ BD_DL	
!"
+ 5S K!"  !">6⁄ (BB__!"  !">6⁄ ) + 5TD!">6 + 5UK;!">6
+ 5V=8DD!" + 5W=
!">6 + 5Y ∆K<=8!" K<=8!">6⁄
+ 56* ∆ !"  !">6⁄ + 566C87_DL	
!" + 56@ BB!">6  !">6⁄
+ 56F BM8!"  !">6⁄ + 56S 8!">6 + 56T=	!"
+ 56U ∆C<I" C<I">6⁄ + 56VM
!" + 56Wv!" + :!" 
Equation	27	
K_==!"(KK!")
= )* + 56BD_DL	
!" + 5@<!" + 5F<!" ∗ BD_DL	
!" + 5SD!">6
+ 5TK;!">6 + 5U=8DD!" + 5V=
!">6
+ 5W ∆K<=8!" K<=8!">6⁄ + 5Y ∆ !"  !">6⁄ + 56*C87_DL	
!"
+ 566 BB!">6  !">6⁄ + 56@ BM8!"  !">6⁄ + 56F 8!">6
+ 56S=	!" + 56T ∆C<I" C<I">6⁄ + 56UM
!" + 56Vv!"
+ :!" 
BD_DL	
!" is the continuous CSR performance score as stated in Appendix E. <!" is the 
CSR reporting indicator discussed above, whereas <!" ∗ BD_DL	
!" covers additional 
CSR performance effects for these firms. We use this semi-continuous formulation to assess 
the validity of our incentive definition. Due to the probable trade-off relationships between 
the two types of EM (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 2012), we include either K!" or 
BB__!" as controls in Equation	26. They capture the substitution effects between EM 
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actions according to their relative costs.144 Alternatively, we apply the two decile-based prox-
ies K_==!" or KK!" as the dependent variable in Equation	27, as a result of which 
separate trade-off controls are no longer required. 
The incorporated control variables minimize omitted variable correlation biases, which 
would heavily constrain the validity of our analysis. Roychowdhury (2006) argues that the 
firm-specific size in terms of its market value of equity (K7) and growth opportunities can 
explain considerable amounts of variation within EM proxies (e.g., Watts & Zimmerman 
1986; Frankel et al. 2002; Prior et al. 2008; Ali & Zhang 2015). We include D!">6 as the 
lagged value of the natural logarithm of K7. With regard to growth opportunities, we use 
K;!">6 as the ratio of the lagged market to book value of equity. A considerably high market 
to book ratio entails high expectations of future company growth, which EM can help meet. 
The two controls also stand for the significance of the equity incentives for EM, e.g., max-
imizing stock-based compensation (e.g., Cheng & Warfield 2005), since K;!", K7 and 
stock-based compensation are similarly responsive to stock price changes.145 =8DD!" is an 
indicator that captures firms with negative earnings. They have different incentives and/or 
possibilities to pursue EM (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006). Kim and Park (2005) show that the 
degree of leverage (=
!">6) can play an important role since highly leveraged com-
panies may undergo contractual renegotiations. This can tempt them to increase income-de-
creasing EM. Leverage also embodies the influences of past performance. Following Ali and 
Zhang (2015), we include two measures for business growth. Total asset growth (∆ !") 
captures the influences on the magnitude of accruals due to correlation with a firm’s working 
capital. As the change in the number of employees, ∆K<=8!" contains a favourable growth 
and performance control (e.g., Zhang 2007). As discussed above, we use an aggregated CG 
score (C87_DL	
!") as a separate control for the influence of CG features on EM (e.g., Kim 
                                                          
144 Following KPW, we alternatively use positive (negative) discretionary accruals as a dependent variable to estimate Equation	26. 
Moreover, we apply all distinct proxies of real-activities manipulation as a dependent variable to estimate Equation	26. We discuss the 
results in section 4.5. 
145 Prior research on EM has additionally claimed that the Big 4 auditors constrain EM better than other auditors (e.g., DeFond & 
Jiambalvo 1993; Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999). The Big 4 companies audit 97 percent of our sample, leaving almost no refer-
ence group influence, which is why we omit this control variable in our main analyses. However, we include it in our robustness analyses 
in section 4.5. 
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et al. 2012).146 BB!">6 and BM8!" control for influences on the variation of EM that are due 
to correlations with last year’s accruals and prediction imperfection of discretionary accruals 
caused by the applied models (e.g., Young 1999; Ashbaugh et al. 2003).147 Moreover, we 
implement  8!" to control for the influence of a firm’s positioning within the market. We 
use the decomposition of the return on net operating assets (8) into the profit margin 
(<K) and asset turnover ( 8) as well as the Du Pont model, which is broadly used in fi-
nancial statement analysis (e.g., Lundholm & Sloan 2004; Palepu et al. 2004; Stickney et al. 
2004; Penman 2009).  8, the cost efficiency and scalability part of the decomposition, is 
the level of revenues divided by the net operating assets of the firm. 8 is comprehended 
as the product of the two decomposition factors. Penman (2009) shows that a firm’s and 
industry’s characteristics concerning these two drivers are negatively correlated. The idea is 
that not only REM in particular (e.g., overproduction, sales manipulation) but also AEM are 
easier to pursue when firms bear higher  8 due to a higher scalability of operating assets 
leading to more transactions.148 =	!" controls for the influences of litigation risk, 
e.g., when regulation occurs (e.g., Bowen et al. 1995; Cheng & Warfield 2005) or auditors 
tend to emphasize conservative accounting (e.g., DeFond & Subramanyam 1998). ∆C<I" 
controls for macroeconomic effects in the respective state (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008). As a 
separate control for the influence of systematic market risk on EM, the beta factor of the 
respective firm (v!") is applied. Prior research finds that firms with a higher beta engage 
in more EM (e.g., Warfield et al. 1995). Finally, to capture the effect of changing financial 
reporting behaviour due to maturation over time, we include the age of the firm (M
!"; 
e.g., Kim et al. 2012). 
                                                          
146 See Appendices D and E for the definition and calculation summary. 
147 The applied first-step models already include regressors to limit the existence of measurement errors. Nevertheless, the variables for 
growth, leverage and size control supplement a favourable specification that prevents the observed coherences between the variables of 
interest and the dependent variables from being spurious, which would lead to erroneous inferences (e.g., Kang & Sivaramakrishnan, 
1995). 
148 In an earlier study, Jansen et al. (2012) detect EM scenarios using the divergence of <K and  8. This is a first indicator that there is a 
connection between  8 and discretionary actions. 
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To study CSR incentives as a moderator for the effect of CG on EM, we use and extend 
Equation	26 and Equation	27 as follows. We add the linear and squared terms (;9!" and ;9!"
@ )149 
of board independence to formulate the relationship with EM. We capture the moderating 
effects using the interaction of board independence with a CSR incentive indicator for both 
intrinsic (;9!" ∗ BD!") and reputation (;9!" ∗ BD!" ∗ <!") firms.
150 
We use a FGLS Driscoll-Kraay estimator, which is robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrela-
tion, time dependence and cross-sectional (spatial) correlation (e.g., Driscoll & Kraay 1998). 
Simple variation and autocorrelation tests (e.g., Cameron & Trivedi 2010) show predominant 
between variation, heteroscedasticity and time series equi-correlation. De Hoyos and 
Sarafidis (2006) claim that considerable cross-sectional dependence can lead to inefficient 
fixed- and random-effects estimation with biased standard errors. Common robust (Arellano 
1987; Froot 1989) and cluster robust (Rogers 1993) standard errors are inapplicable since 
they omit correlation across groups of cross-sections. However, cross-sectional dependence 
is determined by various factors, e.g., not only the correlation across multi-level cross-sec-
tions but also its complexion. In the case of endogeneity, standard fixed- and random-effects 
estimators become inconsistent, biased and inefficient. Instrumental variable (IV) fixed- or 
random-effects estimators with exogenous and relevant instruments remain. Considerable 
amounts of cross-sectional correlation lead to inconsistent and biased IV and Generalized 
Method of Moments estimators, which is a delicate issue. This applies for small panels with 
large- asymptotics in linear-panel data models.151 Testing for cross-sectional dependence 
is an issue within our empirical accounting data setting since the mutual existence of both 
cross-sectional correlation and endogeneity evokes a trade-off decision concerning these 
problems. We run Pesaran’s CD test for unbalanced panels152 and find a significant CD test 
                                                          
149 We run simple curve estimations for the coherence of board independence and EM proxy to obtain a better understanding of which 
formulation fits the model best. We decide on a linear or non-linear (squared) formulation based on the level of significance, course of 
the curve and r-squared. The results favour a non-linear formulation and remain untabulated. 
150 We switch to an indicator based separation of our incentives following the definition above to be able to study the continuous, proba-
bly non-linear effects of board independence. Therefore, BD!" is an indicator that captures all firms with above median CSR perfor-
mance scores. The accuracy of this formulation is guaranteed when our CSR incentives are attached to above median CSR performances, 
which we analyze in section 4.4.2.1. However, we use alternative formulations in section 4.5.3. 
151 In particular, GMM estimators’ large  asymptotics rely on the assumption of no cross-sectional correlation. 
152 Pesaran’s B test (Pesaran 2004) is applicable for small (N > T) unbalanced panels and is the suitable alternative to the common La-
grange multiplier (LM) test for long panels by Breusch and Pagan (1980). 
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statistic (0.01 levels), implying that cross-sectional correlation is an issue within the sample. 
Therefore, we use the specially designed Driscoll-Kraay estimator, which implements a 
Newey-West-type method to correct the cross-sectional averages of the moment conditions. 
It produces consistent and efficient variance-covariance matrices for the setting of heterosce-
dasticity, auto-correlation, time dependence and cross-sectional correlation with large-, 
fixed   asymptotics.153 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 39 panel A and B present the sample distribution by two-digit SIC industries, country 
and year. The sample contains 20 different industries with a weighted average share of 6.93 
percent and an average number of 137 observations. The total number of firm-years consist-
ently increases from 2006 to 2012, and the highest degree is located in the United Kingdom 
(29.8 percent), followed by Germany (12.1 percent) and France (11.0 percent). Taking a 
closer look at the firms that use G4 GRI guidelines to collocate their CSR reports, we find 
that only 102 (8.80 percent) have below median CSR performances and that, in the group of 
firms with above median CSR score (high-CSR firms), 65.63 percent of the total sample 
disclose G4 GRI CSR reports and 34.37 percent either have none or do not invest in such an 
elaborate report. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percent of 
the respective distribution.  
  
                                                          
153 The use of LSDV and FGLS Driscoll-Kraay estimators shows qualitatively equal results. When between variation is high compared to 
within variation, fixed effects are less efficient; thus, random effects estimators with dummies are used. Bootstrapped Hausman approves 
this estimation procedure. Hoechle (2007) notes that very small   decrease favourable estimator features again. We consider the panel 
 = 8 to be sufficiently large. 
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Table 39 – Sample description 
Panel A: Distribution of firm-year observations by industry 
Industry  Two-digit SIC  # of obs.  % of sample  Cum. % 
Metal Mining  10  77  2.82%  2.82% 
Oil and Gas Extraction  13  114  4.17%  6.99% 
Building Construction General Contractor  15  102  3.73%  10.72% 
Food and Kindred Products  20  157  5.74%  16.47% 
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries  27  89  3.26%  19.72% 
Chemicals and Allied Products  28  393  14.38%  34.10% 
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products  32  94  3.44%  37.54% 
Primary Metal Industries  33  84  3.07%  40.61% 
Industrial Machinery and Computer Equipment  35  237  8.67%  49.29% 
Electronic and other Electrical Equipment  36  162  5.93%  55.21% 
Transportation Equipment  37  155  5.67%  60.89% 
Instruments and Related Products  38  144  5.27%  66.15% 
Transportation by Air  45  10  0.37%  66.52% 
Communications  48  230  8.42%  74.94% 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services  49  130  4.76%  79.69% 
Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods  50  57  2.09%  81.78% 
Food Stores  54  110  4.02%  85.80% 
Miscellaneous Retail  59  21  0.77%  86.57% 
Business Services  73  238  8.71%  95.28% 
Engineering and Management Services  87  129  4.72%  100.00% 
    2,733  100.00%   
Panel B: Distribution of firm-year observations by country and year 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total (%) 
Austria 5 5 7 7 7 7 6 8 52 (1.9) 
Belgium 9 9 9 10 10 10 11 11 79 (2.9) 
Cyprus 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 (0.2) 
Denmark 11 13 13 13 13 14 14 14 105 (3.8) 
Finland 5 5 7 7 9 9 9 9 60 (2.2) 
France 27 32 35 37 41 43 43 43 301 (11.0) 
Germany 29 33 40 45 45 46 46 46 330 (12.1) 
Greece 1 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 8 (0.3) 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 (0.2) 
Ireland 5 5 5 6 7 7 7 7 49 (1.8) 
Italy 17 19 21 21 22 23 24 24 171 (6.3) 
Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 (0.3) 
Netherlands 13 15 14 15 16 17 17 17 124 (4.5) 
Norway 6 7 7 7 6 6 6 5 50 (1.8) 
Poland 0 0 2 3 7 8 9 5 34 (1.2) 
Portugal 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 24 (0.9) 
Spain 5 5 7 7 9 10 12 13 68 (2.5) 
Sweden 22 23 25 25 26 26 26 27 200 (7.3) 
Switzerland 22 24 24 26 28 31 32 32 219 (8.0) 
Turkey 0 0 2 2 4 4 6 10 28 (1.0) 
United Kingdom 74 78 91 109 109 113 122 118 814 (29.8) 
Total 255 277 313 346 366 381 398 397 2,733 (100) 
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Table 39 – Sample description (continued) 
Panel C: Distribution of firm-year observations by CSR and REP 
High-CSR firms   Low-CSR firms 
1,574 (57.59%)   1,159 (42.41%) 
 
REP firms Non-REP firms   REP firms Non-REP firms 
1,033 (65.63%) 541 (34.37%)   102 (8.80%) 1,057 (91.20%) 
 
REP firms   Non-REP firms 
1,135 (41.53%)   1,598 (58.47%) 
2,733 (100%) 
A firm is defined as a high-CSR firm when the CSR score lies above the median of the full sample and defined as a low-CSR firm otherwise. A 
firm is defined as a REP firm when the firm discloses a CSR report in accordance with G4 GRI guidelines for sustainability reports and defined as 
a non-REP firm otherwise. The variables are defined in Appendix D. 
 
Table 40 reports the descriptive statistics. The mean absolute value of discretionary accruals 
is 2.5 percent, whereas the mean value of discretionary accruals of zero indicates a desirable 
setting with no systematic up- or downward EM activity. On the other hand, absolute REM 
accounts for 17.9 percent, which is on average seven times the value of AEM. This type of 
EM seems to be more pronounced, which is in line with the findings of other studies (e.g., 
Graham et al. 2005; Cohen & Zarowin 2010; Zang 2012). The mean value of the signed real 
activities proxies of zero completes the favourable randomness setting.154 Concerning the 
CSR performance score, the skewness of -0.61 signals an asymmetric distribution with a long 
tail to the left, indicating a disproportionate frequency of observations with very high CSR 
scores. The mean percentage of independent members on the board accounts for 23.6 percent 
on average. Concerning the control variables, the sample firms account for a low amount of 
losses (only 12 percent of all firm-year observations), the sizes and growth opportunities are 
high, and the mean leverage is 23.5 percent, with an interquartile range of 22.2 percent. Al-
together, the sample characteristics are comparable to those of the prior literature. Several 
variable distributions bear high skewness and indicate the importance of outliers and winso-
rizing. 
  
                                                          
154 Corresponding untabulated tests show that BB!" and K!" are not significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 40 – Descriptive statistics of relevant variables 
Panel: Full sample     
  N  Mean  fgh  Std. dev.  fig  fjg 
Dependent variables             
BB__!"  2,733  0.025  0.017  0.025  0.007  0.034 
BB!"  2,733  0.000  0.001  0.035  -0.015  0.017 
K!"  2,733  0.000  -0.011  0.251  -0.138  0.114 
K__!"  2,733  0.179  0.129  0.176  0.054  0.248 
K_==!"  2,733  10.997  11.000  4.057  8.000  14.000 
KK!"  2,733  0.502  0.500  0.208  0.364  0.667 
Variables of interest             
BD_DL	
!"  2,733  0.647  0.702  0.216  0.486  0.837 
BD!"  2,733  0.576  1.000  0.494  0.000  1.000 
<!"  2,733  0.415  0.000  0.493  0.000  1.000 
;9!"  2,733  0.236  0.000  0.276  0.000  0.500 
Control variables 
D!">6  2,733  15.282  15.196  1.663  14.033  16.436 
K;!">6  2,733  2.895  2.173  2.618  1.284  3.563 
=8DD!"  2,733  0.120  0.000  0.325  0.000  0.000 
=
!">6  2,733  0.235  0.225  0.158  0.114  0.336 
∆K<=8!"  2,733  0.050  0.025  0.179  -0.025  0.092 
∆ !"  2,733  0.088  0.043  0.234  -0.022  0.134 
C87_DL	
!"  2,733  0.565  0.586  0.165  0.449  0.691 
BB!">6  2,733  -0.048  -0.041  0.063  -0.073  -0.015 
BM8!"  2,733  0.114  0.099  0.085  0.064  0.147 
 8!">6  2,733  0.936  0.820  0.563  0.560  1.13 
=	!"  2,733  0.212  0.000  0.409  0.000  0.000 
∆C<I"  2,733  0.029  0.043  0.086  -0.034  0.081 
M
!"  2,733  2.563  2.708  0.529  2.398  2.944 
v!"  2,733  0.968  0.950  0.442  0.670  1.250 
All variables are defined in Appendix D & E. 
Table 41 considers the descriptive statistics comparing high- and low-CSR firms in panel A. 
The mean (median) BD_DL	
!" for the high-CSR firms is 0.808 (0.822) and for the low-
CSR firms is 0.429 (0.450). There are significant differences in the EM values (mean K!" 
of 0.015 (-0.021) for high-CSR (Low-CSR) firms and the mean BB__!" of 0.022 (0.028) 
for high-CSR (low-CSR) firms. Moreover, the aggregate EM measure (K_==!") signifi-
cantly differs between high- and low-CSR firms, which underpins that high-CSR firms en-
gage in lower EM than their socially less responsible counterparts. There are more high-CSR 
firms collocating a G4 GRI CSR report than low-CSR firms, in which the differential is sig-
nificant again. However, we cannot find differences in the CG aspects of the two groups. In 
summary, these findings support that high-CSR firms, independent of their incentive, on av-
erage engage in less EM than firms with low CSR investments and, therefore, performance. 
Moreover, high-CSR firms are significantly larger, though they have higher leverage and 
higher systematic market risk than low-CSR firms. They entail lower actual growth 
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(∆K<=8!" and ∆ !") and expected growth opportunities (K;!">6). High-CSR firms are 
on average older and most likely more consolidated. Panel B compares firms with G4 GRI 
CSR reporting to the remaining sample. The results on the differences in EM proxies show 
that firms with this elaborate, though costly, CSR reporting use considerably lower EM. 
However, the significance of the difference decreases compared to panel A, which could 
mean that firms with high CSR performance but without G4 GRI CSR reporting (intrinsic 
CSR firms) use considerably lower EM and therefore decrease the mean values of the EM 
proxies for the non-REP firms. Another reason could be that high-reputation firms use con-
siderably more EM than the mean high-CSR firm. Both could prove that the separation of 
the two CSR incentives is valid. Moreover, CSR scores are significantly different and show 
that most firms with G4 GRI CSR reporting belong to the high-CSR firms group. The num-
bers in panel C of Table 41 confirm this proposition. Naturally, firms with few CSR actions 
that potentially improve reputation will not invest more money in the provision of G4 GRI 
CSR reporting to cultivate their image. On the other hand, firms that spend the money may 
mutually have extensive CSR to maximize the possible outcomes for their reputation. 
  
D a n i e l  N o r b e r t  S c h a u p p  Earnings Management in the Context of Earnings Quality,  
Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
P a g e  153 | 220 
Table 41 – Descriptive statistics by high- and low-CSR firms and REP and non-REP firms 
Panel A: Full sample 
 
 
High-CSR firms 
(1) 
 
Low-CSR firms 
(2) 
 Difference 
(1) – (2): 
p-value 
  
N Mean cT*  N Mean cT*  
Wilcoxon 
test 
 t-test 
Dependent variables 
BB__!"  1,574 0.022 0.015  1,159 0.028 0.019  <0.001  <0.001 
K!"  1,574 0.015 -0.004  1,159 -0.021 -0.028  <0.001  <0.001 
K_==!"  1,574 10.636 10.000  1,159 11.487 11.000  <0.001  <0.001 
KK!"  1,574 0.502 0.500  1,159 0.500 0.500  0.935  0.808 
Variables of interest 
BD_DL	
!"  1,574 0.808 0.822  1,159 0.429 0.450  <0.001  <0.001 
<!"  1,574 0.656 1.000  1,159 0.088 0.000  <0.001  <0.001 
;9!"  1,574 0.239 0.000  1,159 0.233 0.000  0.948  0.549 
Control variables 
D!">6  1,574 15.889 15.885  1,159 14.458 14.344  <0.001  <0.001 
K;!">6  1,574 2.645 2.012  1,159 3.234 2.498  <0.001  <0.001 
=8DD!"  1,574 0.111 0.000  1,159 0.131 0.000  0.112  0.112 
=
!">6  1,574 0.248 0.234  1,159 0.216 0.201  <0.001  <0.001 
∆K<=8!"  1,574 0.034 0.016  1,159 0.072 0.036  <0.001  <0.001 
∆DD !"  1,574 0.065 0.036  1,159 0.121 0.056  <0.001  <0.001 
C87_DL	
!"  1,574 0.611 0.629  1,159 0.503 0.518  <0.001  <0.001 
 8!">6  1,574 0.910 0.800  1,159 0.973 0.840  0.182  0.004 
M
!"  1,574 2.662 2.773  1,159 2.428 2.639  <0.001  <0.001 
v!"  1,574 1.003 0.990  1,159 0.921 0.830  <0.001  <0.001 
Panel B: Full sample 
  REP firms 
(3) 
 Non-REP firms 
(4) 
 Difference 
(3) – (4): 
p-value 
  N Mean cT*  N Mean cT*  
Wilcoxon 
test 
 t-test 
Dependent variables 
BB__!"  1,135 0.023 0.016  1,598 0.025 0.017  0.210  0.053 
K!"  1,135 0.011 -0.007  1,598 -0.008 -0.014  0.126  0.059 
K_==!"  1,135 10.803 11.000  1,598 11.135 11.000  0.046  0.035 
KK!"  1,135 0.502 0.500  1,598 0.501 0.500  0.961  0.906 
Variables of interest 
BD_DL	
!"  1,135 0.803 0.837  1,598 0.536 0.535  <0.001  <0.001 
;9!"  1,135 0.220 0.000  1,598 0.248 0.167  0.001  0.010 
Control variables 
D!">6  1,135 16.140 16.166  1,598 14.672 14.579  <0.001  <0.001 
K;!">6  1,135 2.536 1.936  1,598 3.150 2.414  <0.001  <0.001 
=8DD!"  1,135 0.113 0.000  1,598 0.125 0.000  0.351  0.351 
=
!">6  1,135 0.257 0.242  1,598 0.219 0.205  <0.001  <0.001 
∆K<=8!"  1,135 0.035 0.013  1,598 0.062 0.032  <0.001  <0.001 
∆DD !"  1,135 0.060 0.030  1,598 0.109 0.055  <0.00  <0.001 
C87_DL	
!"  1,135 0.609 0.622  1,598 0.534 0.549  <0.001  <0.001 
 8!">6  1,135 0.866 0.760  1,598 0.987 0.860  <0.001  <0.001 
M
!"  1,135 2.697 2.833  1,598 2.467 2.708  <0.001  <0.001 
v!"  1,135 1.007 0.980  1,598 0.940 0.905  <0.001  <0.001 
A firm is defined as a high-CSR firm when the CSR score lies above the median of the full sample and defined as a low-CSR firm otherwise. 
A firm is defined as a REP firm when the firm discloses a CSR report in accordance with G4 GRI guidelines for sustainability reports defined 
as a non-REP firm otherwise. We evaluate the significances of means and medians based on t-tests and Wilcoxon tests, respectively. We 
calculate the p-values and Z-statistics based on two-tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix D. 
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Table 42 reports the correlation matrix. BD_DL	
!" and <!" are negatively correlated with 
BB__!" and K_==!" but positively correlated with K!". Higher CSR firms seem 
to use less EM. The correlations for <!" are qualitatively equal, though less pronounced. 
This could be another sign that these firms act similarly, although not equally, making dif-
ferentiated analyses a meaningful objective. 
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4.4.2 Multivariate analysis 
4.4.2.1 The influence of corporate social responsibility on earnings manage-
ment 
Table 43 shows the results for the multivariate regression analyses of CSR and EM based 
on Equation	26 and Equation	27. The first two columns contain separate analyses of the two 
types of EM (BB__!" and K!"), whereas column three shows the outcomes for 
the total proxy for EM (K_==!"). All regressions are highly significant (p < 0.01), and 
the explanatory power of the models varies from 23 percent for BB__!" to 26 percent 
for K!". These figures are slightly higher than those reported by KPW and BFMM. 
Initially, our results concerning the influence of CSR engagement on AEM and REM 
seem to be highly consistent with these authors. The coefficient for BD_DL	
!" is neg-
ative and significant at the 0.01 level in columns one and three, indicating that firms with 
a higher score-based performance in CSR engage in less AEM and total EM.155 The co-
efficient on K!" is positive and highly significant (at the 0.01 level), signifying a lower 
use of REM. In summary, these results can indicate that firms with higher CSR engage-
ment engage less in EM than their less responsible counterparts. 
When we take a closer look at the specific CSR incentives, the findings are much more 
diverse. The coefficient for firms with G4 GRI CSR reporting is significant, as is the 
isolated influence of this group’s CSR score on AEM and total EM (BD_DL	
!" ∗
<!"). In summary, they suggest that the direction of the total effect for firms with this 
elaborate reporting depends on the respective CSR engagement. For example, for 
BB__!", all high-reputation firms exceeding a net CSR performance score of 0.68 
have a combined negative effect, indicating lower AEM activities. Thus, they decrease 
the risk of an accounting controversy that might negatively affect their image. With a 
mean CSR performance score of 0.80, most firms with G4 GRI CSR reporting (88 per-
cent) and, more importantly, almost every (97 percent) high-reputation firm (firm with 
                                                          
155 A consideration of signed discretionary accruals (BB!") shows the same results. We also use various alterations and divisions 
of the EM proxies in additional analyses in section 4.5.2. However, the confirmative results remain untabulated. 
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high CSR and G4 GRI CSR reporting) use even lower AEM than the remaining sample.156 
This result also confirms our formulation for the moderating role of the two CSR incen-
tives in the influence of CG on EM. 
Table 43 – Multiple regressions of EM on CSR 
 m-ww_nopxy xy _-PPxy p-xy 
BD_DL	
!" -0.004 0.225 -2.620 -0.120 
 (3.83)*** (13.32)*** (12.02)*** (16.56)*** 
<!" 0.023 0.046 2.325 -0.041 
 (6.35)*** (0.92) (11.09)*** (2.34)** 
BD_DL	
 ∗ <!" -0.030 -0.093 -2.721 0.076 
 (7.75)*** (1.81)* (10.07)*** (3.60)*** 
K!" 0.003    
 (2.66)***    
BB__!"  0.270   
  (2.90)***   
D!">6 0.001 0.014 -0.083 -0.010 
 (3.10)*** (5.91)*** (2.44)** (3.99)*** 
K;!">6 0.000 0.013 -0.096 -0.009 
 (0.45) (5.19)*** (1.94)* (7.41)*** 
=8DD!" 0.020 0.023 1.426 -0.075 
 (24.72)*** (3.43)*** (17.30)*** (23.41)*** 
=
!">6 -0.012 -0.096 -0.062 0.109 
 (6.25)*** (6.56)*** (0.19) (10.22)*** 
∆K<=8!" 0.001 -0.049 0.613 0.028 
 (1.14) (2.72)*** (4.29)*** (5.50)*** 
∆ !" 0.000 -0.022 0.311 -0.005 
 (0.76) (1.00) (1.14) (0.42) 
C87_DL	
!" 0.006 -0.056 1.502 0.002 
 (3.20)*** (3.83)*** (6.13)*** (0.14) 
BB!">6 -0.016 -0.260 2.597 0.188 
 (6.29)*** (8.57)*** (5.73)*** (8.02)*** 
BM8!" 0.000 1.280 -14.383 -0.768 
 (0.04) (39.27)*** (31.26)*** (33.90)*** 
 8!">6 0.000 -0.036 0.610 0.034 
 (0.77) (13.10)*** (5.26)*** (15.78)*** 
=	!" -0.000 0.157 -1.488 -0.066 
 (0.19) (16.60)*** (5.86)*** (7.63)*** 
∆C<I" 0.000 -0.043 1.371 0.044 
 (0.02) (0.80) (1.82)* (2.00)** 
M
!" -0.001 0.031 -0.302 -0.014 
 (2.32)** (5.88)*** (3.36)*** (9.22)*** 
v!" 0.002 0.028 0.163 -0.033 
 (4.53)*** (6.26)*** (2.69)*** (10.25)*** 

	% Included Included Included Included 
9%
	% Included Included Included Included 
@ 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.23 
 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test statistics are 
calculated using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with lag (7). The mean VIF for all regressions are again considerably below 5. 
                                                          
156 The remaining 12 percent of the G4 GRI CSR reporting firms can have lower budgets for CSR investments and/or instead decide 
to use more EM to report higher reported earnings. These firms seem to miss the point of the higher risk of accounting controver-
sies. 
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In column two, the coefficient for the interaction term BD_DL	
!" ∗ <!" attracts at-
tention. It is negative and significant at the 0.10 level157, indicating a probable trade-off 
between AEM and REM for the G4 GRI CSR reporting firms. Compared to non-REP 
firms, they seem to engage in more REM with increasing CSR engagement and decreas-
ing AEM, as noted above. Column 4 covers the trade-off proxy between REM and AEM 
and underpins this finding, which also fits the considerations in the prior literature con-
cerning the trade-off between the two types of EM (e.g., Graham et al. 2005; Cohen et al. 
2008; Badertscher 2011; Kim et al. 2012; Zang 2012). Here, the coefficients on <!" 
and BD_DL	
!" ∗ <!" show highly significant proof of a substitution of AEM through 
REM when the CSR score rises compared to the remaining firms, which tend to trade off 
vice versa. This is already the case for firms with G4 GRI CSR reports and a net CSR 
score higher than 0.56.158 Consequently, high-reputation firms may be more willing to 
exchange future shareholder value for an improved image in the present. Lower AEM 
will decrease their risk of accounting investigations and, therefore, reputational damage. 
Higher REM will ensure that the company still provides sufficient earnings numbers, and 
business activities will need to be altered based on the risk of future performance. This 
could be viewed as a hint that reputation is instead a mix of earnings numbers and CSR 
perception and that the myopia hypothesis may not hold when firms use CSR to build 
their reputation rather than out of intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic firms seem to weigh fu-
ture shareholder value much higher (e.g., Bozzolan et al. 2015) and therefore substitute 
from REM to AEM at a higher risk of accounting controversies. They may have no pro-
nounced incentive to hide their EM activities to cultivate their image.159 It is important to 
view the latter outcome in line with column 3, as addressed above. Intrinsic firms use a 
lower amount of EM overall, whereas high-reputation firms with a CSR score of below 
0.85, i.e., 48 percent of all high-reputation firms, use a significantly higher total EM com-
pared to the remaining firms. 
                                                          
157 We explain this very weak coherence with the issue that negative values of REM stand for income-decreasing EM, while it is 
uncertain whether the discussed situations can actually be used into the opposite direction. In chapter 4.5, we alternatively use only 
positive values of REM and find much more robust results. 
158 There are no firms with CSR scores below 0.56 that are located in the high-reputation firms group (high-CSR firms with G4 GRI 
CSR report). 
159 On a final note, the existence of a trade-off relationship is confirmed by the two significant positive coefficients for K!" 
(BB__!") in column one (two). 
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Further, companies with a higher market to book ratio and, in particular, a higher market 
value of equity seem to exhibit more AEM than REM, most likely to maintain long-term 
profitability and to maximize shareholder value (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002; Roychowdhury 
2006). Similarly, equity incentives to achieve stock-based compensation may arise late 
in the year, in which changes in business activities consume too much time (Cheng & 
Warfield 2005). Companies with higher leverage seem to use considerably lower AEM 
and higher REM, which can be due to comprehensive assessment by lenders, which 
makes it more difficult for the respective firms to engage in AEM (e.g., Becker et al. 
1998; Ali & Zhang 2015). Concerning the introduced variable of  8!">6, the results 
show that firms with a higher ATO exhibit higher REM due to the higher scalability of 
business processes. The coefficient is highly significant (at the 0.01 level). Moreover, 
there seems to be another trade-off that decreases AEM and increases REM, which con-
firms the hypothesis of easier ways to perform REM when ATO is higher. 
In summary, our analyses indicate that different CSR incentives exist and can lead to 
significant differences in EM decisions. Our findings for intrinsic firms are consistent 
with those of KPW, Hong and Andersen (2011) and BFMM, whereas for high-reputation 
firms, we find considerable deviations from the myopia hypothesis, supporting  and 
i. 
4.4.2.2 The influence of corporate governance on EM and the moderating role 
of CSR 
Table 44 reports the results concerning multiple regressions of CSR and board independ-
ence (;9!") on the EM proxies. The results on the influence of CSR on EM for the two 
separate incentives remain qualitatively almost equal. The coefficients for the net CSR 
score on K!" (BB__!", K_==!" and KK!") are positive (negative) and 
significant. Together with the coefficients on <!" and BD_DL	
!" ∗ <!" they con-
firm our considerations from Table 43. 
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Table 44 – Multiple regressions of EM on CSR and BI 
 m-ww_nopxy xy _-PPxy p-xy 
BD_DL	
!" -0.003 0.219 -2.605 -0.113 
 (1.77)* (12.94)*** (11.03)*** (17.92)*** 
<!" 0.023 0.037 2.415 -0.032 
 (6.94)*** (0.77) (10.90)*** (1.97)** 
BD_DL	
 ∗ <!" -0.031 -0.076 -2.963 0.061 
 (9.23)*** (1.46) (10.16)*** (2.93)*** 
;9!" -0.006 -0.113 0.334 0.179 
 (1.79)* (5.13)*** (2.24)** (9.47)*** 
;9@!" 0.018 0.159  -0.290 
 (3.95)*** (4.37)***  (10.94)*** 
;9 ∗ BD!" -0.005 -0.004 0.037 -0.001 
 (3.34)*** (0.39) (0.22) (0.05) 
;9 ∗ BD ∗ <!" 0.002 -0.038 0.538 0.035 
 (0.94) (3.52)*** (2.44)** (3.11)*** 
K!" 0.003    
 (2.60)**    
BB__!"  0.261   
  (2.82)***   
D!">6 0.001 0.014 -0.084 -0.009 
 (3.29)*** (5.89)*** (2.31)** (4.64)*** 
K;!">6 0.000 0.013 -0.100 -0.009 
 (0.55) (5.45)*** (2.04)** (7.34)*** 
=8DD!" 0.020 0.020 1.457 -0.071 
 (24.32)*** (3.22)*** (18.16)*** (21.22)*** 
=
!">6 -0.012 -0.100 -0.006 0.113 
 (6.32)*** (6.95)*** (0.02) (11.18)*** 
∆K<=8!" 0.002 -0.050 0.635 0.027 
 (1.35) (2.81)*** (4.59)*** (5.34)*** 
∆ !" 0.000 -0.022 0.306 -0.005 
 (0.77) (1.02) (1.14) (0.48) 
C87_DL	
!" 0.004 -0.025 1.133 -0.014 
 (1.62) (2.25)** (5.22)*** (0.87) 
BB!">6 -0.016 -0.256 2.580 0.183 
 (6.27)*** (8.37)*** (5.71)*** (7.79)*** 
BM8!" -0.000 1.280 -14.368 -0.769 
 (0.04) (41.58)*** (32.60)*** (35.38)*** 
 8!">6 0.000 -0.036 0.618 0.034 
 (1.02) (11.78)*** (5.33)*** (16.40)*** 
=	!" -0.000 0.159 -1.487 -0.070 
 (0.08) (17.01)*** (5.80)*** (7.27)*** 
∆C<I" -0.002 -0.047 1.317 0.057 
 (0.90) (1.01) (1.81)* (4.13)*** 
M
!" -0.001 0.032 -0.298 -0.016 
 (1.93)* (6.17)*** (3.40)*** (11.26)*** 
v!" 0.002 0.028 0.146 -0.033 
 (4.45)*** (6.66)*** (2.54)** (10.41)*** 

	% Included Included Included Included 
9%
	% Included Included Included Included 
@ 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.24 
 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test statistics are calculated 
with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with lag (7). The mean VIF for all regressions are again below 5. ;9!" is the respective percentage of strictly 
independent members on the board, and ;9@!" is the respective squared term. See Appendix D for detailed variable descriptions. BD!" is an 
indicator that captures high-CSR firm as firms with a CSR performance score above the median of the full sample. 
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The linear coefficient for board independence on BB__!" is negative and significant, 
which is consistent with prior research using a solely linear formulation (e.g., Beasley 
1996; Dechow et al. 1996; Klein 2002; Davidson et al. 2005; Peasnell et al. 2005). How-
ever, we find the proposed squared relationship with a turning point, from whence the 
effects of higher independence on EM reverse. We estimate the 95 percent confidence 
interval for the turning points of all of our curves using the Fieller method (e.g., Fieller 
1954; Haans et al. 2016) to construct the interval. We find that all turning points are lo-
cated well within these intervals and data range, which is why the non-linearities are in 
fact (inverted) U-shaped relationships.160 Consequently, the course of the curve is U-
shaped for AEM, e.g., the positive monitoring effect is gradually offset by the negative 
coordination/expertise effects.161 The linear interaction effect ;9!" ∗ BD!" is highly sig-
nificant (at the 0.01 level) and negative (coefficient of -0.005), indicating that high-CSR 
firms use significantly lower AEM than low-CSR firms as ;9!" increases. This leads to 
different slopes of the U-shaped curves. Higher board independence decreases the use of 
AEM for (low-) high-CSR firms until the degree of (16.02) 29.37 percent independent 
members. At which point, the overall effect for (low-) high-CSR firms increases again 
and even becomes positive at the degree of (32.04) 58.74 percent board independence. 
The monitoring effect seems to be higher for high-CSR firms, which is why it takes longer 
for coordination/expertise problems to set them off. This could be due to the increased 
responsiveness of the CSR incentives to a limitation of AEM since both reputation and 
intrinsic incentives tend to decrease the usage of AEM in the first place due to the risk of 
accounting controversies and intrinsic motivation. Hereafter, unsurprisingly, there is no 
additional significant interaction effect for high-reputation firms. Regardless, the results 
show that excessive independence can also lead to the opposite effect on EM. 
Figure 7 shows the course of the curve for the combined ;9!" effects on AEM separately 
for the total sample and both the low- and high-CSR firms and confirms our finding that 
the effect of board independence on AEM is more pronounced for high-CSR firms. 
                                                          
160 The tests of simple curve regressions and the course of the curve for the coherence of our EM and CG proxies confirm this find-
ing. We additionally test for flattening/steepening of the curve through the moderator. Since our moderators are indicators, situa-
tions of flattening and steepening are less likely. Tests including the incorporation of squared moderation terms support this position 
(e.g., Haans et al., 2016). 
161 In this sense, a positive effect means decreasing the use of AEM, whereas a negative effect means increasing the use of AEM. 
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Figure 7 – The non-linear influence of BI on AEM 
 
Figure illustrates the combined effect of the linear and squared coefficients for board independence on m-ww_nop. The respective lines 
show the course for the total sample (2,733 obs.), high-CSR firms (1,574 obs.) and low-CSR firms (1,159 obs.) separately. 
Interestingly, the coefficient for ;9!" in column three indicates that the total EM engage-
ment increases (coefficient 0.055 at the 0.05 level).162 In addition, we have a significant 
and even higher coefficient for the interaction effect of ;9!" and the high-reputation firms 
group, signifying that these firms apply significantly more total EM than all other firms. 
The coefficients on REM in column two can explain this finding. First, we find a negative 
linear and a positive squared coefficient (both significant at the 0.01 level), suggesting 
another U-shaped relationship. Bearing in mind that REM is negatively scaled, a higher 
;9!" increases the amount of REM used. This result is interesting since we can interpret 
it as a probable shortcoming of board independence as a monitoring device in limiting 
REM. Moreover, high-reputation firms seem to use even more REM as the independence 
of the board increases, coinciding with our assumptions concerning how executives 
would act to maintain decent earnings numbers that cultivate their reputation strategy. 
Figure 8 shows the course of the curve for the combined ;9!" effect on REM, this time 
                                                          
162 For board independence on total EM coherence, our analyses show that sole linear formulation fits best. This is the only regres-
sion in which squared formulation cannot help improve the fit of the coherence. 
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separately for the reputation and low-CSR firms as well as the total sample. Further cal-
culations show that, for high-reputation firms, the turning point is located at a ;9!" of 
47.67 percent, with a zero at 95.34 percent, indicating that the effect increases the use of 
REM for most of the curve. 
Figure 8 – The non-linear influence of BI on REM 
 
Figure illustrates the combined effect of the linear and squared coefficients for board independence on xy. The respective lines show 
the course for the total sample (2,733 obs.), high-reputation firms (1,033 obs.) and low-CSR firms (1,159 obs.) separately. 
Column four shows the results for the EM trade-off proxy. Now, we find an inverted U-
shaped relationship, which is consistent with our previous results. Firms seem to substi-
tute AEM through REM as monitoring increases until a certain degree of independence 
in which the monitoring effect is offset and hence possibilities for AEM increase again. 
The interaction effect for high-reputation firms is significant and shows that these firms 
may be more inclined to trade off from AEM to REM, which is in line with the other 
results and the elaborated incentives. For high-reputation firms, we comprehend a turning 
point at 36.90 percent, with a zero at 73.80 percent. At which point, they trade off back 
from REM to AEM, most likely due to high coordination and expertise problems. The 
executive part of the board may evaluate the risk of accounting controversies to be con-
siderably lower in these cases. Figure 9 illustrates the course of the curve for reputation, 
low-CSR firms and the total sample firms, and it supports these considerations. 
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Figure 9 – The non-linear influence of BI on REMvsAEM 
 
Figure illustrates the combined effect of the linear and squared coefficients for board independence on p-xy. The respective 
lines show the course for the total sample (2,733 obs.), high-reputation firms (1,033 obs.) and low-CSR firms (1,159 obs.) separately. 
In summary, intrinsic CSR firms seem to further reduce their AEM actions as monitoring 
increases, and in particular, they refrain from using more REM instead of AEM, which 
can help them reach higher earnings without high risks of being detected, but may damage 
shareholder value. On the other hand, reputation enhancement firms seem to increase 
REM as AEM possibilities shrink, and therefore, both achieve their earnings goals and 
decrease the risk of investigations concerning their financial reports. This strategy comes 
at the possible expense of share- and stakeholders and affects future profitability. These 
findings indicate that CSR and, in particular, CSR incentives can moderate the effective-
ness of the monitoring devices applied by shareholders. The respective CSR incentive 
influences the degree to which and whether firms trade off one type of EM for another 
that most likely has worse future effects for the user of the information than the type that 
was used in the first place. These results can be viewed as confirmation of , i and 
. 
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4.5 Additional analyses 
4.5.1 Analysis of high-incentive situations 
We follow the related literature and test whether our general results hold in situations that 
are thought to trigger higher incentives to pursue EM than the financial reporting deci-
sions of normal years (e.g., Burgstahler & Dichev 1997; Graham et al. 2005; 
Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008). We test the zero earnings benchmark, which 
comprises disproportionate reactions from various stakeholders when the benchmark is 
not met. Similarly, future unfavourable negotiation power and equity valuation may cause 
the incentive to meet or beat the zero earnings. Second, analysts’ forecasts can incite 
managers to take EM actions to provide the expected earnings numbers to capital market 
addressees (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Bozzolan et al. 2015). Since 
these incentives can have higher importance than both reputational and intrinsic incen-
tives, we check whether our results are distorted when we omit them. KPW and Chih et 
al. (2008) analyse the incentive situations on a univariate level and find a significantly 
lower use of EM for high-CSR firms. BFMM split their sample and re-estimate their re-
gressions for all firms with above earnings forecast earnings.163 We re-estimate Equation	
26 and Equation	27, adding DJD<B !", which is an indicator variable that captures the 
suspected earnings group or analyst forecast error interval.164 Table 45 provides the mul-
tivariate results, showing results that are qualitatively consistent with and quantitatively 
comparable to the findings stated above in Table 43.165 This finding is not overall surpris-
ing since high-incentive situations should not bias the results of our questions about gen-
eral EM strategies in different CSR and CG settings if our models are well specified. 
However, the zero earnings threshold seems to cause above average incentives that lead 
to higher AEM. 
                                                          
163 However, firms with earnings that are considerably above the earnings forecasts may not have an incentive to manage their earn-
ings. We alternatively apply an indicator variable when estimating the total sample to cancel out the possible omitted variable bias 
caused by the exclusion of high-incentive situations. 
164 We classify the full sample earnings and analyst forecast error intervals over the range from -0.075 to +0.075. The interval range 
is always 0.005. The suspect intervals are [0;0.005] for both situations. For the analyst forecast error, the general convention of the 
interval range of one cent is modified for a multi-currency setting. We additionally perform univariate tests following KPW. We 
find no significant differences in the EM proxies between high-CSR and low-CSR firms, indicating that all companies in the respec-
tive suspect situation use comparable amounts of EM. 
165 We additionally analyse the last year’s earnings incentive and all three incentives for K_== and KK with and with-
out CG characteristics. Untabulated results show that there is no change in our already stated results. 
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Table 45 – Multiple regressions of EM on CSR with SUSPECT control 
 DJD<B !"  
Zero Earnings 
DJD<B !" 
Analyst Forecasts 
 m-ww_nopxy xy m-ww_nopxy xy 
BD_DL	
!" -0.004 0.225 -0.004 0.224 
 (3.89)*** (13.28)*** (3.82)*** (12.99)*** 
<!" 0.023 0.045 0.023 0.045 
 (6.27)*** (0.91) (6.35)*** (0.90) 
BD_DL	
 ∗ <!" -0.030 -0.093 -0.030 -0.092 
 (7.70)*** (1.80)* (7.75)*** (1.78)* 
DJD<B !" 0.003 0.011 0.000 0.043 
 (1.99)** (1.48) (0.06) (2.16)** 
K!" 0.003  0.003  
 (2.65)***  (2.64)***  
BB__!"  0.269  0.270 
  (2.89)***  (2.87)*** 
D!">6 0.001 0.014 0.001 0.014 
 (3.11)*** (5.95)*** (3.09)*** (5.86)*** 
K;!">6 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.013 
 (0.48) (5.18)*** (0.45) (5.30)*** 
=8DD!" 0.020 0.024 0.020 0.024 
 (23.99)*** (3.67)*** (24.56)*** (3.36)*** 
=
!">6 -0.012 -0.096 -0.012 -0.097 
 (6.19)*** (6.59)*** (6.19)*** (6.84)*** 
∆K<=8!" 0.001 -0.049 0.001 -0.049 
 (1.20) (2.67)*** (1.14) (2.75)*** 
∆ !" 0.000 -0.022 0.000 -0.022 
 (0.69) (1.00) (0.76) (1.01) 
C87_DL	
!" 0.006 -0.055 0.006 -0.056 
 (3.32)*** (3.78)*** (3.19)*** (3.84)*** 
BB!">6 -0.016 -0.258 -0.016 -0.264 
 (6.19)*** (8.64)*** (6.34)*** (8.66)*** 
BM8!" 0.001 1.282 0.000 1.281 
 (0.15) (40.00)*** (0.05) (39.28)*** 
 8!">6 0.000 -0.036 0.000 -0.036 
 (0.80) (12.80)*** (0.77)*** (12.65)*** 
=	!" -0.000 0.157 -0.000 0.157 
 (0.19) (16.64)*** (0.19)*** (16.69)*** 
∆C<I" -0.000 -0.044 0.000 -0.047 
 (0.03) (0.81) (0.02) (0.91) 
M
!" -0.001 0.031 -0.001 0.031 
 (2.36)** (5.85)*** (2.34)** (5.81)*** 
v!" 0.002 0.028 0.002 0.028 
 (4.44)*** (6.26)*** (4.53)*** (6.27)*** 

	% Included Included Included Included 
9%
	% Included Included Included Included 
@ 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.26 
 2,733 2,733 2,733 2,733 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. All test statistics 
are calculated using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with lag (7). The mean VIF for all regressions are again considerably below 
5. DJD<B !" is an indicator for the respective high-incentive situation, for the zero earnings threshold with the earnings inter-
val [0;0.005] and for the forecasted earnings threshold with the analyst forecast error interval [0;0.005]. See Appendix D for 
detailed variable descriptions. 
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4.5.2 Different discretionary accruals and real activities EM measures 
To further test the robustness of our results, we conduct all analyses with alternative dis-
cretionary accruals from the performance-matched modified Jones model (DeFond & 
Subramanyam 1998; Kothari et al. 2005) and the performance-matched adapted Jones 
model (Dechow et al. 2003). In addition, following Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang 
(2012), we apply two alternative combined proxies for REM to separate the ambiguous 
effects of abnormal operating cash flows. First, we comprehend K!" as the sum of 
abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal production costs, multiplied by negative 
one.166 Alternatively, we obtain K!" as the sum of abnormal operating cash flows and 
abnormal discretionary expenses and use only positive values of K!" due to the pre-
dominant income-increasing nature of the discussed situations. We proceed equivalently 
for a modified calculation of KK!" and K_==!". The results remain consistent 
with the tabulated results. Alternatively, we follow KPW and use separate proxies for 
positive and negative discretionary accruals (AEM) and separate proxies for all types of 
REM in our regressions. Further, we use standardized values of all EM proxies (e.g., 
Cohen et al. 2008). The results are similarly qualitatively equal, quantitatively even better 
in some cases, and therefore further support our findings.167 
4.5.3 Different CSR firm criteria and additional control variables 
Concerning the definition of CSR incentives, analysis of board characteristics and suspect 
intervals on EM, we alternatively define high-CSR firms as firms in the top third and low-
CSR firms as firms in the bottom third of the CSR distribution. This leads to a more 
conservative distinction between high- and low-CSR firms. The results remain qualita-
tively the same for all regressions. Since CSR incentives may exist only when CSR in-
vestments exceed a certain amount, we also alter the general formulation and use only 
indicators for firms with above median or top third CSR performance. Our results remain, 
although there is a loss in efficiency, because there is no longer any continuous variable 
for CSR. We incorporate additional control variables to cancel out an omitted variable 
bias. The integration of a dummy for financial statements audited by Big 4 companies 
                                                          
166 The negative scaling remains for the combined real activities EM proxies for reasons of consistency. 
167 For reasons of manageable size, the regression tables for these robustness checks remain untabulated. 
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does not alter our results, nor does an additional control for the board size and/or number 
of board meetings. Further, we use a performance control to rule out the possibility of 
biased coefficients due to a solely implicit performance control by the applied variables 
and models. The inclusion of return on assets and industry-mean adjusted return on assets 
as a separate regressor leaves the results qualitatively the same and quantitatively almost 
equal to the already tabulated findings. These observations confirm our specification and 
proposition of a sufficient performance control immediately from the outset.168 
4.6 Conclusion 
This study analyses the influence of CSR on EM and the effect that CG has on EM. In 
particular, the study tries to elucidate the diverse incentives for CSR investments. We 
therefore ask whether firms that invest in CSR engagement also convey doing so as a 
cooperative strategy in their EM motivations or whether they use it as a vehicle to boost 
their image and conformably decide about EM. Furthermore, we question whether these 
diverse incentives have a moderating role in whether independence in the board fosters 
monitoring and therefore reporting transparency and shareholder value. 
The outcomes show consistent proof for diverse relationships between CSR performance 
and EM, depending on the predominant incentive behind CSR investment. For the pre-
dominantly intrinsic segment of CSR firms, higher CSR entails a thorough approach with 
lower types of EM and even a shift from REM to AEM to prevent shareholder value from 
being damaged. For the predominantly reputational segment of CSR firms, the primary 
goal is an improvement of their image, which is why they decide to use lower AEM to 
ensure that they preclude investigations and reputational damage, while they use even 
more REM and thereby damage future shareholder value. We further find that higher 
percentages of independent board members upgrade monitoring processes to a certain 
degree, improving the degree of transparent reporting in terms of lower AEM. However, 
firms that predominantly seek to improve their reputation take the easy route and use even 
                                                          
168 The results for all these alterations again remain untabulated. 
D a n i e l  N o r b e r t  S c h a u p p  Earnings Management in the Context of Earnings Quality,  
Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility 
P a g e  169 | 220 
more REM, which the board can hardly detect or even prevent, and thereby jeopardize 
shareholder value. 
Our findings hold after controlling for various control variables in the multivariate anal-
yses, the integration of a special situations control and an additional control for board 
specifics, performance and auditing. They are robust to various types of discretionary 
accruals and real activities measures, the separate use of proxies as well as EM proxy 
standardization. Further, they are robust to an alternative separation of the sample into 
firms of high and low CSR performance and sole use of indicators in formulation of the 
CSR incentives. Overall, the results are consistent with  and i. The findings on board 
independence confirm . 
Naturally, the study has some limitations. In particular, there may be more than the al-
ready controlled high-incentive situations, which could influence the results. Addition-
ally, possible influencing effects from the levels of enforcement in the different countries 
are captured only by the industry and year instruments and other control variables and 
were not specified separately.169 This could lead to changes in the conclusions. The gen-
eral distinction between one-tier and two-tier systems concerning board structure can 
slightly affect the comparability of results between the distinct systems due to diverse 
monitoring mechanisms and opportunities to influence financial reporting.170 The general 
criticism of EM modelling using residuals of first-stage regressions, particularly for dis-
cretionary accruals, also holds for this study. However, we try to minimize the frequently 
discussed measurement errors by choosing the most sophisticated existent models, esti-
mating them cross-sectionally and controlling for performance. Similarly, differentiation 
of the two incentive groups using the CSR reporting behaviour may not lead to a perfect 
distinction, and therefore, the results may lack efficiency. Nevertheless, the results of our 
study seem to prove that voluntary CSR disclosure can be a proper vehicle for differenti-
ation. Subsequent studies can focus on disentangling the mediating role of CSR incentives 
concerning other board characteristics, the auditing process or regulation. We may there-
fore gain further insights into what features drive EM as well as the trade-off relationship 
                                                          
169 On the other hand, we try to minimize the possibility of omitted variable bias to a very high degree by including the various con-
trols. 
170 However, we regard these differences as no significant influence on the results of the study (e.g., Jungmann 2007). In particular, 
the distinction may not overall ground the possibilities to pursue independence in collocation. 
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and how CSR incentives correspond. This could be of interest for the addressees of dis-
closures, lead to a better understanding of which instruments support transparency and 
enable stakeholders to make useful decisions. Additionally, it may be interesting to eval-
uate future performance following high CSR performance for both CSR incentives, par-
ticularly in regard to whether high-reputation firms succeed in achieving competitive ad-
vantages and higher future economic performance. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A – Variable definitions chapter 2 
Variable Definition 
Variables applied in basic models B1-B7 
==< Total loan loss provisions; 
< Non-performing loans/assets; 
∆< Change in non-performing assets; 
=G Loan loss allowances/reserves; 
 = Total loans; 
∆ = Change in total loans; 
 =_B C89D Total loan categories, calculated as fraction of loans associated 
to the respective loan category for each of the categories ana-
lysed; 
B8 Net charge-offs, calculated as loan losses minus recoveries; 
  Total assets. 
Additional variables applied in static and dynamic models S1-S4 and D1-D4 
D9H Bank size, calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets; 
; < Earnings before tax and provisions, scaled by lagged total assets; 
B<; Capital adequacy ratio, calculated as tier 1 capital, scaled by 
lagged total assets. 
Control variables 
∆C< Change in GDP for country j the respective bank i is located, 
from year t-1 to year t; 
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∆JK< Change in unemployment rate for country j the respective bank i 
is located, from year t-1 to year t; 
∆=<
L Change in land prices, e.g., calculated as change in a land price 
index; 
BD  Return on the Case-Shiller Real estate Index; 
∆;M9 Change in a business failure index; 
∆D Change in implied standard deviation of bank asset values. 
Proxies for earnings management 
==<	(==<__) Discretionary loan loss provisions, comprehended as the signed 
(absolute) value of the residual from first-stage regressions. 
Proxy for extreme performance 
BM8 Cash-flow from operations. 
Variables for OMV-test 
C8G b Change in sales, scaled by lagged total assets; 
=8DD Dummy variable, which equals 1 if net income before extraordi-
nary items is negative, 0 otherwise; 
=89  Loan intensity, calculated as total loans scaled by total assets; 
9B97 Income diversification, calculated as non-interest income scaled 
by interest income. 
Proxy for earnings management detection 
D Average residual, calculated as mean value of DLLP for each 
bank; 
B'c Comment/restatement of K-10/Q-10 indicator. Dummy variable, 
which equals 1 if the respective bank received a SEC comment 
letter on their annual (K-10) or quarterly (Q-10) financial report 
with respect to the treatment of loan loss provisioning and related 
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issues; or the respective bank restated its K-10 or Q-10 report 
because of insufficiencies regarding the treatment of loan provi-
sioning and related issues. 
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Appendix C – Variable definitions chapter 3 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
BB__ Absolute value of discretionary accruals, calculated as residuals from 
the cross-sectional McNichols model; 
BB Signed value of discretionary accruals, calculated as residuals from 
the cross-sectional McNichols model. <BB contains only positive, 
BB only negative values; 
K Signed value of the sum of real activities based EM measures, calcu-
lated as negatively scaled proxy; 
K_== Total EM proxy, calculated as sum of deciles of both BB__ and 
K; 
KK EM trade-off proxy, calculated as ratio of K decile and K_==; 
c1BB__ Extreme AEM indicator, calculated as 1 if BB__ is in the top 
quintile of the distribution, 0 otherwise; 
c1K Extreme REM indicator, calculated as 1 if inverted K is in the top 
quintile of the distribution, 0 otherwise. 
B9 Client importance, either proxied by B9D or B9D; 
B9D Client Importance Sales, calculated as share of total fees for audit and non-
audit services of the total sales of the audit firm in financial year. Total sales 
of the audit firm have to disclosed in the transparency reports for each fi-
nancial year according to Art. 55c para. 1 sent. 3 no. 3 WPO. Total fees for 
audit and non-audit services consists of four different numbers, fees from 
audit services (Art. 314 para. 1 no. 9 HGB), fees from other assurance ser-
vices (Art. 314 para. 1 no. 9 HGB), fees from tax services (Art. 314 para. 1 
no. 9 HGB) and fees from other services (Art. 314 para. 1 no. 9 HGB); 
B9D Client Importance Non-Audit Sales, calculated as share of total non-audit 
fees of the total fees for audit and non-audit services in financial year. Total 
non-audit fees consist fees from other assurance services (Art. 314 para. 1 
no. 9 HGB), fees from tax services (Art. 314 para. 1 no. 9 HGB) and fees 
from other services (Art. 314 para. 1 no. 9 HGB). Total fees for audit and 
non-audit services consists of all four different numbers, fees from audit 
services (Art. 314 para. 1 no. 9 HGB), fees from other assurance services 
(Art. 314 para. 1 no. 9 HGB), fees from tax services (Art. 314 para. 1 no. 9 
HGB) and fees from other services (Art. 314 para. 1 no. 9 HGB); 
< Dependent Firm; indicator, which is 1 when firm’s respective client im-
portance proxy lies above the discussed thresholds (5%, 10%, 15% for B9D, 
40%, 50% for B9D), 0 otherwise. See detailed information on whether 
the dependence is studied for a one, two or three consecutive years time-
period; 
		 Importance of the audit service line sales for the total sales of the au-
ditor, calculated as the sum of the audit fees of the auditor in the fi-
nancial year divided by the total sales of the auditor; 
		; Importance of total fees from all PIEs for the total sales of the auditor, 
calculated as the sum of all fees from PIE clients of the auditor in the 
financial year divided by the total sales of the auditor; 
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D9= Low audit service line importance indicator, calculated as 1 when 
		 is below median 		, 0 otherwise; 
 M9<= Low total fees from PIEs importance indicator, calculated as 1 when 
		; is below median 		;, 0 otherwise; 
%_K EU SME definition from May 2003: midget audit firm ≤  2 m. EUR 
Sales; 
	%_D EU SME definition from May 2003: small audit firm 2 mi. EUR < 
sales ≤ 10 m. EUR; 
%_K% EU SME definition from May 2003: medium audit firm 10 m. EUR 
< sales ≤ 50 m. EUR; 
%_=
 EU SME definition from May 2003: large audit firm sales > 50 m. 
EUR; 
%D Auditor Size; categorical variable, 1 = %_K; 2 = %_D; 3 
= %_K%; 4 = %_=
; 
B Best practice audit committee indicator, calculated as 1 if firm coin-
cides with DCGK paragraph 5.3.2, e.g., existence of an audit com-
mittee with a chair that meets the following requirements: (1) inde-
pendent member of the board, (2) accounting expert, (3) no executive 
member for at least three years, (4) not the chair of the supervisory 
board. 
BB Total accruals, calculated as earnings before extraordinary items mi-
nus cash flow from operations; 
7 Revenues; 
∆7 Change in revenues; 
∆ Change in accounts receivable; 
<< Net property, plant and equipment; 
∆C< Change in gross domestic product; 
8 Return on assets, given as net income before extraordinary items 
scaled by lagged total assets; 
∆97 Change in inventories; 
B8CD Costs of goods sold; 
<8 Production costs, calculated as sum of B8CD sold and ∆97; 
9D< Discretionary expenses, calculated as sum of R&D and selling, gen-
eral and administrative expenses (Advertising expenses also in-
cluded); 
 	_′c Tobin’s Q, calculated as sum of MVE, long-term debt and current 
debt, divided by total assets; 
9  Internal funds, calculated as sum of net income before extraordinary 
items, research and development expenses and depreciation and 
amortization. 
D Natural logarithm of the market value of equity (MVE); 
K; Market-to-book ratio, calculated as MVE/BVE, where BVE is the 
book value of equity;  
=8DD Indicator, which is 1 when firm’s net income before extraordinary 
items is negative, and 0 otherwise; 
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=	 Indicator for litigation risk of firms in regulated markets, which is 1 
when firm is located in a market with SIC Code 2833-2836, 3570-
3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961 or 7370-7474, and 0 otherwise; 
BM8 Net cash flow from operations; 
=
 Leverage of the firm, given as total debt scaled by total assets; 
∆  Change in total assets, scaled by lagged total assets; 
∆ Change in earnings, scaled by lagged total assets; 
M
 Firm age, calculated as natural logarithm of (1 + the number of years 
since the firm appears in Thomson Reuters data base); 
<
Bℎ Partner Change; indicator, which is 1 when there is a change in audit man-
date partners, meaning either engagement or revenue partner or both, and 0 
otherwise; 
%Bℎ Indicator, which is 1 when there is a change in the audit firm, and 0 other-
wise; 
%8B Clean audit opinion indicator, calculated as 1 if the auditor issues a 
clean audit opinion, 0 otherwise; 
;	
D Board size, calculated as number of independent and executive members on 
the board; 
;	
9 Board Independence, calculated as percentage of independent, meaning 
non-executive board members on the board; 
7	BC' Numbers of violations on the German Corporate Governance Codex 
(Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex); Art. 161 of the German Stock 
Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) obliges every capital market oriented Ger-
man corporation to declare compliance with codex, while the variable cap-
tures statement on probable violations; 
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Appendix D – Variable definitions chapter 4 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
BB__ Absolute value of discretionary accruals, calculated as residuals from 
the cross-sectional McNichols model; 
BB Signed value of discretionary accruals, calculated as residuals from 
the cross-sectional McNichols model. <BB contains only positive, 
BB only negative values; 
K__ Absolute value of the sum of real activities based EM measures, cal-
culated as negatively scaled proxy:  
BM8__!" − <8__!" + 9D<__!"; 
K Signed value of the sum of real activities based EM measures, calcu-
lated as negatively scaled proxy. 
K_== Total EM proxy, calculated as sum of deciles of both BB__ and 
K. 
KK EM trade-off proxy, calculated as ratio of K decile and K_==. 
BD_DL	
 Net performance score for the Corporate Social Responsibility pillar 
from the ASSET4 ESG data base, calculated as average score of the 
KPI categories assuming equal weights and divided by 100, see Ap-
pendix B; 
BD Indicator, which is 1 when firm’s CSR performance score in the year 
lies above the median of the CSR performances scores of the full sam-
ple, and zero otherwise; 
< Indicator, which is 1 when a firm provides a CSR report, which has 
been prepared following G4 GRI guidelines for sustainability report-
ing, and zero otherwise. 
;9 Board Independence, calculated as percentage of independent board 
members, e.g. members that have not served for more than ten years, 
do have holdings of less than 5 percent, do not have cross-board mem-
bership, do not have family ties to the firm and do not accept any 
compensation other than the compensation for the board service; 
BB Total accruals, calculated as earnings before extraordinary items mi-
nus cash flow from operations, scaled by lagged total assets; 
DB= Scaled intercept, calculated as one divided by lagged total assets; 
BM8 Net cash flow from operations, scaled by lagged total assets; 
7 Revenues, scaled by lagged total assets; 
∆7 Change in revenues, scaled by lagged total assets; 
∆ Change in accounts receivable, scaled by lagged total assets; 
<< Net property, plant and equipment, scaled by lagged total assets; 
∆C< Change in gross domestic product, scaled by lagged gross domestic 
product; 
8 Return on assets, given as net income before extraordinary items 
scaled by lagged total assets; 
∆97 Change in inventories, scaled by lagged total assets; 
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B8CD Costs of goods sold, scaled by lagged total assets; 
<8 Production costs, calculated as sum of costs of goods sold and change 
in inventories, scaled by lagged total assets; 
9D< Discretionary expenses, calculated as sum of R&D and selling, gen-
eral and administrative expenses (Advertising expenses also in-
cluded), scaled by lagged total assets; 
D Natural logarithm of the market value of equity (MVE); 
K; Market-to-book ratio, calculated as MVE/BVE, where BVE is the 
book value of equity;  
=	 Indicator, which is 1 when firm’s net income before extraordinary 
items is negative, and 0 otherwise; 
=
 Leverage of the firm, given as total debt scaled by total assets; 
∆K<=8 Change in number of employees, scaled by lagged total assets; 
∆  Change in total assets, scaled by lagged total assets; 
C87_DL	
 Net performance score for the Corporate Governance pillar from the 
ASSET4 ESG data base, calculated as average score of the KPI cate-
gories assuming equal weights and divided by 100. When studying 
B9, we leave out the first KPI category (Board Functions) when cal-
culating the net performance score. When studying ;9, we leave out 
the second KPI category (Board Structure) when calculating the net 
performance score. See Appendix B; 
 8 Asset turnover ratio, calculated as level of revenues divided by net 
operating assets; 
=	 Indicator for litigation risk of firms in regulated markets, which is 1 
when firm is located in a market with SIC Code 2833-2836, 3570-
3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961 or 7370-7474, and 0 otherwise; 
M
 Firm age, calculated as natural logarithm of (1 + the number of years 
since the firm appears in Thomson Reuters data base); and 
v Market risk, given as beta factor of the firm, calculated as relationship 
of the volatility of the stock of the firm and the volatility of the mar-
ket, based on between 23 and 35 consecutive month end price changes 
in percent relative to a local market index. 
DJD<B  Indicator for Suspect firms. For the zero earnings threshold, suspect 
firms are firms within the earnings interval [0;0.005), where intervals 
are drawn upon net income before extraordinary items scaled by 
lagged total assets. For the forecasted earnings threshold, suspect 
firms are firms with an analyst forecast error in the error interval 
[0;0.005), where intervals are drawn upon error in reported earnings 
per share compared to mean forecasted earnings per share scaled by 
mean forecasted earnings per share. 
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Appendix E – CSR & CG performance score calculation chapter 4 
Within the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG data, the BD_DL	
!" uses the category performance 
scores of the two pillars Environmental and Social performance: 
CSR performance Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG 
Pillar Environmental Social 
KPI  
Categories 
Emission Reduction Customer / Product Responsibility 
Product Innovation Society / Community 
Resource Reduction Society / Human Rights 
 Workforce / Diversity and Opportunity 
 Workforce / Employment Quality 
 Workforce / Health & Safety 
 Workforce / Training and Development 
 
The CG score C87_DL	
!" is calculated using the following KPI categories: 
CG Performance Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG 
Pillar Corporate Governance 
KPI  
Categories 
Board of Directors/ Board Functions 
Board of Directors/ Board Structure 
Board of Directors/ Compensation Policy 
Integration/ Vision and Strategy 
Shareholders / Shareholder Rights 
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